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Abstract
Artificial Intelligent autonomous systems are becoming increasingly ubiquitous in
daily life. Mobile devices for example provide mechanical-generated intelligent support to humans, with various degrees of autonomy, and are a key part of the recent
autonomous revolution. Autonomous intelligent systems aim to understand and interact with their users in a timely manner, while many of them are characterized by
constrained resources. Despite that, the average person does not act in a formulaic
and risk-neutral manner but instead exhibits risk-aware attitudes when performing
a task that includes sources of uncertainties. When humans make decisions, they
explore their surroundings, understand the emerging risks, perform actions, and
evaluate their perceived outcomes. What a person characterizes as a satisfactory
outcome is subjective to her own reasoning, behavior, and risk capacity. Therefore, an autonomous intelligent system should be enriched with human awareness,
thus it should account for and sometimes mimic its owner’s cognitive behavior and
behavioral patterns, such that the latter’s subjective satisfaction is optimized, and
personalized service is provided.

v

Furthermore, the proliferation of autonomous systems, e.g., mobile or wearable
devices, boosts the data volume and service demand. Each autonomous system aims
to optimize its owner’s experience in a self-centric manner, and in several application
domains, its actions impact the others’ experience and decision-making process generally. To this end, the users’ subjective goals generate conflicts, and the autonomous
intelligent systems are expected to make decisions in non-cooperative environments.
In this thesis, we investigate and introduce distributed autonomous decision-making
frameworks by focusing on motivating application domains with the aforementioned
challenges. We utilize Game Theory for studying the strategic interaction of the
autonomous intelligent systems in non-cooperative environments and tackling the
necessity of non-centralized and scalable solutions. We build autonomous intelligent
decision-making agents through Reinforcement Learning, which is a popular statistical Artificial Intelligence (AI) technique for controlling unknown environments with
partial, and incomplete information. Reinforcement Learning (RL) introduces the
concept of an agent that learns to interact with an unknown environment by performing actions that are mainly driven by particular observations, and by evaluating the
resulted feedback. We extend the regular RL setting through reward reshaping for
considering the user’s risk-aware characteristics that are exhibited in real life. We incorporate Prospect Theory, which belongs to the behavioral economic subgroup, and
describes how individuals make decisions between probabilistic alternatives, where
risk is involved, and the probability of different outcomes is unknown. In the considered non-cooperative environments, we seek distributed solutions, thus Equilibrium
points, where each autonomous intelligent agent does not have the incentive to change
its own decision unilaterally.
Our investigation leads to autonomous intelligent decision-making frameworks
that could serve as a step towards Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), where the
computing systems learn to perform a task in a human-centric manner, thus in a
similar way that the task would be completed by a person in real life.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Motivation

The recent and rapid advances of Artificial Intelligence (AI) have brought us autonomous intelligent systems that have become more personalized and context-aware,
serving people beyond the role of instrumental tools towards intelligent assistants and
companions in our daily lives. Generally, people desire intelligent systems to perform
actions and act as decision-making agents on behalf of them. In addition, people expect them to learn to perform actions through their interactions with them, and
assist them to achieve their subjective goals at work [1, 2], at home [3, 4, 5], or even
on the road [6, 7, 8]. The necessity of such autonomous intelligent systems is increasing rapidly alongside people’s standards and demands of when an intelligent system
that they interact with, it performs actions and decisions in a way they like or prefer
based on their personality, behavioral patterns, and reasoning. Moreover, the needs
of using and building autonomous intelligent systems that act as decision-making
agents are more and more observable by the day in a variety of application domains.
In e-learning, for example, autonomous intelligent tutoring systems are needed
to make decisions and track students’ skill levels, needs, and weaknesses to provide
personalized support and increase learning gains [9, 10, 11]. Self-driving cars interact
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with pedestrians and the passengers, while aim on providing transport assistance
based on passengers needs and safety protocols [12, 13, 14]. The elderly population
has motivated the development of autonomous intelligent systems [15] that are able
to provide them company [16], assist with therapy [17], and keep them safe [18].
In addition, the use of wearable mobile devices that need to act as autonomous
intelligent decision-making agents has increased dramatically, primarily for fitness,
healthcare monitoring, and personalized medicare [19, 20, 21]. Global virus diseases
constitute indicative examples, as they have recently motivated the development and
incorporation of autonomous intelligent systems into personalized healthcare and
monitoring [22]. Moreover, recommendation systems are built upon autonomous
intelligent systems that track and learn user’s preferences, and habits, to provide
personalized content, ads, information, and generally optimize user’s engagement on
a platform, e.g., social network [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29].
Furthermore, alongside the developments in AI, network technologies and their
recent advances push forward the proliferation of mobile systems [30, 31, 32, 33],
e.g., smartphones, smart home, smart cities, and smart grid technologies [34, 35, 36,
37, 38, 39], or the Internet of Things (IoT) [40, 41, 42] in more generalized terms.
In particular, new generation networks [43, 44] have emerged novel applications such
as online interactive games, video stream analysis, augmented reality, virtual reality
[45, 46, 47, 48, 49], and a huge amount of sensory data that need to be processed and
analyzed promptly [50, 51, 52]. In these application domains, the mobile systems
aim to provide personalized services and assistance to their owners. The mobile systems interact with their users and act as autonomous intelligent systems that learn
to perform actions. However, these mobile systems introduce several key challenges,
as most of the time, they are equipped with constrained resources, e.g., energy availability, computing capability, which set practical limitations [53] to their general
capabilities as autonomous intelligent decision-making agents. In the majority of the
described applications domains, the mobile systems co-exist, while they are compet-
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ing for shared resources, e.g., network infrastructure. Therefore, these application
domains can be mainly characterized as non-cooperative games [54], where each mobile system seeks to optimize its owner’s objective, while at the same time its actions
in the shared environment impact the rest of mobile systems effort to optimize their
own users’ objectives. As a result, the non-cooperative nature of these application
domains, as long as the volume of data and mobile systems, highlight and motivate
the interest of the recent research literature [55, 56, 57, 58] for building autonomous
intelligent systems that sense their environment, learn to perform actions, and are
mainly orchestrated in a distributed manner by avoiding high complexity centralized
approaches with single points of failures. Game Theory [59] constitutes a powerful mathematical tool to study the interactions between the mobile systems under
the described non-cooperative nature of the application domains. However, Game
Theory is a branch of applied mathematics and mainly studied in economics, which
makes its applicability in various application domains challenging.
In the above application domains, despite the aforementioned challenges, the
resource-constrained computing systems should address the requirements of flexibility, adaptability, and intelligence. The latter stems from the fact that these environments are characterized by incomplete, dynamic, and uncertain information
constraints [60]. Artificial Intelligence (AI), and especially Machine Learning (ML)
[61] has established learning as a powerful approach for building personalized autonomous intelligent systems to cope with the above information constraints. In
particular, Reinforcement Learning (RL) [62], which is a sub-field of Machine Learning, can extend the capabilities of mobile systems, and make them autonomous intelligent decision-making agents. However, the extension of the regular RL setting into
distributed learning algorithms with low complexity and exchange of information to
deal with the large volume of data and mobile systems remains a key challenge in
the considered application domains [63].
Moreover, human awareness should be incorporated in the decision-making of
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autonomous intelligent systems. This is mainly motivated by the fact that people
in real life demonstrate risk-aware behavioral attitudes, thus they tend to exhibit
risk-seeking or loss-aversion behavior when making decisions in environments with
uncertainty. As a result, a real intelligent autonomous system should optimize the
user’s subjective objective by considering the user’s risk-aware characteristics, as
they constitute the user’s personality and risk capacity. Towards this direction, it has
been argued [64], that a simple version of expected utility theory does not properly
describe human behavior. Prospect Theory [65] was proposed as an alternative to
pure expected utility theory, and has emerged as a realistic model of how people
make decisions under uncertainty, by successfully modeling and considering many of
their standard biases [66].
To this end, the introduction and development of low complexity distributed
decision-making frameworks that cope with the aforementioned challenges is highly
required. In particular, these distributed decision-making frameworks should incorporate human awareness and cognition, and effectively address the requirements of
intelligence and autonomy, while at the same time the constrained resources of the
computing systems are properly considered. Furthermore, environments with shared
resources should be further investigated, as the inherited uncertainties, and competition among the computing systems should be studied, and successfully incorporated
in the decision-making process.

1.2

Dissertation Contributions

In this dissertation, we cover theoretical foundations, and we propose a novel theory
and scalable distributed decision-making frameworks towards transforming computing systems with constrained resources into autonomous intelligent decision-making
agents. We focus our study on non-cooperative environments and application domains that are mainly characterized by incomplete, dynamic, and uncertain infor-
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mation, and meet the described challenges. In particular, we bridge Game Theory
and Reinforcement Learning for introducing distributed low complexity learning algorithms, and we extend the regular RL setting by considering risk-aware characteristics, as these arise in humans’ decision-making process in real life. We establish
sufficient conditions for convex optimization, existence, and convergence to Equilibrium points in a distributed manner for the considered non-cooperative environments.
Our introduced approaches are evaluated through extensive empirical studies, and we
demonstrate their state-of-the-art performance in a variety of application domains.
The main contributions of this dissertation are summarized below.
1. We propose low complexity distributed decision-making frameworks for computing systems with constrained computing and energy resources. In environments, where the computing systems can retrieve all the required information
for supporting their decisions, we focus on establishing sufficient conditions for
convex optimization, and convergence to Equilibrium points in a distributed
manner. On the other hand, for environments that are characterized by partial
or incomplete information, we introduce distributed learning schemes through
Reinforcement Learning, and their performance and convergence are empirically evaluated.
2. We introduce additional Equilibrium points for non-cooperative games towards
more realistically capturing the actual goals and needs of the computing systems in several real-world application domains. The existence, uniqueness, and
convergence to them are theoretically proved and empirically demonstrated.
The limitations of the commonly assumed mathematical notion of the Nash
Equilibrium point are underlined, and described, while the benefits of the introduced Equilibrium points are studied.
3. Human awareness and risk-aware behavioral patterns are incorporated into
the decision-making process to deal with the inherited uncertainties of envi-
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ronments with shared resources of limited capabilities. The latter establishes
autonomous intelligent decision-making computing systems that can sense and
mimic their owner’s behavior, towards optimizing the latter’s subjective goals.
We propose a new Reinforcement Learning setting through reward reshaping
such that the human’s risk-aware characteristics are properly considered.
4. The introduced decision-making frameworks are extensively analyzed theoretically and empirically through simulations in a variety of real-world applications.
Finally, their state-of-the-art performance is demonstrated through comparative and scalability empirical studies.

1.3

Publications

All the work presented in this thesis has been published for publication in peerreviewed journals or conferences. The work in Chapter 3 has been published in the
following venues [67, 68, 69, 70]:

Mitsis G., P.A. Apostolopoulos, E.E. Tsiropoulou, and S. Papavassiliou. "Intelligent dynamic data offloading in a competitive mobile edge computing market." Future Internet 11, no. 5 (2019): 118.
P.A. Apostolopoulos, M. Torres, and E.E. Tsiropoulou. 2019. Satisfactionaware Data Offloading in Surveillance Systems. In Proceedings of the 14th
Workshop on Challenged Networks (CHANTS’19). Association for Computing
Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 21–26.
P.A. Apostolopoulos, E.E. Tsiropoulou and S. Papavassiliou, "Cognitive Data
Offloading in Mobile Edge Computing for Internet of Things," in IEEE Access,
vol. 8, pp. 55736-55749, 2020.
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P.A. Apostolopoulos, E.E. Tsiropoulou and S. Papavassiliou, "Risk-Aware Data
Offloading in Multi-Server Multi-Access Edge Computing Environment," in
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 1405-1418, June
2020.
Furthermore, an extension of the research work that is presented in Chapter 3.6 has
been published in the following [52].
P.A. Apostolopoulos, G. Fragkos, E. E. Tsiropoulou and S. Papavassiliou,
"Data Offloading in UAV-assisted Multi-access Edge Computing Systems under Resource Uncertainty," in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing.
The above research work investigates the mobile users’ data offloading in multiple ground MEC servers and UAVs, which provide remote computing capabilities,
while the UAVs are located in closer proximity to the mobile users due to their flying capabilities. The UAVs’ computing uncertainties that mainly stem from their
limited energy availability, are properly considered in our introduced risk-aware
decision-making framework (Chapter 2.3.2), which incorporates human awareness
in the decision-making process.

Our research work in Chapter 4 has been published in [71]:
P. Promponas, P.A. Apostolopoulos, E.E. Tsiropoulou and S. Papavassiliou,
"Redesigning Resource Management in Wireless Networks based on Games in
Satisfaction Form," 2019 12th IFIP Wireless and Mobile Networking Conference (WMNC), 2019, pp. 24-31. (~ Best paper award)
, and our introduced and described work in Chapter 5 has been published in the
following venues [72, 73]:
P.A. Apostolopoulos, E.E. Tsiropoulou, S. Papavassiliou, "Demand response
management in smart grid networks: A two-stage game-theoretic learningbased approach". Mobile Networks and Applications. 2018 Oct 4:1-4.
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P.A. Apostolopoulos, E.E. Tsiropoulou and S. Papavassiliou, "Risk-Aware Social Cloud Computing Based on Serverless Computing Model," 2019 IEEE
Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2019, pp. 1-6.
Moreover, the following published research work is based on our introduced Equilibrium points (Chapter 2.1.2), and on our described decision-making theory of Reinforcement Learning and Game Theory (Chapters 2.2 & 2.1). The latter ones are
utilized towards IoT devices’ computation offloading to the MEC servers, where the
former ones constitute resource-constrained computing systems that aim to fulfill
their minimum Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements in a distributed manner. The
MEC servers and IoT devices act as Reinforcement Learning decision-making agents
towards optimizing their cumulative perceived reward. A low complexity two-stage
distributed decision-making framework is introduced.
P.A. Apostolopoulos, E. E. Tsiropoulou and S. Papavassiliou, "Game-theoretic
Learning-based QoS Satisfaction in Autonomous Mobile Edge Computing,"
2018 Global Information Infrastructure and Networking Symposium (GIIS),
2018, pp. 1-5.
Furthermore, in the following published research work an evacuation planning
mechanism is introduced to support the distributed and autonomous evacuation process within the operation of a Public Safety System. Our introduced decision-making
framework ESCAPE [74], which is executed by the evacuees’ resource-constrained
devices, was developed based on the principles of Reinforcement Learning (Chapter
2.2), and Game Theory (Chapter 2.1).
G. Fragkos, P.A. Apostolopoulos, E.E. Tsiropoulou, 2019. "ESCAPE: Evacuation Strategy through Clustering and Autonomous Operation in Public Safety
Systems" Future Internet 11, no. 1: 20.
The following published research work introduces a distributed decision-making
orchestration framework in a Smart City environment. Reinforcement Learning is
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utilized to model and study each human’s decision-making process that selects in a
distributed manner a Point of Interest (PoI), i.e., different places in a Smart City, to
visit based on prior experiences [75].
N. Patrizi, P.A. Apostolopoulos, K. Rael and E.E. Tsiropoulou, "Socio-Physical
Human Orchestration in Smart Cities," 2019 IEEE International Conference
on Smart Computing (SMARTCOMP), 2019, pp. 115-120.
The following research works were published or submitted for publication during
my Ph.D. studies, where I had the opportunity and great honor to be a Research
Intern for Sandia National Laboratories, and Facebook. In Sandia National Laboratories I performed research towards developing an autonomous airborne imaging
system (on a UAV platform) of the National Solar Thermal Test Facility (NSTTF)
concentrated solar power (CSP) plant, for identification, assessment, and correction
of sun’s reflectors through optimization, machine learning, and image processing
techniques.
J. Yellowhair, P.A. Apostolopoulos, D.E. Small, D. Novick, and M. Mann,
"Development of an Aerial Imaging System for Heliostat Canting Assessments,"
SolarPACES 2020 (to appear).
J. Yellowhair, P.A. Apostolopoulos, D.E. Small, D. Novick, and M. Mann,
"UAS Imaging Path Planner for Heliostat Canting Assessments," SolarPACES
2020 (to appear).
In Facebook, I performed research on personalization for Web-based services with
offline Reinforcement Learning [76]. The user’s authentication after a failed login
attempt was formalized as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) (Chapter 2.2), and the
introduced Reinforcement Learning approach was deployed in a production system
(Facebook’s social network). The developed personalized user authentication led to
significantly improved long-term objectives.
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Pavlos Athanasios Apostolopoulos, Zehui Wang, Hanson Wang, Chad Zhou,
Kittipat Virochsiri, Norm Zhou, and Igor L. Markov. "Personalization for
Web-based Services using Offline Reinforcement Learning," submitted to ACM
SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining.
2021.

1.4

Dissertation Outline

The remainder of the thesis will be organized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents theoretical concepts of Game Theory, Reinforcement Learning, and Prospect Theory. We focus on non-cooperative environments, thus on a
sub-field of Game Theory, and we describe the commonly considered notion of Nash
Equilibrium, which is based on the concept of rationality. Motivated by the latter, we
introduce novel theory regarding additional Equilibrium points beyond rationality,
alongside the required conditions for convergence to them. We detail the key theoretical foundations of Reinforcement Learning and Deep Reinforcement Learning.
The latter ones combined with Game Theory introduce several theoretical concepts
and decision-making frameworks in Learning Game Theory. Moreover, we present
Prospect Theory, which constitutes a behavioral model that captures humans’ riskaware attitudes. Prospect Theory is utilized by our decision-making frameworks
for modeling human awareness in the decision-making process. Finally, we detail
how the presented and newly introduced theory is leveraged towards developing
distributed decision-making frameworks for autonomous intelligent systems. The
decision-making frameworks are further theoretically investigated and extended under the considered application domains in the next Chapters, and their performance
is empirically evaluated.
Motivated by the benefits and the inherited research challenges of the recently
introduced network technologies, Chapter 3 investigates mobile users’ computation
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offloading to Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) servers. Towards capturing mobile
users’ devices’ limitations, we present low-complexity distributed decision-making
frameworks that could serve as the underlying intelligence that enables autonomy
for the considered computing systems. The introduced theory in Chapter 2 is further
enriched concerning the unique challenges of the studied application domain. Our
decision-making frameworks are extensively analyzed theoretically, and empirically
evaluated and verified as well.
Chapter 4 introduces a redesigned resource management for wireless networks,
based on our presented Equilibrium points and theory in Chapter 2. The latter’s
challenging theoretical problems regarding existence, convergence, and uniqueness
are addressed, proved, and empirically shown. Towards intuitively demonstrating
our research work, we leverage a highly motivating application domain and significant problem of efficient resource management for personalized services in wireless
networks. This is mainly motivated by the tremendous proliferation of personalized
computing devices that aim to autonomously assist their owners daily, and provide
personalized services, while at the same time they are characterized by constrained
resources and different levels of requirements.
Chapter 5 presents theoretical foundations of how decision-making frameworks
could be leveraged as the underlying intelligence for computing systems in smart
technologies. Firstly, we introduce a distributed decision-making framework that is
based on the principles of Game Theory, and Reinforcement Learning, for Demand
Response Management (DRM) and companies’ pricing problems in Smart Grid Networks. Secondly, the recently introduced and motivating Cloud concept of Serverless
Computing is investigated under uncertainty and risk-aware behavioral patterns. In
particular, the task allocation to the Cloud for remote processing either on Virtual Machines (VMs) or Serverless Computing functions is studied, and a risk-aware
distributed decision-making framework is presented.
Chapter 7 provides and suggests future research directions based on our insights,
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observations, and lessons that we acquired from this thesis. Moreover, we present theoretical formulations and indicative results of an ongoing research work that extends
our introduced decision-making frameworks in Chapter 3. Specifically, we introduce
a decision-making framework that captures mobile users’ computation offloading
problems from end-to-end in a stochastic and dynamic environment. Additionally,
under the considered realistic environment, we demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance and capabilities of our approach.
Chapter 8 summarizes the contributions, and concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries, and Introduced Theory
This chapter covers theoretical foundations regarding the three main theories that
this dissertation lies on, i.e., Game Theory, Reinforcement Learning, and Prospect
Theory. We start by reviewing each theory and its well-established theoretical concepts individually. In particular, regarding Game Theory we mainly focus on the
concept of non-cooperative games, due to the nature of the application domains that
we later study. Furthermore, we introduce key parts of our novel proposed theory,
and we present them as mathematical extensions to the above well-defined mathematical concepts. The rest parts of the mathematical theory of our introduced
approaches are systematically presented alongside their empirical evaluation in the
studied motivating and challenging application domains. The empirical studies best
support and illustrate our introduced approaches’ applicability and state-of-the-art
performance.

2.1

Game Theory

This chapter is a critical dissection of the main considered assumptions in deductive
and classical Game Theory. Given the breadth and depth of Game Theory, this
dissertation does not aim to be considered as an exhaustive analysis of all theoretical
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concepts and made assumptions of Game Theory. In contrast, here we focus on
non-cooperative games, which constitute a particular sub-concept of Game Theory.
The latter choice mainly stems from the fact that in this dissertation we investigate
autonomous decision-making in recently introduced research application domains
that are mainly characterized by the generated conflicts among the decision-makers.
In other words, we are interested in shared environments, where each autonomous
decision-making agent is mainly rational, and its actions affect and get affected by
the rest of autonomous decision-making agents’ actions and rationality.

2.1.1

Mathematical Background

Game Theory was given its first mathematical formulation by John von Neuman and
Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 [77] aims to model and study situations in which decisionmakers interact. The result of the game-theoretic modeling of such interactions is
called game, and here is denoted as G. The definition of the game G is given as
follows:
G = (N , An , un )

(2.1)

where,
• N is the set of individual decision-makers, who interact.
• An is the set of different actions available to each of the individuals. It is also
typically called as the individual’s n ∈ N set of strategies.
• and un is the utility function that assigns a value to each individual for each
possible combination of choices made by every individual.
Generally, the above abstract game-theoretic model does not make any assumptions
about the decision-making agents’ behavior, whereas each decision-making agent
n ∈ N is by definition assumed as an entity with preferences. We denote as an ∈
An the chosen action of player n, and as a−n = {a1 , · · · , an−1 , an+1 , · · · , a|N | } the
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action profile of all other decision-makers except n. The utility function un in most
branches of Game Theory is meant to represent the individual’s n preference for
each possible combination of actions made by every individual, i.e. un (an , a−n ). As
a result, in almost all game-theoretic models of Game Theory, the utility function
is assumed that implicitly drives each decision-making agent’s actions, and it takes
numerical values on an interval case. Furthermore, the utility functions are commonly
interpreted as von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern utilities, which allows expected
utility theory [64] to evaluate probability distributions over possible outcomes of the
game G.
Moreover, in Game Theory, the decision-making agent’s n utility un denotes a
measure of subjective psychological fulfillment, which is essentially justified by reference to some background framework that is typically only known by the individual
decision-maker n. Bob and Alice, who we model as decision-making agents for the
example, may have opposite subjective opinions about onions and pickles. For example, Bob may adore more the taste of onions, and with that said he associates a higher
utility value to onions rather than to pickles, whereas Alice may assigns hers owns
subjective utility values in the exact opposite way. The subjective utility measure of
each decision-maker constitutes one of the most important features of Game Theory,
as there are relatively few models where utilities that are interpreted as preferences
are compared across the decision-making agents. The latter finds its roots in the
social philosophy of utilitarianism and is not commonly observed in game theoretical
models, whereas it could be certainly found in the research literature [78, 79].

Rationality and Non-cooperative Games
In classical Game Theory and its applications in economics as long as in other noneconomic related applications domains [80], the decision-making agents are assumed
rational. To this end, each decision-making agent is interested to optimize its utility
un by choosing an appropriate action an , and through the anticipation of the actions
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of the rest of the decision-making agents, i.e., a−n . It is worth to be noted that
in the case where all decision-makers have optimal actions regardless of what other
decision-makers do, then this situation can be modeled without any appeal to Game
Theory. Otherwise, in any other case, we need Game Theory!
The decision-maker’s n rationality implies that the agent n selfishly aims to
optimize its utility function un , and under this setting, the game G is considered
non-cooperative. In contrast, in cooperative games, the decision-making agents are
willing to cooperate for the overall "good", e.g., the decision-making agents act such
P
that the system’s overall utility n∈N un is optimized. However, in the investigated
application domains, the latter idea contradicts with decision-makers rationality in
real life, and as a result, the concept of cooperative games is out of the scope of
this dissertation. In the following, we focus our analysis on non-cooperative games,
and we start by introducing two of the most commonly used concepts of Equilibrium
points in the research literature.
Generally, an action profile a∗ = {a∗1 , · · · , a∗n , · · · , a∗|N | } constitutes an Equilibrium point for the game G, if and only if, no decision-making agent n ∈ N has the
incentive to change its action a∗n unilaterally [81]. In non-cooperative games, due to
each decision-making agent’s rationality, we are mainly interested in two different
concepts of Equilibrium points, which constitute stable solutions for the game G.
The first one is the concept of Nash Equilibrium (NE) [81], which was first introduced by John Nash, who was awarded the 1994 Noble Prize in economics. The NE
point is defined as follows, while its assumed key feature is that all decision-making
agents make their actions selfishly and independently.
Definition 1 An action profile a∗ = {a∗1 , · · · , a∗n , · · · , a∗|N | } is a pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) point of the non-cooperative game G, if and only if, no decision-making
agent n ∈ N can improve its utility function un by deviating unilaterally, i.e.,
un (a∗n , a∗−n ) ≥ un (an , a∗−n ), ∀n ∈ N , an ∈ An
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Correlated Equilibrium (CE) point is another commonly used solution for a noncooperative game G, and can be regarded as a generalization of NE point’s definition,
as each NE point is a CE point as well, while the opposite does not always hold.
Moreover, the set of CE points of the non-cooperative game G is convex, whereas
the corresponding NE points are isolated points at the extrema of this set [60]. To
this end, CE points are structurally simpler than that of NE points, while due to
the convexity property of the set of CE points, fairness between the decision-making
agents N could be well addressed. In particular, the CE point is defined as follows:
Definition 2 A probability distribution ρ over A1 × · · · × A|N | is a Correlated Equilibrium (CE) point, if and only if, for all n ∈ N , for all actions an ∈ An , and all
alternative actions a0n ∈ An , it holds true that:
X

ρ(an , a−n )(un (an , a−n ) − un (a0n , a−n )) ≥ 0

(2.3)

a−n ∈A−n

, where A−n = A1 ×· · · An−1 ×An+1 · · · A|N | , and ρ(an , a−n ) represents the probability
that the decision-maker n takes action an , while all other decision-making agents take
action profile a−n . In other words, the above definition implies that at the CE point,
if the decision-making agent n takes the action an , then choosing any other action
a0n 6= an can not yield to a higher expected utility for the decision-maker n.

2.1.2

Beyond Rationality: Introduced Equilibrium Points

In this chapter, we introduce additional game-theoretic models and Equilibrium
points that are differentiated from the key idea of rationality, which is adopted in
the concepts of NE and CE points. The advantages of these Equilibrium points are
multi-fold, as the properties of their existence are less restrictive than the commonly
adopted notions of NE and CE points, while at the same time they better reflect
the actual decision-makers’ subjective goals in particular application domains. In
particular, the notion of rationality implies that each individual decision-maker is
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interested to selfishly optimize its perceived utility function, whereas in several noncooperative environments each individual’s subjective goals could be better expressed
by the satisfaction of the individual’s utility constraint rather than the latter’s optimization [82]. The latter idea was originally introduced as a mathematical theoretical
concept in [83], and in [84], and for a particular class of conditions in pure strategies
for the case of a finite set of actions, i.e., An , ∀n ∈ N . Later, the concept was formulated in terms of a fixed point inclusion for the case of pure strategies in [85], in the
context of both finite actions, convex, and closed action sets. Here, we introduce a
novel game formulation where in contrast with the concept of pure rationality, as this
was introduced in Chapter 2.1.1, each decision-maker is characterized by a minimum
feeling of rationality, thus it aims to satisfy its utility constraint selfishly. In general,
a game in satisfaction form is defined as follows:
Ĝ = (N , An , un , fn )

(2.4)

where as before (Equation 2.1),
• N is the set of individual decision-makers, who interact.
• An is the set of different actions available to each of the individuals.
• un is the utility function that assigns a value to each individual for each possible
combination of choices made by every individual.
• fn is the correspondence, i.e., fn : A−n → 2An that determines the set of actions
of decision-maker n which allows its satisfaction given the actions taken by all
other decision-makers. In other words fn (a−n ) = {an ∈ An : un (an , a−n ) ≥
ūn }, where ūn is the decision-maker’s n utility constraint, i.e., minimum utility
prerequisite.
In a satisfaction non-cooperative game, each decision-maker aims to satisfy its utility
constraint careless of whether other decision-makers can satisfy or not their utility
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constraints. Under this setting, we are seeking a stable solution, i.e., an Equilibrium
point a+ , where each decision-maker n ∈ N does not have the incentive to change
its action unilaterally, as its utility constraint is satisfied. This Equilibrium point is
called Satisfaction Equilibrium (SE) point and is defined as follows:
Definition 3 An action profile a+ is an SE point for the game Ĝ, if and only if:
+
∀n ∈ N , a+
n ∈ fn (a−n )

(2.5)

+
+
+
+
, where a+
−n = (a1 , · · · , an−1 , an+1 , · · · , a|N | ) It is worth to be noted, that since each

decision-maker aims to be satisfied, none of them has a particular interest of changing
its current action once they are at the SE.
In order to study the existence of an SE in the game Ĝ = (N , An , un , fn ), let the
correspondence F : A → 2A , where A = A1 × · · · × A|N | , be defined as follows:
F(a) = f1 (a−1 ) × · · · × f|N | (a−|N | )

(2.6)

then, a SE exists if and only if:
∃a ∈ A : a ∈ F(a)

(2.7)

This formulation in combination with the existing fixed point theorems [86] provide
sufficient conditions and properties for the existence of the SE [87]. In particular,
using the fixed point theorem of Knaster and Tarski [88], the following theorem holds
true:
Theorem 1 Consider the game Ĝ in satisfaction form Ĝ = (N , An , fn ), and let the
set A have a binary relation denoted by . Let also
• V = (A, ) be a complete lattice.
• F(a) be non-empty ∀a ∈ A.
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• the correspondence F in Equation 2.6 satisfies that ∀(a, a0 ) ∈ A2 , such that
a  a0 , it holds that
∀(b, b0 ) ∈ F(a) × F(a0 ), b  b0

(2.8)

To this end, the game G has at least one SE in pure strategies. It is worth to be
noted, that in order the above theorem to hold true, then it is required that ∀a ∈ A
the set F is non-empty, i.e,
∀n ∈ N , ∀a−n ∈ A−n , ∃an ∈ An : an ∈ fn (a−n ).

(2.9)

As a result, there could exist multiple action profiles a+ satisfying decision-makers
utility constraints. For that reason, a representative example among all different SE
points is the Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium (ESE) point, at which each decisionmaker achieves its minimum utility prerequisites via being simultaneously penalized
with the minimum cost. The latter is mainly motivated by the fact that in several
application domains, a decision-maker’s performed action leads to a perceived utility
function value, while it comes with an associated cost at the same time. To capture
the notion of decision-maker’s n penalty and effort associated with a performed action
an ∈ An , the concept of the cost function is introduced. For all n ∈ N , the cost
function cn : A → [0, 1] satisfies the condition: cn (an ) < cn (a0n ), ∀(an , a0n ∈ A2n ), if
and only if, an introduces a lower cost for decision-maker n than action a0n . The ESE
point is defined as follows:
Definition 4 An action profile a is an ESE point for the game Ĝ, with cost functions cn , ∀n ∈ N , if and only if:
∀n ∈ N , an ∈ fn (a−n )

(2.10)

∀n ∈ N , ∀an ∈ fn (a−n ), cn (an ) ≥ cn (an )

(2.11)

Similarly, there could exist multiple action profiles a that constitute ESE points for
the game G [87, 89]. Here, we introduce another Equilibrium point of special interest
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that allows us to rank the different ESE points of the game G. In particular, we
call that Equilibrium point as Minimum Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium (MESE)
point. At the MESE, all decision-makers satisfy their utility constraints, with the
minimum cost for themselves, as well as with the minimum total cost from the
system’s perspective. The MESE point is defined as follows:
Definition 5 An action profile a† is an MESE point for the game Ĝ, with cost
functions cn , ∀n ∈ N , and a set of action profiles that are ESE points E = {a ∈ A :
∀n ∈ N , an ∈ fn (a−n ), ∀a0n ∈ fn (a−n ), cn (a0n ) ≥ cn (an )}, if and only if:
∀n ∈ N , a†n ∈ fn (a†−n )

(2.12)

∀n ∈ N , ∀an ∈ fn (a†−n ), cn (an ) ≥ cn (a†n )

(2.13)

∀e ∈ E,

X

cn (en ) ≥

n∈N

X

cn (a†n )

(2.14)

n∈N

The uniqueness and existence of MESE are investigated under the setting of a particular application domain, i.e., uplink power control in wireless networks, in Chapter
4.

2.2

Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement Learning [62] dates back to the early days of cybernetics, and work
in statistics, psychology, neuroscience, and computer science. In the last five to ten
years, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has experienced dramatic growth in attention
and interest in the Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence communities, due to
promising and motivating results in a variety of application domains like controlling
continuous systems in robotics [90], playing Go [91], Atari [92], and competitive
video games [93, 94]. RL is the study of how an agent can interact with its dynamic
and unknown environment to learn a policy, which maximizes expected cumulative
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reward for a task, or as understood by Sutton and Barto, RL is a fusion of the trialand-error "law-of-effect" tradition [95]. RL is considered as a third Machine Learning
paradigm, alongside Supervised and Unsupervised Learning [62, 61]. In other words,
RL is different from Supervised Learning, which describes the learning on a training
set of labeled examples provided by a knowledgeable external supervisor, as in RL’s
interactive problem, it is often impractical to obtain examples of desired behavior
that are both correct and representative of all the situations in which the agent has
to act. Moreover, RL is different from Unsupervised Learning, as RL is trying to
maximize a reward signal instead of trying to find a hidden structure.

2.2.1

Mathematical Background

Figure 2.1: Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement Learning (RL) seeks to control an interactive dynamic environment (Figure 2.1), where at each discrete time slot, t = 0, 1, · · · , the RL agent
observes the environment’s state st and responds with action at , while the environment responds with an associated reward rt+1 and transitions into the next state st+1 .
The RL agent aims to determine an optimal policy for performing actions on each
given state, such that the perceived cumulative reward over the long-time horizon is
maximized. This problem is known as a sequential decision-making problem [96], and
the model of Markov Decision Process [97], provides a simple yet powerful method
for modeling states, actions, states transitions, and rewards received in each state
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transition. For that reason, most of the RL work uses MDPs to model the underlying
dynamics of the agent’s environment. In particular, the RL agent’s environment can
be defined by an MDP (S, A, r, ρ, γ), where S is the state space with st ∈ S, A is
the action space with at ∈ A, r(st , at ) is the reward function, ρ(·|st , at ) is a conditional probability distribution of the form ρ(st+1 |st , at ) (environment’s dynamics),
and γ ∈ (0, 1] is a scalar discount factor. The probability distribution ρ(st+1 |st , at )
is also called transition probability, and it essentially represents the probability that
the state of the environment in the next time slot (t + 1) is transformed to st+1 from
st given that the RL agent performs the action at .
If complete information of the MDP is known, i.e., ρ(st+1 |st , at ), ∀(st+1 , st ) ∈
S2 , at ∈ A, then the agent’s sequential decision-making problem can be effectively
solved by using well-defined classic planning techniques, e.g., Dynamic Programming
[98] or Teleo-Reactive [99]. However, in real-world problems the decision-maker’s
environment’s underlying dynamics are unknown. In these problems, classic planning
techniques meet significant difficulties in solving them, and RL techniques are thus
developed to combat the incomplete knowledge challenge. Although RL techniques
are based on Dynamic Programming, however, they offer two important advantages
over Dynamic Programming. Firstly, RL methods perform policy evaluation and
policy improvement at the same time simultaneously [62]. In particular, the RL
agent can evaluate its current learned policy, i.e., policy evaluation, by using it to
interact with the environment, while the perceived feedback is used as a correction
signal to further improve its learned policy, i.e., policy improvement. As a result, RL
methods allow the agent to focus only on the policies that are important and spend
less time on the less promising ones. Secondly, RL can be empowered with powerful
function approximators, e.g., neural networks [100] or till coding [62], to represent
the agent’s information, so that the experiences learned in one state can be used in
other "close" states as well. The latter helps RL to achieve generalization, e.g., over
the state-action space, and scale better.
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The RL agent’s goal in an MDP (S, A, r, ρ, γ), as this was defined above, is to
determine autonomously, and by only exploiting its experienced interactions with
the environment, an optimal policy π ∗ for performing actions at any given state.
Thus, an optimal policy of the form π ∗ (at |st ), where for each state st defines a
distribution over possible actions at ∈ A. The policy should maximize cumulative
reward over time, i.e., an expectation under the environment’s dynamics over the
long-time horizon:
"
J(π) = E

∞
X

#
γ t r(st , at )

(2.15)

t=0

s0 = s, a0 = a, st ∼ ρ(·|st−1 , at−1 ), at ∼ π(·|st )
The discount factor essentially indicates how much attention should be paid to the
instant reward and the long-term reward respectively. In other words, as γ → 0, the
importance of the current immediate reward becomes more important, whereas as
γ → 1, future rewards that contribute to the overall cumulative reward are taken
into account more and more. Furthermore, based on Equation 2.15 the Reinforcement Learning objective problem can be viewed as an optimization over the space
of policies π:
"
π ∗ = arg max E

∞
X

π

#
γ t r(st , at )

(2.16)

t=0

Value-based Reinforcement Learning
The value function V π (s) represents the expected discounted cumulative reward that
will be received by the RL agent by following policy π, and starting from state s:
V π (s) = E[rt + γrt+1 + γ 2 rt+2 + · · · |st = s, π]

(2.17)

where, rt = r(st+1 |st , at ), or in other words rt = r(st , at ), is the immediate reward
received in time step t, st is the state visited in t, and at ∼ π(at |st ) is the RL agent’s
performed action. Besides the value function defined in Equation 2.17, also known
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as V-values, another most widely used value function in RL, is the state-action-value
function, referred as Q-values, which expresses the expected discounted cumulative
reward obtained by the RL agent after performing action at in state st , and thereafter
following policy π:
Qπ (s, a) = E[rt + γrt+1 + γ 2 rt+2 + · · · |st = s, at = a, π]

(2.18)

, where at is the RL agent’s performed action in state st . A significant result about
value functions, is that the V-values satisfy the Bellman equation for a fixed policy
π [62]:
V π (s) =

X

ρ(s0 |s, a) · [r(s0 |s, a) + γV π (s0 )]

(2.19)

s0

, where a ∼ π(a|s), thus the value function of the state s can be recursively defined
by the value function of the next state s0 . To this end, the problem of obtaining
the current state’s value function for a fixed policy π, can be solved by obtaining
the next state’s value function, and the immediate reward, which can essentially
be received by the RL agent’s environment. As a result, the Bellman’s equation
breaks the RL agent’s sequential decision-making problem into sub-problems, and
essentially it witnesses that the sequential decision-making problem in the MDP has
optimal substructures, i.e., an optimal solution can be constructed efficiently from
optimal solutions of its sub-problems [98, 101].
Therefore, Bellman’s equation guarantees the convergence property of the value
function, thus Equation 2.19 can be rewritten as follows:
T π V π (s) = V π (s)

(2.20)

, where T π is the Bellman operator underlying the fixed policy π such that:
(T π V )(s) =

X

ρ(s0 |s, a) · [r(s0 |s, a) + γV (s0 )]

(2.21)

s0

, where a ∼ π(a|s), and Equation 2.21 defines a linear system of equations with
respect to V π , and T π is an affine linear operator [102], and if 0 < γ < 1, then T π is
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a maximum-norm contraction and the fixed-point equation T π V π (s) = V π (s) has a
unique solution ∀s ∈ S [103].
Furthermore, for an optimal policy π ∗ (Equation 2.16), the value function is
defined as follows:
V ∗ (s) =

X

∗

pπ (a|s)

a0

X

ρ(s0 |s, a) · [r(s0 |s, a) + γV ∗ (s0 )]

(2.22)

s0
∗

, where a ∼ π(a|s), and pπ (a|s) is the probability of performing action a in state s in
the space of optimal policies. Moreover, the Bellman equation holds for the Q-values
as well, thus:
Qπ (s, a) =

X

ρ(s0 |s, a) · [r(s0 |s, a) + γQπ (s0 , a0 )]

(2.23)

s0

, where a ∼ π(a|s), and similarly for an optimal policy π ∗ holds true that:
Q∗ (s, a) =

X

h
i
0 0
ρ(s0 |s, a) · r(s0 |s, a) + γmax
Q(s
,
a
)
0
a

s0

(2.24)

Furthermore, Equation 2.24 can be rewritten with in respect to the expected Q-value
of the next state as follows:
h
i
∗ 0 0
Q∗ (s, a) = r(s, a) + γEs0 ∼ρ(s0 |s,a) max
Q
(s
,
a
)
0
a

(2.25)

To this end, the RL problem seeks an optimal policy π ∗ such that Q∗ (s, a) ≥ Qπ (s, a),
∀π, s ∈ S, a ∈ A. The latter equation indicates that an optimal policy can be derived
by having the optimal Q-values, i.e., Q∗ , as follows:
π ∗ (s) = δ(arg max Q∗ (s, a)), ∀s ∈ S

(2.26)

a∈A

, where δ operator could express either a deterministic policy, or any other stochastic
policy, e.g., -greedy policy [62]. As a result, Value-based Reinforcement Learning
essentially aims to estimate the optimal state-action-value function, i.e., Q∗ (s, a)∀s ∈
S, a ∈ A, as then an optimal policy π ∗ , e.g., -greedy strategy, can be defined based
on the optimal Q-values, and as per Equation 2.26.
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Q-Learning [62] constitutes the most representative Value-based RL approach, and
uses a Q-table to store the Q-values, i.e., Q(s, a), ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A. Q-learning aims to
estimate the optimal Q-values, i.e., Q∗ (s, a), ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A. For that reason, the RL
agent alternates between two phases, i.e., Q-values updates, and further interaction
with the environment. In particular, the RL agent at each time slot t observes
the environment’s state st , and performs an action at , with typically an -greedy
policy, i.e., version of π(at |st ) = δ(at = arg maxat ∈A Q(st , at )). The perceived reward
r(st , at ) and environment’s next state st+1 are used for the update of the Q-values
at each training iteration, as follows [62]:


Q(st , at ) = Q(st , at ) + α r(st , at ) + γmax Q(st+1 , at+1 ) − Q(st , at )
at+1

(2.27)

The described iterative alternation between Q-values update, i.e., policy improvement, and RL agent’s interaction with the environment, i.e., policy evaluation, lead
the stored Q-values to approximate the optimal Q-values, i.e., Q∗ (st , at ), ∀st ∈ S, at ∈
A, and as a result the RL agent to establish an optimal policy π ∗ .

2.2.2

Deep Reinforcement Learning

Figure 2.2: Deep Reinforcement Learning

Over the past few years, RL has become even more popular due to its success
in addressing sequential decision-making problems through the integration of deep
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learning techniques. This combination is typically called Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) [104, 105], and it has provided human problem-solving capabilities even
in high dimensional spaces for complicated tasks. For instance, DRL has been successfully applied and address complicated problems in real-world applications such
as robotics [106], self-driving cars [107], finance [108], and smart grids [109]. A key
part that has pushed the success and applicability of DRL in complicated problems,
is the recent advances in deep learning [110, 111, 112, 113, 114] that have brought
us expressive deep neural networks. The latter are utilized as function approximators and allow DRL to deal with high dimensional state-action spaces, while at the
same time perceive enriched and intelligent generalization, e.g., over the state-action
space.
The main motivation behind DRL is the fact that in several real-world complex
environments that are characterized by high dimensional state and action spaces, it
is either impractical or even infeasible to use regular RL techniques. For instance,
regular Q-learning uses an Q-table to store all the Q-values for every possible stateaction pair. The latter would not be possible in a complex environment with high
dimensional state-action space. For that reason, DRL uses deep neural networks as
function approximators in order to overcome the problem of the high dimensional
state and action spaces, and achieve effective generalization. In particular, a deep
neural network (Figure 2.2) with parameters θ can be used for parameterizing the
DRL agent’s policy πθ , in the case where its policy is directly optimized through
Equation 2.16, i.e, Policy Gradient methods [115], or a state-action-value function
Q(st , at ; θ), in the case of Value-based Reinforcement Learning (Chapter 2.2.1).
Deep Q-Network (DQN) [92] is the most representative framework of DRL, and
constitutes the DRL alternate of the regular Q-learning. Specifically, the state-actionvalue function Q(st , at ) is approximated with a deep neural network with parameters
θ, i.e., Q(st , at ; θ). At each time slot t the DQN receives as input the environment’s
state st ∈ S, and outputs the state-action Q-values Q(st , at ; θ), ∀at ∈ A.
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As in the regular Q-learning, the DRL agent alternates between improving the
parameters θ of the DQN, and data collection via interaction with the environment,
and through a stochastic policy, thus π(at |st ) = δ(at = arg maxat ∈A Q(st , at ; θ)),
e.g., -greedy strategy. In contrast with the regular Q-learning, which takes a single gradient step (Equation 2.27) towards minimizing the difference between the
left-hand and right-hand side of Equation 2.25, in DQN a replay buffer of the form
D = {(st , at , st+1 , rt+1 )}, where rt+1 = r(st , at ), is utilized for storing the DRL agent’s
interactions with the environment. To this end, at each training iteration, the parameters θ of the DQN are updated by randomly sampling a batch of interactions of
the form (st , at , st+1 , rt+1 ), and through back-propagation and gradient descent [116]
with respect to the Temporal Difference Loss function Li (θi ), which similarly with
Equation 2.27 is defined as follows:


Li (θi ) = Est ,at ∼D (yi − Q(st , at ; θi ))2
(2.28)


−
Here yi = Est+1 ∼D r(st , at ) + γmax Q(st+1 , at+1 ; θi )) , θi are the parameters of
at+1

the DQN at the iteration i of the learning procedure, and for better stability in the
learning procedure the θi− are frozen parameters that are used for estimating the
target values, i.e., yi , through another DQN often called the target DQN. The θ−
parameters of the target DQN are periodically updated to the latest parameters θ of
the DQN.

2.2.3

Learning Game Theory

The existence of Equilibrium points, as these were introduced in Chapter 2.1, is
the first key part of our introduced autonomous decision-making and game theoretic
solutions. However, finding these Equilibrium points is the next challenging key
part that needs to be tackled, given a shared non-cooperative environment. The
latter constitutes a challenging problem, especially in non-cooperative environments
that are characterized by incomplete, dynamic, and uncertain information, as the
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application domains that we study in this dissertation. For that reason, in this
chapter we review Learning Game Theory (LGT) [117, 118].
LGT assumes that the decision-makers can learn over time about the game and
the behavior of others. To this end, LGT describes each decision-maker’s process of
learning as a sequential decision-making problem, where the decision-maker n ∈ N
learns to perform actions an ∈ A such that its objective goals, e.g., utility maximization, utility prerequisite’s satisfaction, are perceived. As a result, Reinforcement
Learning, as this was introduced in Chapters 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 could be utilized, such
that each decision-maker n ∈ N acts as an RL agent, and learns an optimal policy
π ∗ that maximizes its perceived cumulative long-term reward (Equation 2.15). For
example, under the setting of a non-cooperative game G, where each decision-maker
behaves rational, the decision-maker’s n perceived reward rn after performing action
an , could be its perceived utility function value, i.e., un . In the following, we maintain
the RL notation, as this was introduced in Chapter 2.2.1, thus we refer to decisionmaker’s n perceived reward as rn , which generally could be reshaped appropriately
concerning the decision-maker’s objective goals.
To this end, the purpose of this Chapter is to bridge Game Theory and Reinforcement Learning under the perspective of LGT. For that reason, we introduce
distributed RL algorithms that are mainly characterized by low complexity and constitute candidate solutions for the case where the decision-maker is coupled with a
resource-constrained computing system. These techniques could be considered as
additional RL techniques, like the ones that were introduced in Chapters 2.2.1 and
2.2.2, and could be utilized such that the decision-maker’s goals are achieved, and
convergence to Equilibrium points is perceived through learning.
The un-neglectable information constraints that are included in real-world application domains can be mainly classified into the following three categories [60]:
• Incomplete: a decision-maker has only partial information about the environment, and it knows only the individual information and nothing about the
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rest decision-makers.
• Dynamic: the environment’s states are time-varying and unknown, thus the
environment’s dynamics (Chapter 2.2.1) are unknown.
• Uncertain: the decision-maker’s observations are not equal to the actual values, thus the observed values are corrupted by noise.
Here, we introduce a general procedure of distributed learning of Equilibrium points,
where each decision-maker behaves as an RL-agent, thus it learns an optimal policy
by repeatedly performing actions and by observing the environment’s feedback, e.g.,
state transitions, perceived rewards. For that reason, we assume that the decision
epoch is discrete and divided into slots of equal length. Furthermore, by using the
notation introduced in Chapters 2.1 and 2.2.1, we denote as a = (a1 (t), · · · , a|N |(t) )
the action profile, and as r(t) = (r1 (t), · · · , r|N | (t)) the perceived rewards of the
decision-makers in slot t, respectively. Generally, the learning procedure can be
expressed as follows:
an (t + 1) = R[an (1), · · · , an (t); rn (1), · · · , rn (t)]

(2.29)

, where R is the learning rule. In particular, different learning algorithms correspond to different update rules, i.e., R, and the already introduced RL techniques
in Chapters 2.2.1, and 2.2.2 can be directly mapped to learning rules.
Stochastic Learning Automata (SLA) [119] could be essentially considered as
a distributed policy-based RL algorithm [115], where each decision-maker’s n ∈ N
policy at slot t is approximated through a probability distribution πn (t) ∈ ∆(An ),
where ∆(An ) is the set of probability distributions over the available action set An .
The update rule R of the SLA, is based on the idea that if an action is selected by
the decision-maker n ∈ N at slot t, and a positive reward value rn (t) is received, then
the probability of choosing this action in the next iteration of the learning procedure
increases with regards to the magnitude of the perceived reward. The commonly used

31

Chapter 2. Preliminaries, and Introduced Theory

update rule in the research literature is the linear reward-inaction (LRI) [62, 120],
which is defined as follows:
πnm (t + 1) = πnm (t) + βr̂n (t)(1 − πnm (t)), m = an (t)

(2.30)

πnm (t + 1) = πnm (t) − βr̂n (t)πnm (t), m 6= an (t)
where, r̂n (t) is the decision-maker’s n perceived normalized reward, e.g., utility value,
in slot t, and β is the step size. Despite LRI’s analytical tractability, several other
forms of update rules have been used in research literature, e.g., linear reward-penalty,
linear reward--penalty [121]. Although, the convergence of the SLA algorithm for
general non-cooperative games is hard to guarantee, it asymptotically converges to
the NE point of potential games, where the definition of a potential game is given as
follows:
Definition 6 A game G is an (exact) potential game if there exists a potential function φ : A1 × · · · × An → R, such that ∀n ∈ N , ∀an ∈ An , and ∀a0n ∈ An , it holds
true that:
un (an , a−n ) − un (a0n , a−n ) = φ(an , a−n ) − φ(a0n , a−n )

(2.31)

In particular, when the step size β → 0, the linear reward-inaction algorithm asymptotically converges to the NE of potential games with random reward values [122].
Binary Log-Linear Algorithm (BLLA) [123] is another low complexity policybased RL algorithm, where similarly as before each decision-maker n ∈ N approximate its policy πn through a probability distribution. Assuming that at slot t the action profile is (a1 (t), · · · , a|N | (t)), a decision-maker n is chosen arbitrarily to perform
exploration and learning. The decision-maker n chooses an action ân (t) uniformly,
e.g., with probability

1
,
|An |

and observers its perceived new reward r̂n (t), given that

the rest decision-makers do not change actions. Therefore, the chosen decision-maker
n updates its policy π as follows:
er̂n (t)β
er̂n (t)β + ern (t)β
ern (t)β
πn [an (t + 1) = an (t)] = r̂n (t)β
e
+ ern (t)β

πn [an (t + 1) = ân (t)] =
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where β is the step size. The described iterative procedure is repeated until some
stop criterion is met, e.g., probability of every player for choosing a corresponding
particular action is sufficiently approaching one. Furthermore, with A = A1 × · · · ×
A|N | , then the following theorem holds true [124]:
Theorem 2 If all decision-makers in a potential non-cooperative game G adhere to
the binary log-linear algorithm, then the unique stationary distribution µ(a) ∈ ∆(A)
of any action selection profile a ∈ A, is given as follows:
µ(a) = P

eβΦ(a)
βΦ(a0 )
a0 ∈A e

(2.33)

, where Φ is the potential function of the game G.
To this end, the binary log-linear algorithm with a sufficiently large β, asymptotically
converges to an action profile that maximizes the potential function, thus to the best
NE point of the game G [125]. Some recent applications of the presented learning
approaches can be found in [126, 127, 128, 129].

2.3

Prospect Theory

In this dissertation, we are interested in non-cooperative environments, where the
decision-makers compete with each other for shared resources. To this end, the shared
resources are considered as Common-pool resources (CPRs), which are characterized
by the following properties [130]. In particular, they are non-excludable, thus they
are accessible by any decision-maker, while at the same time they are rivalrous or
subtractable, thus higher use by one decision-maker leads to less availability for
the others. Rational or myopic behavior by decision-makers competing for a CPR
often results in sub-optimal outcomes, or even to the potential destruction of the
resource. The latter phenomenon is typically referred to in the research literature as
the Tragedy of the Commons [131].
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As a result, a CPR experiences probabilistic failure due to over-utilization, which
leads to uncertainty in the outcomes for the decision-makers [132]. Generally, under
this setting, where uncertainty is encountered, studies from behavioral economics
show that humans are typically neither risk-neutral nor expected utility maximizers,
i.e., rational decision-makers - Chapter 2.1.1, when making decisions under uncertainty, and instead exhibit risk-aware attitudes and characteristics [133]. One of the
most widely accepted behavioral models of decision-making under probabilistic uncertainty is Prospect Theory, which was firstly introduced by Kahneman and Tversky
[65], and describes a decision-making behavioral model under risk and uncertainty.
In particular, Prospect Theory captures humans’ risk-aware behavioral characteristics, where a human acting as a decision-maker evaluates her perceived reward in a
probabilistic manner, and concerning a reference point, i.e., reference reward, (reference dependence property). The latter constitutes a "safe", i.e., guaranteed, outcome
that the decision-maker can perceive. The evaluation of decision-maker’s experienced
reward concerning a reference point formalizes the concepts of gains and losses, and
these are expressed through decision-maker’s prospect-theoretic utility function. Furthermore, the decision-maker is characterized as risk-seeking or risk-averse based on
her perceived prospect-theoretic utility function, i.e., gains or losses. In particular,
the decision-maker exhibits a greater dissatisfaction from a potential loss, i.e., less
reward than the reference point, compared to its satisfaction from a gain, i.e., higher
reward than the reference point, of the same magnitude (loss aversion property).
In other words, the decision-maker’s associated prospect-theoretic utility function is
concave on gains and convex for losses, thus the decision-maker exhibits risk-seeking
behavior under losses and risk-averse behavior under gains (diminishing sensitivity
property). The latter gives rise to an S-shaped prospect-theoretic utility function.
As a result, prospect-theoretic utility functions essentially account for systematic deviations in decision-maker’s behavior from the predictions of the classical expected
utility theory framework [64].
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Prospect Theory has been applied in diverse settings involving decision-making
under risk, including finance, insurance, industrial organization, and betting markets
[134]. The human-robot interaction [135] could be considered as an indicative example, where humans’ risk-awareness should be encountered by the robots for predicting
humans’ behavior and collaborate with them. Moreover, Prospect Theory has been
utilized towards designing advertisement campaigns and products’ promotions [136]
through the modeling of customers’ risk-aware behavioral characteristics and biases.
Some research works have focused on examining decision-makers’ behavior under
uncertainty only for the cases of gains or losses in the examined system, i.e., concave
or convex part of decision-maker’s prospect-theoretic utility function, respectively,
[66, 137]. Furthermore, Prospect Theory has been adopted in various cyber-physical
environments and application domains, including dynamic resource management in
5G wireless networks [138, 139, 140, 141], public safety networks [142], anti-jamming
communications in cognitive radio networks [143], users’ transmission power management and anti-jamming techniques in UAV-assisted networks [144], Quality of
Experience [145, 146] in cyber-physical social systems. In this dissertation, we enrich our introduced autonomous decision-making approaches with decision-maker’s
risk-aware behavior (i.e., concerning both gains and losses) under the principles of
Prospect Theory, and by considering the risk of failure of the CPR in the considered
application domain, as reflected by the theory of the Tragedy of the Commons.

2.3.1

Mathematical Background

Following the aforementioned properties of the behavioral model that is introduced
by Prospect Theory, each decision-maker’s n prospect-theoretic utility function for
an uncertain outcome zn ∈ R is of the following form:

 (z − z ◦ )αn
, when zn ≥ zn◦
n
n
un (zn ) =
 −kn (z ◦ − zn )βn , otherwise
n
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, where zn◦ is the reference point concerning which losses and gains are defined, and
αn , βn are real-valued parameters lying in the interval (0, 1]. In particular, regarding the first branch of Equation 2.34, the maximization of un directly implies the
maximization of decision-maker’s gains, with respect to its reference point zn◦ , which
constitutes the "safe" outcome, i.e., guaranteed perceived reward. On the other
hand, based on on the second branch of Equation 2.34, the maximization of un implies the minimization of decision-maker’s losses, which are evaluated with respect
to its reference point zn◦ as well.
The real parameters αn , βn ∈ (0, 1] describe decision-maker’s n sensitivity in gains
and losses, respectively, and these are expressed through its perceived outcome zn ,
and its reference point zn◦ . In other words, small values in αn describe decisionmaker’s risk-seeking behavior in losses, and risk-averse behavior in gains, while small
values in βn imply a higher decrease in decision-maker’s prospect-theoretic utility
function un when its perceived outcome zn is close to its reference point zn◦ . Furthermore, kn ∈ [0, ∞) reflects the impact of losses compared to gains in decisionmaker’s prospect-theoretic utility function un . In particular, for the case, kn > 1,
the decision-maker n weighs the losses more than the gains, whereas in the case
0 < kn ≤ 1 the decision-maker weighs the gains more or equal than the losses. As a
result, different values in αn , βn , kn allows taking into account with high granularity
all the different behavioral characteristics of each decision-maker, while in the case
where αn = α, βn = β, kn = k, ∀n ∈ N , a homogeneous decision-makers population
is considered with respect to their risk-aware characteristics.

2.3.2

Risk-aware Decision-Making Framework

In this chapter, we introduce a risk-aware decision-making framework, by bridging
Game Theory, Reinforcement Learning, and Prospect Theory, thus incorporating
decision-makers’ risk-aware characteristics in their decision-making process. The
latter is mainly motivated by the fact that in real-world applications, as the studied
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application domains in this dissertation, humans demonstrate risk-aware attitudes
during their decision-making process. The autonomous decision-making agents aim
to provide personalized experience to their owners, thus the user’s risk-aware characteristics should be considered properly. First of all, by adopting the notation that was

Figure 2.3: Risk-aware Reinforcement Learning

introduced in Chapter 2.2.1, a decision-maker’s n ∈ N received reward at slot t, and
after performing action an ∈ An , is defined as rn (t). As it was described in Chapter
2.2.3, under the concept of LGT, the decision-maker’s reward rn (t) can essentially be
its perceived utility function value un , given the setting of a non-cooperative game G.
In the introduced RL techniques in Chapters 2.2.1, and 2.2.3, the decision-maker’s n
reward rn (t) constitutes the environment’s feedback that drives its actions, thus its
learned policy πn . As a result, the decision-maker’s risk-aware characteristics could
directly be incorporated in the introduced RL setting, through reward reshaping
(Figure 2.3), thus via the decision-maker’s risk-aware reward, which is defined as
follows:

 (r (t) − r◦ (t))αn
, when rn (t) ≥ rn◦ (t)
n
n
rn (t) =
 −kn (r◦ (t) − rn (t))βn , otherwise
n
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, where rn (t) is the decision-maker’s n perceived reward at slot t, and is evaluated
with respect to its reference reward point rn◦ (t), which generally it is defined as a
function of slot t, whereas it could hold true that rn◦ (t) = rn◦ , ∀t. Furthermore, by
denoting as p the CPR’s probability of failure, and by assuming that in the case
of CPR’s not failure, the decision-maker’s perceived reward rn (t) is higher than its
corresponding reference reward point rn◦ (t), and lower in the case of CPR’s failure,
then Equation 2.35 could be rewritten as follows:

 (r (t) − r◦ (t))αn
, with probability (1 − p)
n
n
rn (t) =
 −kn (r◦ (t) − rn (t))βn , with probability p
n

(2.36)

Following the properties of rationality (Chapter 2.1), the decision-makers could be
modeled as risk-aware expected reward (utility) maximizers with respect to their
perceived reward in Equation 2.36 as follows:


E(rn (t)) = (1 − p) · (rn (t) − rn◦ (t))αn + p · −kn (rn◦ (t) − rn (t))βn

(2.37)

, where αn , βn , kn are the decision-maker’s risk-aware parameters, as these were described in Chapter 2.3.1. It is worth to be mentioned that, as in Chapters 2.2.1 &
2.2.3, the notions of decision-maker’s perceived reward rn and utility un are used
equivalently under the setting of a non-cooperative game G. As a result, Equations
2.35 & 2.37 could directly be used in the introduced RL techniques. In particular,
rn (t) corresponds to the environment’s returned reward for the decision-maker n,
after the latter performs its action an , whereas rn◦ (t) is the decision-maker’s n reference reward point. As a result, the new reshaped reward rn (t) could express the
decision-maker’s n final perceived reward after performing its action an , and in the
case of a rational decision-maker E(rn (t)) (Equation 2.37) could be used instead.
Under this setting, decision-makers’ risk-aware characteristics are incorporated in
their decision-making process. Furthermore, the existence, uniqueness, and convergence to NE points of the non-cooperative games under the introduced risk-aware
decision-making framework, are demonstrated in the studied application domains.
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Mobile Edge Computing
In this chapter, we present artificial intelligent and risk-aware autonomous decisionmaking approaches for the challenging and motivating application of Mobile Edge
Computing (MEC). First, we provide an overview of Mobile Edge Computing to
demonstrate its essential connection with Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC), and better underline the key benefits and features of the former compared to the latter one.
Then, we focus our analysis on MEC, as it constitutes an application domain that has
attracted tremendous research attention in the last 5 years, mainly since MEC can
offer unique capabilities and features for mobile devices and users. However, MEC
brings several key challenges that need to be tackled such that it is utilized effectively
and efficiently. Towards this direction, we propose and analyze our decision-making
approaches that meet several key and novel features and fulfill significant gaps in the
current research literature. Our introduced approaches utilize the introduced theoretical concepts, as these were presented in Chapter 2. In particular, we demonstrate
the applicability of our approaches, and we extend the basic theory with respect to
the unique properties of the MEC application domain. Furthermore, we evaluate
these approaches through extensive empirical work, which confirms our theory and
demonstrates our approaches’ perceived state-of-the-art performance.
The rise of 5G networks alongside the Internet of Things (IoT) evolution have
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skyrocketed the number of connected objects, which was around a few dozen billion
in 2015 and is foreseen to reach 500 billion devices that are connected to the Internet by 2030 [147], while the global mobile traffic is expected to increase sevenfold
by 2021 [148]. These applications with intensive computation demands mainly ask
for low latency and high energy consumption, which is difficult to be met by a mobile device, as it constitutes a resource-constrained computing system with limited
computing capability and battery availability [149]. Despite the recent hardware advances in smart devices, several of them are not yet capable of efficiently supporting
computationally-intensive applications, as their local computation and energy resources appear still insufficient. For that reason, MCC [150] was initially introduced
as a computation offloading paradigm, where mobile devices offload their computation tasks to Cloud servers with rich computing and storage resources. Despite
MCC’s powerful computing and storage capability, connecting and communicating
with remote servers in the cloud includes significant propagation delays in addition
to large and unpredictable queuing delays [151], which make it difficult for MCC to
fulfill the low latency requirements of the emerged applications of mobile devices.
Therefore, Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) [152, 153] was motivated as an alternative computation offloading paradigm that can promote the computation capability of mobile devices by providing computing services through MEC servers that are
located at the edge of the core networks, thus nearby. Specifically, small cell base
stations densely deployed and distributed close to mobile devices are empowered with
powerful computing capabilities, and turn into MEC servers, thus edge computing
nodes that can provide both communication and computation resources to mobile
devices. The latter can offload their intensive computation tasks to the MEC servers
for remote execution through wireless channels [154]. The data processing by MEC
servers near the edge of the network reduces the traffic congestion at the backhaul
of the network and makes propagation delays negligible. Furthermore, privacy and
security are enhanced through MEC in contradiction with the central cloud that has
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a single point of failure.
As a result, MEC provides the greatest help for latency-sensitive and computationally intensive applications, and several application domains such as connected
vehicles [155], mobile AR/VR [156], Smart Cities [157, 158], etc, could be benefited
and be developed effectively and efficiently by utilizing MEC. However, mobile devices’ computation offloading, i.e., data offloading, in a MEC environment is not
straightforward. The mobile devices’ computation offloading includes computation
probabilistic uncertainties due to the dynamic, and shared nature of the MEC environment, which need to be considered in the proposed resource allocation schemes,
as they influence the users’ experienced completion latency and energy consumption.
For that reason, some of the aforementioned key challenges in mobile devices
computation offloading in the MEC environment have attracted great interest in the
recent research literature [159]. Towards this direction, Software Defined Networking (SDN) [160] with its network programming capabilities stands out as a natural
candidate technology complementing the MEC advancement for designing dynamic,
intelligent, and adaptable networks that can address the key challenges in mobile
devices computation offloading paradigm. SDN separates the control from the data
plane and enables the programmable control mechanism [161]. To this end, MEC
can substantially benefit from the SDN technology [162], as a centralized entity, i.e.,
SDN controller, has a global view of the MEC environment and manages mobile
devices computation offloading more efficiently and dynamically.
Furthermore, Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies have the potential to effectively address unstructured and seemingly intractable problems [163, 164] involving
large and high dimensional amounts of data that need to be considered in the design
and optimization of mobile devices computation offloading scheme. Reinforcement
Learning (RL) [62], and its variant Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) [165, 166],
as these were introduced in Chapter 2.2, constitute indicative examples of AI-enabled
decision-making paradigms [167] that have attracted great interest in wireless net-
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works [168, 169]. The latter stems mainly due to RL’s capability to effectively design and optimize decision-making policies by exploiting the interactions with the
dynamic and unknown environment, as long as the recent advances in deep neural
networks that can empower RL, i.e., DRL, and make it able to deal with high dimensional data, while at the same time enriched and intelligent generalization among the
mobile devices is achieved. As a result, the interest of researchers in autonomous
decision-making approaches for mobile devices associated with MEC servers, and
mobile devices computation offloading is growing [170, 171, 172, 173].

3.1

Related Work

In this chapter, we review the current research literature for the main key challenges
that arise in a MEC environment. In particular, we focus on the mobile devices computation offloading problem, which includes the required resource allocation, and
mobile devices association with MEC servers, in the case where a multiple MEC
servers environment is considered. As a result, we present research works that have
well-investigated the aforementioned key challenges, by categorizing them into the
following categories, thus based on the MEC environment setup, i.e., single/multiple
MEC server(s), and key utilized technologies, i.e., RL/SDN-enabled MEC. In the first
two categories, with sufficient assumptions and considerations, the research works
focus on the data offloading problem through the consideration of well-established
mathematical theories and algorithms, e.g., convex optimization, Lyapunov optimization, etc, while in the latter two categories, the authors mainly aim to introduce
learning approaches that are able to deal with a more complex mathematical formalization of the aforementioned challenges, thus more realistically, e.g., mobility,
environment’s dynamics consideration.

Single MEC Server Environment: Regarding the single MEC server setup, Mao
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et al [174] have assumed that the computation task requests from the mobile users arrive in a stochastic manner, and they formulated a power consumption minimization
problem with task buffer stability constraints to examine the tradeoff between the
mobile users’ power consumption and the execution delay of the computation tasks.
The decision regarding the local execution and computation offloading is based on
Lyapunov optimization, while the communication resources, i.e., transmission power
and bandwidth, are allocated following the Gauss-Seidel method. A similar problem
is considered in [175] under the consideration of a multi-channel wireless interference
environment. The authors propose a distributed approach to determine the users’
computation offloading decisions based on game theory.
On the other hand, a centralized approach is introduced in [176], [177], targeting
the energy-efficient data offloading via jointly optimizing the computation offloading and the radio resource allocation for all the users in the network, to obtain the
minimal energy consumption under the latency constraints in a single-MEC server
environment. The same problem is studied in [178] under the assumption of mobile
users’ personalized delay requirements, which introduces additional constraints (as
many as the number of users) in the corresponding optimization problem. This problem has been also extended in a MIMO multicell system [179], where multiple users
offload their data to a single-MEC server. The formulated optimization problem is
non-convex, thus the authors propose an iterative algorithm following the successive
convex approximation technique to determine a local optimal data offloading and
radio resource allocation. In [180] and [181], the authors assumed an orthogonal
frequency division multiple access communication schemes and proposed a computation offloading approach that is minimizing the weighted sum of mobile users’ energy
consumption under appropriately considered constraints for the completion latencies
of the mobile users’ tasks.
In [182], the authors study the workload balancing problem in a fog network to
minimize the latency of data flows in the communications and processing procedures
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by associating mobile devices to suitable base stations. Hierarchical computing infrastructure is proposed in [183] consisting of shallow and deep cloudlets and the
authors study the problem of users’ data offloading to reduce the latency and improve the quality of service based on a queuing theory analysis. In [184], the authors
examine the joint optimization problem of minimizing the system cost in terms of
leasing virtual machines for computing purposes, while guaranteeing QoS requirements, and they address it as a mixed-integer nonlinear programming problem. In
[185], the author provides a techno-economic analysis via proposing a coalitional
game-based pricing scheme to study the users’ data offloading problem.
The centralized partial data offloading problem, while the mobile users can harvest energy from the environment, is studied in [186] and [187] based on linear programming and Lyapunov optimization, respectively, towards determining the optimal policies of offloading decision, clock frequency control, power splitting ratio,
and transmission power allocation. In [188], the authors focus their study on the
communication collisions at the shared network when multiple users offload their
data to a single-MEC server. The authors aim to minimize the average application
completion time following a mixed integer programming approach. The problem of
computation offloading under public safety events [189], where the MEC server can
become unreachable for various reasons, e.g., natural disaster, terrorist attacks [190],
is studied in [191]. The authors create mobile users’ clusters, which can execute the
assigned task by communicating in a device-to-device manner until the MEC server
becomes reachable again. Furthermore, two single-MEC server architectures have
been proposed in [192] and [193], named MVR architecture [192] which enables the
use of virtual resources at the MEC server by the mobile users, and HMEC architecture [193], which not only enables the users to exploit the MEC server’s computing
capabilities and energy availability, but also provides means to protect the users’
privacy.
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Multiple MEC Servers Environment: Limited research work however has been
performed so far in the multiple MEC servers environment regarding the full and/or
partial offloading and radio resource allocation. In this setting, several additional
dimensions arise in the decision-making process, namely: a) determine to which
server(s) should a user offload its data, b) determine the total amount of data to
be offloaded, and c) optimize the data offloading allocation among multiple MEC
servers. All these aspects ideally should be treated jointly, as there is a strong
interdependence among them. The latter makes the combined optimization and
decision-making problem more complicated with the increasing number of users and
MEC servers.
The problem of pure data offloading is studied in [194], where the authors aim
to determine the amount of offloaded data to each MEC server (without considering the radio resource allocation) via formulating a multiple knapsack problem.
Similarly, two separate problems are formulated in [195] regarding the mobile users’
energy consumption minimization and the minimization of the application’s execution latency. Both problems are non-convex ones and the authors transform the first
problem to a convex one based on the variable substitution technique, while they
propose a locally optimal algorithm with the univariate search technique to address
the second one. The joint data offloading and radio resource allocation problem has
been recently studied in [196] considering that the mobile users can harvest energy
from the surrounding environment.

SDN-enabled MEC: The capabilities of SDN [197] have been exploited by the
MEC environment to intelligently address the mobile users’ computation offloading
problem. In [198] the authors propose an approach for selecting a computing node,
i.e., mobile user’s device, MEC server, cloud server, through an SDN controller.
The latter acts as a decision-maker that executes the Computing Mode Selection
algorithm and its decisions are shared with the mobile users. Moreover, in [199],
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SDN is used for designing an SDN enabled MEC framework for vehicular networks,
where the authors suggest SDN as a candidate and promising solution for overcoming
key challenges such as network scalability, and data traffic overload. The authors
deploy an SDN technology with multiple SDN controllers, which can change their
status into active or sleep based on the network status. Furthermore, the benefits of
exploiting SDN in MEC within the era of Internet of Things (IoT) are discussed in
details in the surveys [200, 162].
The authors in [201] focused their investigation on computation-intensive virtual
reality and vehicular IoT applications, where an SDN enabled MEC framework was
proposed for providing the necessary data plane flexibility, and reduced latency. On
the other hand, in [202] SDN’s capabilities are exploited for enhancing security in
IoT, while in [203] SDN is combined with MEC to overcome the limitations of network densification of IoT within a smart home environment.

RL-enabled MEC: Recently, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has been utilized by
the MEC environment as a powerful and data-driven decision-making paradigm that
deals with the dynamic MEC environment. The majority of the recent research works
focus on designing and optimizing mobile users’ computation offloading policies in a
MEC environment by exploiting RL’s capabilities. Specifically, most of these research
works introduce RL-based computation offloading policies, where each mobile user
acts as decision-making agent and learns an optimal policy by using its observed
interactions with the MEC environment. In [204] the authors propose a DRL-based
approach to minimize the computation cost of each mobile user concerning energy
consumption and buffering delay. The authors introduce a decentralized scheme,
where each user learns an optimal continuous power allocation policy for both local
execution and computation offloading. For that reason, each user maintains and
trains a neural network on its interactions with the MEC environment and through
a Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) approach [205] due to the continuous
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nature (power allocation) of the problem.
On the other hand, in [206] the authors extend each mobile user’s computation
offloading policy since, except the power allocation, they also include the computation offloading decision, i.e., selection of a MEC server, and the CPU frequency
allocation in the case of local execution. Similarly, the authors assume that each
mobile user maintains its own Deep Q-network (DQN) [92], which is trained on mobile user’s interactions with the MEC environment. A different RL-based approach
is introduced in [105], where a centralized decision-making agent learns an optimal
policy for mobile users’ computation offloading decisions (offload or not), and the
computational resource allocation at the MEC server’s side. The policy is learned
and optimized through RL and towards minimizing the overall aggregated cost of the
system. The authors utilized a DQN network with a pre-classification step before
learning to limit the large action space of the agent.
In [207] a semi-distributed computation offloading and scheduling algorithm based
on DRL is introduced in an IoT MEC environment. The learned optimal policy minimizes the weighted sum of average delay and power consumption overall IoT devices.
The authors consider a stochastic underlying arrival model that describes the dynamics of the MEC environment and utilize DRL for approximating the optimal value
functions and determine an optimal policy. In a similar IoT MEC environment in
[208], the authors propose a computation offloading problem formalization under the
setting of partial offloading, thus each mobile user’s application can be arbitrarily
divided into two parts, where one part is computed locally, while the remaining part
is offloaded to a MEC server. The latter constitutes the offloading strategy of each
mobile user, and the authors proposed a DRL-based approach that exploits a DQN
to optimize mobiles uses’ offloading strategies such that the overall system’s cost
is minimized. Furthermore, the mobile users’ association to MEC servers is performed through a separate algorithm, which is based on channel gains, thus through
a communication metric related to the wireless channel’s conditions and mobile users’
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mobility

3.2

Contributions

The key contributions of the following presented research work towards addressing
the aforementioned challenges, and filling several research gaps in Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), are summarized as follows:
1. The problem of monetary-based pricing of the MEC servers computing services
has not been addressed in the existing literature. To this end, an SDN-powered
MEC architecture towards dealing with the joint problem of intelligent MEC server
selection and mobile users’ data offloading in multiple MEC servers and multiple
mobile users, is proposed. MEC servers’ key characteristics, i.e., pricing, discount,
cost, and users’ offloaded data are considered for introducing welfare functions for
the MEC servers. The mobile users’ association to the MEC servers is handled
by an RL framework that utilizes each MEC server’s reputation score, and past
experiences for optimizing mobile users’ perceived cumulative reward. A two-layers
optimization problem is formulated and solved by the SDN controller aiming at
maximizing the MEC servers’ profit and also maximizing the perceived satisfaction
by the mobile users. The mobile users’ maximization problem of their satisfaction
is addressed at the first stage as a non-cooperative game among the end-users, who
practically aim at maximizing their utility function. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) point
is determined, which expresses the optimal amount of offloading data for each mobile
user. At the second stage of the joint optimization problem, given the mobile users’
offloaded data, an optimization problem of each MEC server’s profit (as expressed by
its welfare function) is formulated and solved by the MEC servers. A series of detailed
simulation experiments and a comparative evaluation are performed to evaluate the
performance of the proposed decision-making framework.
2. We introduce a surveillance system consisting of areas of interest (AoI) with IP
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cameras, MEC servers, and a Fully Autonomous Aerial System (FAAS). The cameras
partially offload the computing tasks related to the videos’ processing to the MEC
server that is associated with the AoI or to the FAAS, if the latter is flying above
the AoI, while the rest are executed locally at the IP cameras. Each IP camera
experiences a time and energy overhead to offload its data and process a part of the
data locally. A holistic utility function is introduced representing the IP cameras’
level of achieved Quality-of-Service (QoS) while accounting for their time and energy
constraints that they possess in the video processing procedure. A non-cooperative
game among the IP cameras is formulated and the concept of Satisfaction Equilibrium
(SE) (Chapter 2.1) is adopted to determine a stable data offloading, where the IP
cameras satisfy their minimum QoS prerequisites. A distributed decision-making
framework based on RL determines the IP cameras’ data offloading at the SE, if the
latter exists. If the SE does not exist, the proposed Distributed Learning Satisfaction
Equilibrium (DLSE) algorithm converges to the Generalized SE, where only a part
of the cameras satisfy their QoS prerequisites. A Reinforcement Learning (RL)
algorithm indicates the FAAS’s movement by considering the quality of information
from the AoIs. Detailed numerical results are presented to evaluate the proposed
framework’s pure operation, and its scalability performance, while a comparative
evaluation is provided to show its drawbacks and benefits.
3. We propose a risk-aware decision-making framework that incorporates human
awareness for IoT devices’ computation offloading to a MEC server, by leveraging the
principles of Game Theory and Prospect Theory. The consideration of the proposed
decision-making framework is well motivated and supported by the observations that
the MEC IoT environment presents a competitive resource-constrained environment,
where the users are making decisions under uncertainty, which stems from the partially available information and the competition to share the limited resources. The
individual entities of a system, i.e., cognitive IoT devices, make distributed and
autonomous decisions under risk and uncertainty of the associated payoff of their de-
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cisions, which is determined in a probabilistic manner, while they may demonstrate
systematic deviations from the expected utility theory, where all the individuals are
assumed as risk-neutral concerning their choices. To this end, a properly defined
prospect-theoretic utility function is utilized, which encapsulates the device’s perceived energy and time overhead. The devices’ data offloading is formulated as a
non-cooperative game, and is solved in a distributed manner by converging to a
unique Nash Equilibrium point (Chapter 2.1, whose existence and uniqueness are
theoretically proven, and empirically shown. A series of experiments are performed
to evaluate the performance and the inherent attributes of the proposed risk-aware
decision-making framework.
4. Towards fulfilling the limited research work that has been performed so far in multiple MEC server environments, We extend our risk-aware decision-making framework towards considering and addressing mobile users’ computation offloading under
energy and time overhead constraints in multiple MEC servers, and multiple mobile
users environment. We address the data offloading problem under realistic uncertainties of the multiple MEC servers that have certain and limited capabilities. To
this end a heterogeneous environment is introduced, where each user can offload
arbitrarily parts of its application to multiple MEC servers for remote execution.
The users determine, under risk, the computation load to be offloaded at each MEC
server, taking into consideration the computation uncertainty (limited computation
capability) at each MEC server, due to its shared nature among the users. The problem of each user determining autonomously the portion of its computation task that
will be performed at each MEC server has been formulated as a constrained convex optimization problem of each user’s satisfaction utility and is treated as a noncooperative game among the users. The respective non-cooperative game is solved in
a distributed manner, and the existence and uniqueness of a Pure Nash Equilibrium
(PNE) are proven. A distributed decision-making framework that converges to the
PNE is introduced. Our indicative results demonstrate the performance of the risk-
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aware decision-making framework under the considered complex environment, and a
comparative evaluation highlights its benefits and state-of-the-art performance.
A detailed description of the introduced decision-making frameworks, alongside
their theoretical principles and empirical evaluations, is demonstrated in the following
chapters.

3.3

Intelligent Data Offloading in Competitive Mobile Edge Computing Market

Software-Defined Networks (SDN) and Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), capable
of dynamically managing and satisfying the end-users computing demands, have
emerged as key enabling technologies of 5G networks. In this research work, the joint
problem of MEC server selection by the end-users and their optimal data offloading,
as well as the optimal price setting by the MEC servers is studied in multiple MEC
servers and multiple end-users environments. The flexibility and programmability
offered by the SDN technology enable the realistic implementation of the proposed
framework. Initially, an SDN controller executes a Reinforcement Learning framework based on the theory of Stochastic Learning Automata (Chapter 2.2.3) towards
enabling the end-users to select a MEC server to offload their data.
The discount offered by the MEC server, its congestion, and its penetration in
terms of serving end-users computing tasks and its announced pricing for its computing services is considered in the overall MEC selection process. To determine
the end-users’ data offloading portion to the selected MEC server, a non-cooperative
game among the end-users of each server is formulated and the existence and uniqueness of the corresponding Nash Equilibrium are shown. An optimization problem of
maximizing the MEC servers’ profit is formulated and solved in order toe the MEC
servers’ optimal pricing with respect to their offered computing services and the
received offloaded data. To realize the proposed framework, an iterative and low-
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complexity algorithm is introduced and designed. The performance of the proposed
approach is evaluated through modeling and simulation under several scenarios, with
both homogeneous and heterogeneous end-users.

3.3.1

System Model
SDN Controller

MEC Server Selection based on
Stochastic Learning Automata

(b(t)*, p(t)*)

a(t)

Optimal Data Offloading

p(t)*

Optimal Pricing of the MEC
Servers Computing Services

b(t)*

Figure 3.1: SDN-enabled MEC architecture

The SDN-enabled MEC architecture consisting of multiple MEC servers and multiple end-users is presented in Figure 3.1. Each MEC server s ∈ S, S = [1, ..., s, ...|S|],
(t)

communicates with the SDN controller towards setting the price ps [$/bits] of its
computing services per time slot t. The whole operation of the examined system
is divided in time slots, where T = [1, ...t, ..., |T |] denotes their corresponding set.
At each time slot, the SDN controller determines the MEC server selection by the
(t)

end-users (see Section 3.3.2), as well as the optimal price ps for each MEC server
(t)

and the optimal data offloading bu,s [bits] of each end-user u to the selected server s
(see Section 3.3.3). Each end-user u, u ∈ U, U = [1, ..., u, ...|U |] receives the required
(t)

information by the SDN controller to offload its data bu,s to the selected server s.
(t)

Each end-user u has a maximum amount of data Iu that should be processed to
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perform a computing task, and part of them are offloaded to the MEC server, i.e.,
(t)

(t)

(t)

bu,s ∈ Au = [0, Iu ], while the rest of the data are processed locally.
End-User Utility Function
At the beginning of each time slot, each end-user u sends to the SDN controller its
(t)

total computing demands Iu that is needed to execute a computing task, while the
(t)

SDN controller determines the optimal amount of offloaded data bu,s for end-user u
at the MEC server s, as it will be explained in detail in Section 3.3.3. Given that the
MEC servers have bounded and limited computing capabilities, the data offloading
(t)

strategies of the rest of the end-users, i.e., b−u , contribute to the configuration of the
(t)

prices announced by the MEC servers and influence the data offloading bu,s of enduser u. Thus, towards formulating the user’s u perceived satisfaction, the end-user’s
(t)
P P
b
(t)
(t)
(t)
relative data offloading is defined as ru = u,s
(t) , where B−u =
s∈S
u0 ∈U,u0 6=u bu0 ,s
B−u

expresses the total data offloading of the rest of the end-users u0 , u0 ∈ U − {u}. The
(t)

end-user’s actual perceived satisfaction su at time slot t is increasing with respect to
(t)

its relative data offloading bu,s , as part of the requested computing task is offloaded
to the MEC server and does not consume the end-user’s local computing resources.
(t)

Also, after the end-user offloads its total data Iu to the MEC server, its perceived
satisfaction is saturated as the end-user cannot benefit more from the MEC server’s
computing services. Thus, without loss of generality and for presentation purposes
only, here we adopt a logarithmic function with respect to the end-user’s offloaded
(t)

data bu,s to capture end-user’s actual perceived satisfaction, as follows.
(t)

(t)
(t)
s(t)
u (bu,s , b−u ) = αu log(1 + βu ru )

(3.1)

(t)

where b−u is the vector of all end-users data offloading excluding end-user u, and
the αu , βu ∈ R+ parameters determine the slope of the logarithmic function in a
personalized manner for end-user u, thus, expressing how easily or not an end-user
u becomes satisfied by offloading its data to the MEC server.
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Additionally, each end-user is charged for using the MEC server’s computing
services in a fair manner accordingly to its relative data offloading. This policy
enables even the low-budget end-users to exploit the MEC servers’ capabilities at
some degree, by prohibiting the high-budget ones to dominate the system. Thus, the
cost function of end-user’s u offloaded data is formulated as follows.
(t)

(t)
(t) (t) (t)
c(t)
u (bu,s , b−u ) = du ps ru
(t)

(3.2)

(t)

where du , du ∈ R+ expresses end-user’s u spending dynamics in order to use the
(t)

MEC server’s computing services. Specifically, a smaller value of du reflects enduser’s u dynamic behavior to spend more money in order to buy computing support
from the MEC servers. The price announced by the MEC server s is denoted as
(t)

ps [$/bits].
Following the above analysis, end-user’s u utility function captures both its actual
(t)

(t)

perceived satisfaction su and its corresponding cost cu in order to enjoy the MEC
server’s computing services. The end-user’s u utility function is defined as follows.
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)
(t) (t)
(t) (t)
(t)
(t) (t) (t)
Uu(t) (b(t)
u,s , b−u , p ) = su (bu,s , b−u ) − cu (bu,s , b−u ) = αu log(1 + βu ru ) − du ps ru

(3.3)
(t)

(t)

(t)

where p(t) = [p1 , ..., ps , ..., p|S| ] denotes the vector of the prices announced by all
the MEC servers.

Mobile Edge Computing Server Characteristics & Profit
Each MEC server s, s ∈ S supports a total computing demand of the end-users per
P
(t)
time slot equal to u∈U bu,s from all the end-users that selected the specific MEC
server to offload their data. Also, towards providing incentives to the end-users to
(t)

select a specific MEC server to be served from, the latter provides some discounts fs

expressed as a percentage of the originally announced price of its computing services.
(t)

Furthermore, the MEC server has an actual cost cs [$/bits] to process the amount
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of data that it receives. Please be also reminded that the MEC server charges the
(t)

end-users with a price ps [$/bits] for the computing services that it offers.
Additionally, a MEC server increases its positive reputation towards the end-users
if it is characterized by a good penetration within the end-users’ computing demands.
Specifically, the penetration of a MEC server s is defined as the total amount of data
that the server s processed over the total amount of data that are processed within
P

the SDN-powered MEC system for a total time period T , i.e.,

P

t∈{1,...,T }

s∈S

P

P

(t)

u∈U

t∈{1,...,T }

P

bu,s
(t)

.

bu,s
M ax
Bs .

u∈U

Also, we assume that each MEC server s can handle a total amount of data

Thus, an indicative parameter showing the congestion of the MEC server per time
slot in terms of processing the end-users’ offloaded data is expressed as the ratio of
P
(t)
the total amount of data u∈U bu,s that the MEC server processes in time slot t over
(t)
u∈U bu,s
M
ax
Bs

P

its total computing capability of data BsM ax , i.e., CON Gs =

. Following the

above analysis and combining all the aforementioned factors and parameters that
characterize the MEC server s, its reputation score within the SDN-powered MEC
environment is defined as follows.
(t)
(t)
k6=s [(1−fk )]pk

P

Rs(t)

= w1

(1 −

K
(t) (t)
fs )ps

1
+ w2
+ w3 P
(1 + CON Gs )3

P

s∈S

t∈{1,...,T }

P

(t)

P

u∈U

t∈{1,...,T }

bu,s
(t)

P

u∈U

(3.4)

bu,s

In Equation 3.4, the first term expresses the relative pricing of a MEC server s in
terms of offering its computing services to the end-users, the second term expresses
the level of MEC server’s congestion towards serving the end-users, while the third
term expresses its penetration in serving end-users’ computing demands. The weights
w1 , w2 , w3 are configurable parameters that express the relative weight of each term
within our study, and it should hold true that w1 + w2 + w3 = 1. The revenue of each
P
(t)
MEC server s from processing a total amount of end-users’ offloaded data u∈U bu,s
(t)

(t)

depends on the announced price ps and the corresponding discount fs

that the

MEC server provides, and is given as follows.
REVs(t) (b(t) , p(t) ) = (1 − fs(t) )p(t)
s

X
u∈U
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where b(t) is the data offloading vector of all the end-users and p(t) denotes the
announced prices by all the MEC servers in the system. On the other hand, the
MEC server’s total monetary cost to perform the processing of the offloaded data, is
given as follows.
Cs(t) (b(t) ) = c(t)
s

X

b(t)
u,s

(3.6)

u∈U
(t)

where cs is the MEC server’s s computing cost per unit of data. Thus, the MEC
server’s profit is concluded by subtracting its cost from its revenue and is given as
follows.
Ps(t) (b(t) , p(t) ) = REVs(t) (b(t) , p(t) ) − Cs(t) (b(t) ) = (1 − fs(t) )p(t)
s

X
u∈U

(t)
b(t)
u,s − cs

X

b(t)
u,s

u∈U

(3.7)

3.3.2

MEC as a Learning System

At the SDN controller’s side, each end-user is represented and considered as a
Stochastic Learning Automaton that senses the environment and it makes future
decisions based on its past experience. At each time slot t, the end-user can select
to be served by a MEC server s, s ∈ S, thus, the set of end-users’ actions at time
slot t is a(t) = {a1 , ..., as , ..., aS }. The SDN controller has the information of the
end-users’ offloaded data b(t) and the prices p(t) that the MEC servers announce
regarding offering their computing services. The SDN controller can determine the
(t)

reputation score Rs for each MEC server, which can be normalized towards defining
the reward probability as follows.
(t)

rews(t)

=P

Rs

s∈S

(t)

(t)

(3.8)

Rs

(t)

The reward probability rews , 0 ≤ rews ≤ 1 represents the potential reward that
an end-user may experience by choosing to offload its data to the MEC server s.
Following the theory of the Stochastic Learning Automata (Chapter 2.2.3), the action
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(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

probability vector of an end-user u, u ∈ U is Pru = [P ru,1 , ..., P ru,s , ..., P ru,S ], where
(t)

P ru,s is defined as the probability of the end-user u to select the MEC server s to
offload its data. Based on the theory of Stochastic Learning Automata (Chapter
2.2.3), the rule of updating the end-users’ action probabilities at the SDN controller
is defined as follows.

(t)
(t)
(t+1)
, s(t+1) 6= s(t)
− b · rews(t) · P ru,s
= P ru,s
P ru,s

(3.9a)

(t+1)
(t)
(t)
P ru,s
= P ru,s
+ b · rews(t) · (1 − P ru,s
), s(t+1) = s(t)

(3.9b)

where 0 < b < 1 denotes the learning parameter expressing how fast the end-users
explore the available options of the MEC servers towards offloading their data. Equation 3.9a represents the probability of end-user u selecting a different MEC server
to offload its data in the next time slot t + 1 compared to end-user’s choice in the
current time slot t, while Equation 3.9a expresses the probability of end-user u to
keep being served by the same MEC server. It is noted that initially, the end-users’
(t=0)

action probabilities are initialized as P ru,s

= S1 . The MEC server selection learning

process executed at the SDN controller is presented in the Data Offloading and MEC
Server Selection (DO-MECS) algorithm (see Section 3.3.4).

3.3.3

Autonomous Data Offloading & Price Setting

Following the above described Reinforcement Learning technique of the Stochastic
Learning Automata, each end-user has concluded the selection of a MEC server to
offload its data. Then, the goal of each MEC server is to maximize its profit by
processing the end-users’ data, while the goal of each end-user is to maximize its
perceived satisfaction, as expressed by its utility function, by offloading the optimal
amount of data to the selected MEC server. Thus, a two-layer optimization problem
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is formulated, as follows.
(t)

(t)
b(t)∗ = arg max Uu(t) (b(t)
u,s , b−u , p )

(3.10a)

(t)

bu,s

p(t)∗ = arg max Ps(t) (b(t) , p(t) )

(3.10b)

p(t)

As it is observed by Equation 3.10a and Equation 3.10b, the MEC servers optimal
price p(t)∗ and the end-users optimal data offloading b(t)∗ are interdependent, thus,
the joint optimization problem is formulated as a two-layer optimization framework.
Initially, the end-users determine their optimal data offloading b(t)∗ via confronting
the optimization problem of their utility functions as a non-cooperative game among
them. Then, at the second layer, the MEC servers determine their optimal announced
prices p(t)∗ given the data offloading of the end-users, via solving an optimization
problem. The formulation and solution of the optimization problem are performed at
the SDN controller, where its advanced computing capabilities enable fast decisionmaking. In the following two subsections, we will analyze in detail each layer of the
optimization problem.
Optimal Data Offloading
(t)∗

At first the optimal data offloading bu,s of each end-user u that has selected to offload
its data to the MEC server s at the time slot t is determined. A non-cooperative
(t)

(t)

game G = [U, {Au }, {Uu }] is formulated among the end-users who compete with
each other towards determining their optimal data offloading. The game G consists
of three components: (a) the set of end-users (i.e., players) U = [1, ..., u, ..., |U |], (b)
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

the strategy space Au = [0, Iu ], where bu,s ∈ Au , and (c) the end-user’s utility
(t)

function Uu . Each end-user wants to maximize its personal utility function, while
considering the physical limitations, as follows.
(t)
maxb(t)
U (t) (b(t)
u,s , b−u , p )
u,s u

(t)

(3.11a)

(t)
0 ≤ b(t)
u,s ≤ Iu

(3.11b)

s.t.
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In the following analysis, our goal is to show the existence and uniqueness of a
Nash Equilibrium (Chapter 2.1) for the data offloading game. The necessary and
(t)

sufficient conditions are: (i) the strategy space Au , ∀u ∈ U should be non-empty,
convex and compact subset of an Euclidean space RU and (ii) the utility function
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

Uu (bu,s , b−u , p(t) ) is continuous in bu and quasi-concave in bu,s .
(t)

(t)

Theorem 3 The Nash Equilibrium point of the game G = [U, {Au }, {Uu }] exists
and the end-user’s best response data offloading strategy is given as follows.
(t)

B−u αu βu
− 1]
[
(t)
βu d(t)
u ps

(t)∗

BRu (b−u ) = b(t)∗
u,s =
(t)∗

(3.12)

(t)

where 0 ≤ bu,s ≤ Iu .
(t)

(t)

Proof: The strategy space Au = [0, Iu ] represents the amount of data that the
end-user u can offload to a MEC server s, thus by definition it is non-empty, convex,
and compact subset of the Euclidean space RU . Also, based on Equation 3.3, the
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

utility function Uu (bu,s , b−u , p(t) ) is continuous in bu . Furthermore, we determine
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

the second order derivative of the utility function Uu (bu,s , b−u ) with respect to bu,s ,
as follows:
(t)

(t)

∂ 2 Uu (bu,s )
(t)2
∂bu,s

(t)

Given that

(t)

∂ 2 Uu (bu,s )
(t)2
∂bu,s

=−

(t)

αu βu2
(t)2
B−u

(t)

1

·

(t)

[βu +

βu bu,s 2
(t) ]
B−u

<0

(t)

(3.13)

(t)

< 0, the Uu (bu,s , b−u , p(t) ) is concave in bu,s , thus, it is also

(t)

quasi-concave in bu,s . Therefore, the Nash Equilibrium point of the game G =
(t)

(t)

[U, {Au }, {Uu }] exists. Towards determining the best response strategy of each
(t)

(t)

(t)

end-user, we calculate the critical points of the Uu (bu,s , b−u , p(t) ), as follows.
(t)

(t)

∂Uu

(t)

∂bu,s

=0⇔

b(t)
u,s

B
αu βu
= −u ( (t) (t) − 1)
βu du ps

(3.14)

The data offloading of each end-user u should satisfy the physical limitations, i.e.,
(t)

(t)

0 ≤ bu,s ≤ Iu , thus we have the following cases.
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(t) (t)

(t)∗

CASE A: If du ps > αu βu then the best response strategy is bu,s < 0. But since the
(t)

physical limitation imposed states that 0 ≤ bu,s and our function is concave, then
(t)∗

the best response should be bu,s = 0.
(t) (t)

CASE B: If du ps <

αu βu
(t) βu
+1
(t)
B−u

Iu

(t)∗

(t)

then the best response strategy is bu,s > Iu . But
(t)

(t)

since the physical limitation imposed states that bu,s ≤ Iu and our function is
(t)∗

(t)

concave, then the best response should be bu,s = Iu .
CASE C: If

αu βu
(t) βu
+1
(t)
B−u

Iu

(t) (t)

(t)∗

≤ du ps ≤ αu βu then the best response strategy is 0 ≤ bu,s ≤

(t)

Iu which satisfies the physical limitation. In this case, the best response is given by
(t)∗

the equation bu,s =

(t)

B−u αu βu
( (t) (t)
βu du
ps

− 1).

Theorem 3 proves the existence of the Nash Equilibrium point of the game G and
determines the best response strategy for each end-user u, u ∈ U . In the following
theorem, the uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium point of the game G is examined.
(t)∗

Theorem 4 The Nash Equilibrium point bu,s , ∀u ∈ U, s ∈ S of the game G is
unique.
(t)∗

(t)∗

Proof: The uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium point bu,s = BRu (b−u ), for cases
A and B, the Nash Equilibrium point is trivially unique, while for case C we should
(t)∗

show that the best response strategy BRu (b−u ) is a standard function [209]. The
properties of a standard function are the following:
• Positivity f (x) > 0;
• Monotonicity: if x ≥ x0 , then f (x) ≥ f (x0 );
• Scalability: for all a > 1, a · f (x) ≥ f (a · x).
If a fixed point exists in a standard function, then it is unique [209]. Using
Equation 3.12, the above properties of the standard function can be easily shown for
(t)∗

the end-user’s best response function BRu (b−u ). Thus, the Nash Equilibrium point
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of the game G is unique. In conclusion, it is noted that the optimal data offloading
of each end-user is given by Equation 3.12.
Optimal Pricing of the MEC Servers Computing Services
Here, the optimal pricing of the MEC server’s computing services is determined towards maximizing the MEC servers’ profit given the offloaded data of the end-users.
Combining Equation 3.7, Equation 3.10b and Equation 3.12, the corresponding optimal pricing problem of the MEC servers can be written as follows.
p(t)∗ = arg max Ps(t) (b(t) , p(t) )
p(t)

= (1 −

fs(t) )p(t)
s

(t)
(t)
X B−u
X B−u
αu βu
αu βu
(t)
[ (t) (t) − 1]] − cs
[
[ (t) (t) − 1]]
[
βu du p s
βu du ps
u∈U
u∈U

(3.15)

Based on Equation 3.15, it is observed that the optimal pricing problem of the
(t)

MEC servers’ computing services is a function only of their prices ps , s ∈ S.
Theorem 5 The optimal pricing announced by each MEC server for its computing
services given the end-users offloaded data and towards maximizing its own profit is
given as follows.
(t)

p(t)∗
=[
s

B−u
(t) P
u∈U d(t)
u
]1/2
(t)
(t) P
fs ) u∈U B−u

αu βu cs
(1 −

(3.16)

Proof: Towards determining the optimal pricing announced by each MEC server, we
(t)

take the first order derivative with respect to ps and determine the critical points.
(t)

∂Ps (b(t) , p(t) )
(t)

∂ps

(t)
X B−u
X (t) c(t)
1
s αu
(t)
= − (1 − fs )
B−u + (t)2
=0
(t)
βu
p
d
s
u
u∈U
u∈U

(3.17)

Thus, the critical points are given as per Equation 3.16. Furthermore, by checking
(t)

(t)

the second order derivative of Ps (b(t) , p(t) ) with respect to ps , we have:
(t)

∂ 2 Ps (b(t) , p(t) )
(t)2

∂ps
(t)∗

Thus, ps

=

(t)
X B−u

αu
−2c(t)
s
(t)3
ps u∈U
(t)

(t)

<0

du

maximizes the MEC server’s profit Ps (b(t) , p(t) ).
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3.3.4

Data Offloading and MEC Server Selection Algorithm

We introduce an iterative and low-complexity decision-making algorithm towards
realizing the Data Offloading and MEC Server Selection (DO-MECS algorithm).
The DO-MECS algorithm consists of two main components. At the first component,
the MEC server selection by the end-users is executed following the theory of the
Stochastic Learning Automata, as presented in Section 3.3.2. Then, at the second
component of the DO-MECS algorithm, the end-users’ optimal data offloading and
the MEC servers’ optimal pricing are determined, as presented in Section 3.3.3. It is
noted that the first part of the DO-MECS algorithm runs at the beginning of each
time slot, while the second part of the algorithm runs for multiple iterations within
each time slot.
DO-MECS Algorithm:
Step 1 (Initialization): At the first time slot t = 0, set the initial MEC server
selection probability vector as Pru (t = 0), where P ru,s (t = 0) = S1 , ∀u ∈ U, s ∈ S.
Step 2 (MEC Server Selection): At the beginning of each time slot (t > 0), each enduser chooses a MEC server to offload its data based on its action probability vector
Pru (t). If P ru,s (t) ≥ 0.999 for all the MEC servers s, s ∈ S, then stop. Otherwise,
set i = 0, where i denotes the iteration of the second part of the algorithm.
Step 3 (Optimal Data Offloading): Each end-user has been associated with a MEC
server and all the MEC servers announce their prices. Each end-user determines its
optimal data offloading based on Equation 3.12.
Step 4 (Optimal Pricing): Given the end-users’ offloading data, each MEC server
determines the optimal pricing of its computing services based on Equation 3.16.
(t)∗

(t)∗

(t)∗

(t)∗

Step 5 (Convergence): If |bu,s |i+1 −bu,s |i | ≤ 1 and |ps |i+1 −ps |i | ≤ 2 , ∀s ∈ S, u ∈
U , where 1 , 2 (small positive constants) are the convergence control parameters,
then stop. Otherwise, go to Step 3.
Step 6 (Update): Update the end-users’ action probabilities based on Equation 3.9a
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and Equation 3.9b and return to Step 2.

3.3.5

Empirical Evaluation

We provide a detailed empirical evaluation that illustrates the operation, features and
benefits of the proposed DO-MECS framework. We focus on the pure operational
characteristics of our framework, while a comparative evaluation of our approach
against alternative methodologies is provided. Unless otherwise explicitly indicated,
a detailed Monte Carlo analysis [210] has been executed for all the presented numerical results considering averages over 1000 executions.
Operation of the DO-MECS Framework
Table 3.1: MEC servers’ characteristics
Cost c Discount fs
Server
Server
Server
Server
Server

1
2
3
4
5

0.12
0.14
0.20
0.17
0.13

0.05
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.05

Towards illustrating the successful operation of the DO-MECS framework, we
performed detailed simulations considering two main cases regarding the end-users
that reside within the MEC environment: a) homogeneous end-users, and b) heterogeneous end-users, regarding their sensitivity on the pricing imposed by the MEC
(t)

servers (i.e., end-user dynamics du in Equation 3.2). In our simulations, we consider
S = 5 MEC servers and U = 100 end-users, while for demonstration purposes the
weights w1 , w2 , w3 in Equation 3.4 have been considered of same importance, and
each one equal to 1/3. The parameters that characterize the different MEC servers
are presented in Table 3.1.
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(a) Servers’ Pricing

(d) Servers’ Penetration

(b) Number of Users per
Server

(e) Servers’ Reputation

(c) Servers’ Congestion

(f) Servers’ Profit

Figure 3.2: Proposed framework’s operation per time slots - Homogeneous Users

Homogeneous End-Users: Initially, concerning the scenario of homogeneous endusers, Figure 3.2 presents, in a comprehensive manner, indicative numerical results
regarding the pure operation of the DO-MECS algorithm, to gain some insight into
the key operational characteristics and contributions of the various components of
our framework. Specifically, Figure 3.2a presents the relative pricing of each MEC
server, i.e.,

P
(t)
(t)
k6=s [(1−fk )]pk
K
(t) (t)
(1−fs )ps

, as it is determined at the end of each time slot with

respect to the time slots that DO-MECS algorithm needs to converge. It is observed
that in all cases convergence is obtained in less than 3000 time slots, corresponding
to the actual running time of less than 14 seconds for learning rate b = 0.2. Note
that significantly lower convergence times can be achieved if higher learning rates
are considered, as demonstrated later in Section Comparative Evaluation. As it is
presented in Figure 3.2a and Figure 3.2b, the greater is the relative pricing for each
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MEC server, the more attractive it becomes for the end-users. Server 1 accumulates
the majority of the end-users since from Table 3.1 we notice that Server 1 has both
the smallest cost and offers the highest discount compared to the other MEC servers.
The same trend and reasoning follow for the rest of the servers. Please note here
that due to the homogeneity of the considered population each end-user offloads
(t)

the same amount of data (in this experiment offloads its total data, i.e., Iu

=

1000Bytes), to the corresponding selected MEC server, as determined by the MEC
Server Selection process (Step 2 of DO-MECS Algorithm) based on the theory of the
Stochastic Learning Automata (Section 3.3.2). In the following, a different scenario
with heterogeneous end-users is considered and demonstrated, where the end-users
decide to offload different amounts of data, based on the overall system dynamics.
As expected, the congestion on each MEC server, i.e., CON Gs =

P

(t)

u∈U bu,s
,
BsM ax

fol-

lows the same trend as the number of end-users selecting each MEC server (Figure
3.2b). The latter observation is expected, as the more end-users select to offload their
data to a MEC server, the more congested that MEC server becomes (Figure 3.2c)
P

and a greater penetration, i.e.,

P

t∈{1,...,T }

s∈S

P

(t)

P

u∈U

t∈{1,...,T }

P

bu,s
(t)

u∈U

bu,s

, is achieved by that server.

In particular, the MEC servers’ penetration in serving the end-users computing demands is presented in Figure 3.2d. Furthermore, from Equation 3.4, we observe that
the reputation score Rs depends on the relative pricing, the congestion, and the penetration of the MEC servers. The Rs essentially controls the probability based on
which each end-user will select a server to offload its data. In Figure 3.2e, the results
illustrate that the proposed DO-MECS framework tries to boost "weaker" servers
in order to allow them to gain some traction on the market. Additionally, Figure
(t)

3.2f presents the profit Ps (b(t) , p(t) ) that each MEC server receives based on the
its price announcement and the end-users’ data offloading. The results reveal that
Server 1 achieves the highest profit due to the combined effect of having the lowest
cost (Table 3.1) and attracting a large number of end-users, even though it presents
the lowest price as shown in Figure 3.2a. The same trend is followed from the rest of
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the servers, which indicates that the announced price by the MEC server is not the
only dominant factor in shaping the server’s profit, but also the number of end-users
that select to be served by a server is a key parameter in determining the server’s
overall profit.

(a) Users’ Offloaded Data

(b) Servers’ Pricing

(c) Number of Users per
Server

(d) Servers’ received Offloaded Data

Figure 3.3: Proposed framework’s operation per time slots - Heterogeneous Users

Heterogeneous End-Users: Here, we consider the scenario of heterogeneous end(t)

users, i.e., different spending dynamics (i.e., du ) and therefore potentially may of(t)

fload different parts of their total data Iu to the selected MEC server. Specifically,
in Figure 3.3a, we present the convergence of the amount of offloaded data for 10
indicative end-users from the overall available set in the simulated scenario. The results indicate that as the end-users have different spending dynamics, the announced
price by each MEC server has a different impact on each end-user in terms of de-
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termining its amount of offloaded data. Due to the differentiation of the end-users’
spending dynamics, the MEC servers are motivated to adjust their announced prices
to better adapt to the volume of the end-users’ offloaded data. The aforementioned
behavior is captured in Figure 3.3b, where it is observed that the "weaker" servers
are willing to drop their price to increase their stability and penetration on the market, while the stronger ones increase their price to avoid congestion. Moreover, in
Figure 3.3c and Figure 3.3d, the total number of end-users per MEC server and the
corresponding amount of offloaded data per MEC server are presented, respectively.
Comparative Evaluation
We present a comparative analysis of the performance of our proposed framework
against some alternative strategies, to reveal its benefits and advantages. Initially,
we present the impact of the learning rate parameter of the Stochastic Learning
Automata (see Chapters 2.2.3, 3.3.2) in the operation of the DO-MECS framework,
while we evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of different data offloading mechanisms as well. The learning rate parameter b of the Stochastic Learning Automata
Table 3.2: Execution Time for different Learning Rates
Learning Rate
b
b
b
b
b

=
=
=
=
=

Execution Time (sec)

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5

147.2
27.5
11.6
6.4
4.2

algorithm (policy-based RL technique - see Chapter 2.2.3) is an important factor regarding the convergence of the DO-MECS framework to the optimal stable state, as
it expresses a trade-off between exploration and exploitation [62]. Greater values of
the learning rate would lead to faster convergence, however, smaller ones allow the
end-users to better exploit the available options and ultimately conclude to better
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states. To demonstrate the above tradeoff, a comparative evaluation between different values of the learning rate is performed. Table 3.2 shows the average execution
time of our DO-MECS framework until convergence is achieved, while Figure 3.4a
and Figure 3.4b present the average MEC server’s profit and the average end-user’s
utility for different learning rates, respectively. Indeed, it is observed that small values of the learning rate parameter b conclude to slow convergence of the DO-MECS
algorithm, however, they allow the MEC servers and the end-users to achieve higher
average profit and higher average utility, respectively. Based on Figure 3.4a and Figure 3.4b, we can see that the difference in the convergence state (i.e., average MEC
servers’ profit and average end-users’ utility) between learning rates b = 0.1 and
b = 0.2 is negligible, while the difference in the convergence time is significant. This
is also evident from the execution times presented in Table 3.2, where for b = 0.2
the DO-MECS algorithm converges five times faster than in the case where b = 0.1.
Thus, a learning rate of b = 0.2 presents a good balance between optimality and
efficiency.

(a) Average Servers’ Profit

(b) Average Users’ Utility

Figure 3.4: Comparative Evaluation per time slots - Different Learning Rates

Towards evaluating the significance of our proposed autonomous data offloading
mechanism, i.e., DO-MECS framework, a comparison between our mechanism and a
computationally simplistic offloading policy where each end-user offloads a fixed por-
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tion (i.e. percentage) of its data, was performed, while for fairness purposes the rest
of our proposed framework (i.e. server selection and optimal pricing mechanisms) was
kept intact in all strategies. Specifically, concerning the alternative data offloading
mechanism three different variations were examined, where the end-users send 25%,
(t)

58.6% and 100% of their total data Iu , respectively, to the selected MEC servers.
It should be noted here that the alternative with a fixed percentage of 58.6% was
selected because it corresponds to the same exactly average end-user data offloading,
as the one produced by our proposed framework in the considered experiment.

(a) Average Servers’ Profit

(b) Average Users’ Utility

Figure 3.5: Comparative Evaluation per time slots - Different Offloading Policies

The corresponding comparative results are depicted in Figure 3.5a and Figure
3.5b, where the average MEC servers’ profit and the average end-users’ utility, respectively, as a function of the time for the different offloading mechanisms are obtained.
In particular, it is evident that as expected the more data the end-users offload to the
MEC servers, the higher profit the MEC servers experience. However, this happens at
the cost of a very low average utility experienced by the end-users, as clearly demonstrated from the curves corresponding to the 100% offloading alternative. Moreover,
it is observed that allowing the end-users to send a constant amount of data without
enabling them to dynamically adapt their offloading amount of data based on the
system’s conditions (as our framework evangelizes), always results in significantly
lower average end-users’ utility. As a result, the proposed DO-MECS framework of-

69

Chapter 3. Mobile Edge Computing

fers incentives to the end-users to participate in the non-cooperative data offloading
game to dynamically and autonomously determine the optimal amount of data, while
the MEC servers experience the best levels of profit that they can achieve based on
the decisions of their customers, i.e., end-users.

3.3.6

Summary

In the proposed autonomous decision-making framework, the joint problem of MEC
server selection by the end-users, along with their optimal data offloading and the
optimal price setting by the MEC servers is studied in multiple MEC servers and
multiple end-users environments. The flexibility and programmability offered by the
SDN technology enable the realistic implementation of the proposed framework. In
particular, the MEC server selection part of the framework is based on a Reinforcement Learning technique adopting the theory of the Stochastic Learning Automata.
The end-users optimal data offloading and the MEC servers’ optimal pricing of their
computing services is formulated as a two-layer optimization problem.
At the first layer, a non-cooperative game among the end-users of each server is
formulated towards maximizing the perceived satisfaction of each end-user, as expressed by an appropriately formulated utility function. The existence and uniqueness of the game’s NE point are shown, thus concluding to the end-users’ optimal
data offloading strategy. At the second layer of the proposed framework, an optimization problem of each MEC server’s profit is formulated and the corresponding
optimal price of its computing services is determined. A low-complexity Data Offloading and MEC Server Selection (DO-MECS) algorithm are introduced to realize
the overall framework. The operation and performance of the proposed framework
were extensively evaluated through modeling and simulation, while the presented
detailed numerical results demonstrate its performance and benefits in the examined
setting.
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3.4

Satisfaction-aware Data Offloading in Surveillance Systems

We exploit the Fully Autonomous Aerial Systems’ (FAAS) and the Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) servers’ computing capabilities to introduce a novel data offloading
framework and support the energy and time-efficient video processing in surveillance
systems based on the satisfaction games. A surveillance system is introduced consisting of Areas of Interest (AoIs), where a MEC server is associated with each AoI
and a FAAS is flying above the AoIs to support the IP cameras’ computing demands.
Each IP camera adopts a utility function capturing its Quality of Service (QoS) considering the experienced time and energy overhead to offload and process remotely
or locally the data. A non-cooperative game among the cameras is formulated to determine the amount of offloading data to the MEC server and/or the FAAS, and the
novel concept of Satisfaction Equilibrium (SE) is introduced where the IP cameras
satisfy their minimum QoS prerequisites instead of maximizing their performance by
consuming additional system resources. A distributed learning algorithm determines
the IP cameras’ stable data offloading. Also, a reinforcement learning algorithm indicates the FAAS’s movement among the AoIs exploiting the accuracy, timeliness,
and certainty of the collected data by the IP cameras per AoI. Detailed numerical
and comparative results are presented to show the operation and efficiency of the
proposed framework.
Generally, surveillance systems have recently gained great attention due to the
increased number of terrorist attacks, which challenge public safety and homeland
security [211]. With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), the smart Internet
Protocol (IP) cameras have enabled the surveillance systems to capture real-time
video and process it locally [212] or remotely in the cloud computing environment.
However, the surveillance systems confront the challenges of increased computing
demand to process the recorded information.
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The authors in [213] have introduced an image uploading process from the IP
cameras to the cloud, where the images captured by the IP cameras are stored and
processed at the cloud to decrease the cost of storing and processing the information
locally. In [214], a drone-assisted surveillance system is studied, where the videos
captured by the drone are forwarded to Fog Computing nodes through the drones’
ground controller, to be processed and track vehicles’ movement. Following a similar
philosophy, in [215] an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)-based crowd surveillance
system is introduced where the UAVs capture videos that either offload to MEC
servers for further processing or process them on board. The authors discuss the
drawbacks and benefits of the two choices in terms of energy consumption and processing time. In [216], the drones’ video capturing capability is exploited to track
the moving target object and the drones offload part of the computing tasks to a
control center, while the rest are executed locally at the drone.
The UAVs, the drones, and the remote computing capabilities (i.e., Cloud, MEC,
and Fog Computing) have improved the performance of the surveillance systems.
However, the UAVs and the drones still require human control from the ground to
indicate the path that they follow during their flight. To address this issue, the FAAS
has been recently introduced in the robotics and automation research field [217].
The FAAS is a flying robotic system equipped with sensors, surveillance systems,
computing resources, wireless communication interfaces, or any combination of them
and can operate fully autonomously with no human intervention.
In all the aforementioned approaches, each entity involved in the surveillance
system (i.e., IP cameras) aims at maximizing its QoS. The improvement of those
entities’ QoS is proportional to the consumption of communication and computing
resources. However, a surveillance system is a resource-constrained setting, thus
the maximization of each involved entity’s QoS is a sub-optimal solution. Towards
this direction, the games in satisfaction form have been introduced in the field of
Game Theory [218], where the autonomous entities aim to "satisfy" their minimum
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QoS prerequisites in a distributed manner instead of targeting at maximizing their
QoS, and have been applied in the uplink power control problem in wireless cellular
networks [85]. Here, the FAAS’s and the MEC servers’ computing capabilities are
exploited to introduce a novel data offloading framework based on the satisfaction
games in order ultimately to support the energy and time-efficient video processing
in surveillance systems consisting of IP cameras.

3.4.1

System Model

A surveillance area of size L×L consisting of AoIs (e.g., banks, airports) is considered,
where the set of AoIs is A = {1, . . . , i, . . . , A} and they are randomly placed with
coordinates Zi = (Xi , Yi ), Xi , Yi ≤ L. Each AoI has a set of IP cameras Ci =
{1, . . . , j, . . . , Ci } that collect and process data [212] and a MEC server Mi , which
supports their computing demands. A FAAS flies between the AoIs with a velocity
v and altitude d. At each timeslot t, the FAAS receives and processes data from
the AoI’s cameras of which the FAAS is located above. The set of timeslots is
T = {1, . . . , t, . . . , T } and at each timeslot, the FAAS is located above only one AoI.
The set of collected data by each IP camera j ∈ Ci belonging to the AoI i per
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

timeslot t is denoted as Dij = (Bij , CPij , φij , dtij , deij ), where Bij [bits] is the
(t)

(t)

(t)

total collected information, CPij = φij Bij is the number of required CPU cycles to
(t)

process the data, where φij > 0 is the level of the video processing task’s intensity,
(t)

(t)

dtij denotes the time constraint during which the data should be processed, and deij

is the IP camera’s energy availability for the timeslot t. The amount of collected data
(t)

Bij can be partitioned into subsets of specific size, which can be offloaded for remote
processing to the MEC server Mi or the FAAS, assuming that the last one is located
at the AoI i for the timeslot t. For the rest of the analysis, we drop the (t) for
notational convenience, since the same hold true ∀t ∈ T.
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Communication and Computation Model
We denote si = (si1 , . . . , sij , . . . , siCi ) the vector of strategies for the IP cameras
residing in the AoI i, where sij = (chij , aij ) and aij ∈ [0, 1] is the IP camera’s data
offloading percentage, and chij = 0 if the IP camera offloads its aij · Bij amount of
data to the MEC server Mi , while chij = 1 if it offloads to the FAAS. Therefore,
considering that the FAAS is located at the AoI i, then for each other AoI i0 ∈ A, i0 6= i
it holds true that chi0 j = 0, ∀j ∈ Ci0 . Thus, since the AoIs do not interfere with each
other due to their distant locations, the IP camera’s j in AoI i uplink data rate is:
Rij = Wi · log(1 +

σ02

pij gij
P

+

pik gik

)

(3.19)

k∈Ci \{j},chik =chij ,aik 6=0

where Wi is the AoI’s i bandwidth, pij is the IP camera’s j transmission power
to offload part of its data, gij is the channel gain between the IP camera j and the
MEC server Mi (if chij = 0) or the FAAS (if chij = 1), and σ02 indicates the background noise power. The IP camera j in the AoI i experiences the data transmission
tr,t
time overhead Oij
=

aij ·Bij
[sec]
Rij

by offloading aij Bij amount of data and the data

tr,e
= pij
transmission energy consumption Oij

aij ·Bij
[Joules].
Rij

Each MEC server Mi

and the FAAS have the computing capability fMi and fF [Cycles/sec] respectively,
which is shared among the IP cameras that are being served by them. The allocated
computing capability to each IP camera j in order to remotely process its offloaded
data is given as:
fij =

a B φ
P ij ij ij
· ((1 − chij )fMi + chij fF )
aik Bik φik

(3.20)

k∈Ci \{j},chik =chij

where the first factor of Equation 3.20 reveals that an IP camera with a higher
processing intensity (i.e, φij ) and greater amount of offloaded data acquires a higher
computing capability, while the second one reveals that each IP camera j can offload
a part of its data to only one computing resource (i.e., either the MEC server Mi
or the FAAS). Based on the IP camera’s j remote computing capability (Equation
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p,t
3.20), its offloaded data processing time overhead is Oij
=

aij Bij φij
.
fij

Moreover, the

IP camera j has a local computing capability fijl [Cycles/sec] and processes the rest
(1 − aij )Bij data locally. Thus, its local processing time overhead is

(1−aij )Bij φij
l
fij

and

its local processing energy overhead is (1−aij )Bij φij eij , where eij [J/Cycle] is its local
energy consumption to process the data. The IP camera’s j overall time overhead is
given as follows.
aij · Bij aij Bij φij (1 − aij )Bij φij
}
+
,
Rij
fij
fijl
while its overall energy consumption is formulated as:
t
Oij
= max {

e
Oij
= pij

3.4.2

aij · Bij
+ (1 − aij )Bij φij eij
Rij

(3.21)

(3.22)

Towards IP Cameras’ Satisfaction

Each IP camera aims to satisfy its QoS prerequisites expressed in terms of time
dtij and energy deij demands by offloading an amount of data and processing the
rest locally. Thus, we formulate a generic utility function that represents each IP
camera’s QoS as follows.

t
e
 −( dtij −Oij ) · ( deij −Oij ) if Ot ≥ dtij ,Oe ≥ deij
ij
ij
dtij
deij
uij (sij , s−ij ) =
t
e
 ( dtij −Oij ) · ( deij −Oij )
otherwise
dtij
deij

(3.23)

where s−ij is the strategy vector of all the IP cameras of the AoI i except the IP
camera j. Assuming that the FAAS is located at the AoI i, it is evident by Equation 3.21, that when the IP camera’s j chosen computing resource (i.e., the MEC
server or the FAAS) is overloaded, then its perceived time and energy overhead
increase, and its utility value uij is negative if the IP camera does not satisfy at
least one of its QoS prerequisites (i.e., dtij , deij ). Thus, each IP camera j aims
to fulfill its time and energy demands, i.e., uij ≥ 0, via autonomously determining
its offloading strategy sij = (chij , aij ). A non-cooperative game is played among
the IP cameras per AoI to determine a stable data offloading vector that fulfills
the IP cameras’ QoS prerequisites. The game is written in the satisfaction form
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(Chapter 2.1) Gi = [Ci , {Sij }j∈Ci , {uij }j∈Ci , {hij }j∈Ci ], where Ci is the set of the
IP cameras in the AoI i, and considering that the FAAS is located in the AoI i,
N
n
then Sij = {(anij , 0), · · · , (aN
ij , 0), · · · , (aij , 1), · · · , (aij , 1)}, while if the FAAS is not
n
th
located in the AoI i, then Sij = {(anij , 0), · · · , (aN
available
ij , 0)}, and aij is the n

offloading percentage, thus anij ∈ [0, 1], ∀n ≤ N, N ∈ N. Moreover, uij is the AoI’s
i IP camera’s j utility as expressed in Equation 3.23, and hij is the satisfaction
correspondence defined as follows [218].
hij (s−ij ) = {sij ∈ Sij |uij (sij , s−ij ) ≥ 0}

(3.24)

At the Satisfaction Equilibrium (SE) point (see definition in Chapter 2.1) of each
non-cooperative game Gi , the IP cameras satisfy their minimum QoS prerequisites
without overspending the system’s resources, where the latter would occur if they
were targeting at their QoS maximization. We consider that the computing resources
per AoI can support the IP cameras’ minimum QoS prerequisites, i.e., an SE exists,
and our goal is to achieve the better exploitation of the system’s resources by allocating the cameras’ computing tasks.
Towards determining the SE for each non-cooperative game Gi , we propose the
Distributed Learning Satisfaction Equilibrium Algorithm (DLSE) that allows the
IP cameras to autonomously learn and converge to it.

Each camera evaluates

its utility (Equation 3.23) by receiving its allocated remote computing capability
(Equation 3.20) from the MEC server or FAAS and the interference factor (i.e.,
P
+
k∈Ci ,chik =chij ,aik 6=0 pik gik in Equation 3.19) and converges to the strategy sij . Assuming that the elements of the offloading strategy set Sij are indexed with lij , thus
(l )

sijij is the lij th offloading strategy, then lij ≤ Lij , and Lij = 2N if the FAAS is
located in the AoI i, otherwise Lij = N . Let us denote the IP camera’s j offloading
strategy at instant r > 0 as sij (r) ∈ Sij , where it is chosen following a discrete proba(1)

(l )

(L )

(l )

bility distribution πij (r) = (πij (r), · · · , πijij (r), · · · , πij ij (r)), where πijij (r) is the
(l )

probability with which the AoI’s i IP camera j chooses its action sijij at instant
r > 0.
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Algorithm 1 DLSE Algorithm
1: Input/Initialization: AoI i, Ci ,Dij ,∀j ∈ Ci , conv = 0, r = 1
+
+
+
2: Output: s+
i = (si1 , · · · , sij , · · · , siCi )

3: Each j ∈ Ci sets Sij , Lij based on the FASS’s existence
(l )

4: πijij (0) =

1
,
Lij

∀j ∈ Ci , lij ≤ Lij

5: Each j ∈ Ci picks sij (0) based on πij (0), and evaluates Uij
6: while conv == 0 do
7:

for j = 1 to Ci do
Uij +uij
2Uij

8:

uij = uij (sij (r − 1), s−ij (r − 1)), bij (r) =

9:

if uij ≥ 0, then sij (r) = sij (r − 1), πij (r) = πij (r − 1)

10:
11:

else ∀lij ≤ Lij
(l )

(l )

πijij (r) = πijij (r − 1) + λij bij (r)(1

(l )
{sij ij =sij (r−1)}

12:

end for

13:

if SE or GSE point reached then conv = 1

14:

else r = r + 1

(l )

− πijij (r − 1))

15: end while

Each IP camera’s initial policy (Chapters 2.2, 2.2.3) is approximated through a
(l )

uniform probability distribution, thus πijij (r = 0) = 1/Lij , ∀lij ≤ Lij , where Lij is
the number of the IP camera’s j offloading strategies. Let Uij denote the maximum
utility that each IP camera j perceives if it was the only one inside the AoI i. Each
IP camera updates its probability distribution πij based on a learning parameter
λij , so that higher probabilities are allocated to offloading actions which lead the IP
camera j to perceive a higher utility uij . Let us introduce the definition of a clipping
action, which is considered for the study of the DLSE Algorithm’s convergence to an
SE point.

Definition 7 (Clipping Action) At each non-cooperative game Gi , an IP camera
j has a clipping action scij ∈ Sij iff ∀s−ij ∈ S−ij , scij ∈ hij (s−ij ), where S−ij = Si1 ×
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· · · × Si(j−1) × Si(j+1) × · · · × SiCi [85].
Therefore, Definition 7 reveals that once an IP camera concludes to a clipping
action scij at an instance r0 of the DLSE Algorithm, then ∀r ≥ r0 the IP camera
keeps the same offloading strategy, i.e., sij (r) = scij . Thus, assuming that there
exists an IP camera j 0 6= j, such that its satisfaction correspondence hij (s−ij0 j ) = ∅,
∀s−ij0 j ∈ S−ij 0 j , where s−ij0 j is the offloading strategy vector of all the IP cameras
except the camera j 0 and the IP camera j which plays its clipping action scij , and
S−ij 0 j is the corresponding set of vectors, then the DLSE Algorithm converges to a
Generalized SE (GSE) point, which is considered as generalization of the SE point
(see Chapter 2.1), and whose definition is given as:
−
−
Definition 8 (Generalized SE) A strategy profile is a GSE s−
i = (si1 , . . . , siCi ) of

the non-cooperative game Gi , if there exists a partition of the Ci given by Csi and Cui ,
such that ∀j ∈ Csi , sij ∈ hij (s−ij ) and ∀j 0 ∈ Cui , hij 0 (s−ij0 ) = ∅.
Given the DLSE algorithm and the existence of at least one SE point for each game
Gi , and that there is no clipping action, then the DLSE Algorithm converges to the
SE point for each game Gi . Otherwise, in the existence of a clipping action scij for at
least one IP camera, the DLSE Algorithm converges to a GSE point.

3.4.3

FAAS Movement based on Reinforcement Learning

we deploy three different quality factors that capture the QoI that each AoI’s surveillance system provides. We consider that several algorithms (e.g., object detection,
move detection) can be executed locally at the IP cameras’ and remotely at the MEC
servers’ and FAAS’s computing resources to assess each AoI’s QoI. These algorithms
assign values to the following quality factors at the end of each timeslot based on
each IP camera’s captured data.
(a) Accuracy refers of how the observed information inside each AoI conforms to
the reality. After the processing of the IP cameras’ collected data, the number of
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the correctly detected events AEij is evaluated and the IP camera’s accuracy is
qijacc =

AEij
,
T Eij

where T Eij is the total number of events that were captured. The
P
overall accuracy of the AoI i is defined as Qacc
, C1i j∈Ci qij .
i
(b) Timeliness refers to the availability of the information at the desired time. The
timeliness factor is defined as qijtls ,

Dt
t ,
Dt +Oij

where Dt is the duration of each timeslot

t
t and Oij
is the IP camera’s overall time overhead to offload and process the data.
P
1
tls
The AoI’s overall timeliness factor is Qtls
i , Ci
j∈Ci qij .

(c) Certainty: refers to the measurement of confirmation of the information and
is strictly related to each IP camera’s hardware characteristics (e.g., recording rate,
sensor’s pixels). In particular, this quality factor depicts the probability of error
regarding the captured data of each IP camera and it is denoted as qijcrt . The overall
P
1
crt
certainty of the AoI i is evaluated as Qcrt
i , Ci
j∈Ci qij .
Finally, each AoI’s i, i ∈ A overall QoI for a specific timeslot is based on the past
QoI values and is given as follows:
0 acc
t0 ≤t Qi

P
QoIi =

wiacc

t

0 tls
t0 ≤t Qi

P
+

witls

t

0 crt
t0 ≤t Qi

P
+

wicrt

t

(3.25)

where wiacc , witls , wicrt ∈ [0, 1] are the corresponding weights of each quality factor.
Here, the FAAS movement is formalized as a sequential decision-making problem,
where the FAAS acting as an RL-agent (Chapter 2.2) aims to maximize a longterm objective. In particular, at each timeslot, the FAAS is located at an AoI i,
and acts as a computing resource, it provides a higher QoS to the corresponding
IP cameras since the MEC server Mi is less overloaded. Therefore, the IP cameras’
QoS prerequisites could be more easily met with the existence of the FAAS at the
AoI i, and the overall AoI’s timeliness quality factor to be increased. The existence
of the FAAS at the AoIs with high QoI is important since the overall surveillance
system’s performance and effectiveness could be increased by decreasing the delay
between an event’s detection and further actions (e.g., policy, ambulance). Also,
the FAAS’s limited energy availability should be considered for both FAAS’s fly-

79

Chapter 3. Mobile Edge Computing

ing movement and its role as a computing resource. Considering that the FAAS
is located at the AoI i, and by denoting as EP [Joules/Cycle] the FAAS’s energy
consumption to process the received data, then its processing energy consumption is
P
E p = EP · j∈Ci ,chij =1 aij Bij φij . Furthermore, considering that the FAAS was located
at the AoI i0 , i0 6= i at the previous timeslot and
velocity is v, then its
√ the FAAS’s
2 +(Y −Y 0 )2
(X
−X
)
0
i
i
i
i
, where EM [W atts]
movement energy consumption is E m = EM ·
v
is the FAAS’s constant consumed energy while moving with velocity v. Based on the
above discussion, we formulate the reward (Chapter 2.2) that the FAAS experiences
while visiting an AoI i as follows.
p

m

3 · E +E
E
rwi = −
(3.26)
1 · QoIi + 2 · Pi
|Cs |
where Pi = Cii , Csi = {j ∈ Ci |uij ≥ 0} denotes the ratio of the IP cameras that
meet their QoS prerequisites (i.e., dtij , deij ), E is the FAAS’s energy availability,
and 1 , 2 , 3 ∈ [0, 1] denote the weights of the AoI’s QoI, performance (i.e., Pi ) and
the FAAS’s consumed normalized energy, respectively. The physical meaning of the
negative reward value is that reward values closer to zero benefit the FAAS.
In the following, we adopt a Reinforcement Learning (RL) approach that enables
the FAAS to autonomously learn its dynamic environment and decide which AoI to
visit per timeslot towards maximizing its long-term objective (Equation 3.26) [62].
Two of the most widely used RL algorithms are the Q-learning [219] and SARSA
[62] algorithms, as these were introduced in Chapter 2.2, which via stochastic approximation conditions lead the decision-maker to converge to its optimal decision
policy with high probability [220],[221]. In our case, for the FAAS’s sequential decision making problem (i.e., the AoI i that selects to be located at each timeslot t)
we deploy the SARSA algorithm, which first examines the uncertain environment
(i.e., the set of AoIs A), and then derives the optimal strategy based on the model
knowledge that has already been constructed. The FAAS interacts with the environment (i.e., surveillance system), receives the corresponding feedback, i.e., reward
(Equation 3.26), and updates its policy.
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3.4.4

Empirical Evaluation

A detailed numerical performance evaluation and comparative study of the proposed
architecture is conducted through modeling and simulations. We consider a surveillance system consisting of A = 7 AoIs with Ci = 30, ∀i ∈ A cameras. The cameras are
randomly distributed in an area with a radius less than L = 500m from each MEC
server Mi . The considered application characteristics are Bij ∈ [1000, 5000]KB and
CPij ∈ [1000, 5000]M Cycles. The IP cameras’ strategy space consists of 11 data offloading strategies, where ai,j ∈ [0, 1] with step 0.1. Also, we have eij = 10−9 J/Cycle,
fijl ∈ [10−2 , 10−1 ], Wi = 5M Hz, σ02 = 10−13 , pi,j ∈ [0, 1]W , dti,j ∈ [0,
dei,j ∈ [0, CPij eij ]J, gi,j =

1
,
d2ij

CPij
]sec,
fj

where dij is the IP camera’s j distance from the MEC
0

0

0

server Mi or FAAS, wiacc = 0.333, witls = 0.333, wicrt = 0.333, Qiacc , Qitls , Qicrt ∈ [0, 1],
EP = 10−9 J, EM = 0.0013W , E = 17.28 · 106 J, 1 = 0.35, 2 = 0.55, 3 = 0.10,
the duration of a timeslot is 1h, and v = 6.25m/s [222]. The following analysis
demonstrates: (i) the pure operation and characteristics of the proposed framework,
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(ii) its scalability performance, and (iii) a comparative evaluation.
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Figure 3.6: Pure operation of the proposed framework

Pure Operation of the Algorithm
In Figure 3.6.a-c, the amount of offloaded data, the time and the energy overhead,
and constraints are presented for four IP cameras. The IP cameras with ID 12 and 3
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Figure 3.7: Percentage of Satisfied Cameras regarding different AoIs’ characteristics and Cameras’ QoS prerequisities

have strict time and energy constraints (Figure 3.6.b,c), thus they choose to offload a
large amount of data to the MEC server to satisfy their QoS prerequisites. However,
it is observed that even if they choose such a strategy, they cannot meet their QoS
demands and the DLSE algorithm converges to a GSE point. On the other hand,
the IP cameras with ID 1 and 28 have a relaxed time and energy constraints and
they achieve to satisfy them, while the stricter the constraints are, the less time and
energy overhead they experience, and the more data they offload.
Several factors influence whether or not an IP camera meets its QoS prerequisites,
such as the MEC server’s computing capability, IP cameras’ average distance from
the MEC server, time and energy constraints, and the number of cameras per AoI. In
Table 3.7, the percentages of satisfied IP cameras per AoI are presented for different
scenarios. Only one influential factor was changed per each scenario varying from
1x < 2x < ... < 7x, where x is any of the aforementioned influential factors and
the order follows the AoI’s ID, while the values of the rest factors remain the same.
The results reveal that as the IP cameras’ average distance from the MEC server
increases, their communication channel conditions deteriorate, thus a smaller number
of IP cameras meets its QoS prerequisites. Also, as the computing capability of the
MEC server per AoI becomes stronger, the MEC server can more efficiently serve
the cameras’ computing demands, thus a greater number of them fulfills its QoS
prerequisites. As the cameras’ time and energy constraints become stricter, a smaller
number of IP cameras gets satisfied, and as the number of cameras per AoI increases,
the latter becomes congested in terms of the communication and computing aspects,
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Figure 3.9: Avg. Number of FAAS’s visits per AoI and AoI’s QoI

thus a smaller number of cameras meets its QoS demands. Finally, it is observed
that AoI 4 has superior performance in all scenarios as the FAAS resides at that AoI.

Figure 3.8.a presents the FAAS’s average reward versus the timeslots. After
almost 50 timeslots, the FAAS learns its environment and then it can choose the path
that provides the maximum reward (Equation 3.26). In Figure 3.8.b-c, it is shown
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that the percentage of satisfied cameras is significantly higher and the corresponding
IP cameras’ time and energy overheads are lower as the time evolves, when the FAAS
visits those areas, thus showing the great benefits of adopting the FAAS in the overall
considered architecture.
Figure 3.9.a, b depict the average number of FAAS’s visits and the average Quality
of Information per AoI in a time frame of 250 timeslots. It is observed that if an AoI
has high QoI, the SARSA algorithm will efficiently consider the FAAS’s perceived
reward and enable the FAAS to visit more often the critical AoIs, i.e., the ones having
high value of QoI.
Scalability Evaluation
Here, we provide a scalability analysis for increasing number of cameras and available strategies to show the performance of the proposed framework. Figures 3.10a &
3.10b show the time and energy overhead and the percentage of satisfied IP cameras
for increasing number of cameras per AoI. The results reveal that as the number of
cameras increases, the AoIs become more congested in terms of their communication and computing environment, thus the IP cameras’ time and energy overhead
increases, while the percentage of the cameras that meet their QoS prerequisites
decreases. Additionally, as the number of data offloading strategies increases (Figure 3.10c & 3.10d), the IP cameras have greater flexibility of choices, thus the IP
cameras’ time and energy overhead decreases and the corresponding percentage of
satisfied cameras increases. The latter phenomenon is observed as the cameras can
more accurately select the amount of data that they offload, thus better exploit the
system’s resources.
Comparative Evaluation
Finally, comparative scenarios are presented to confirm the benefits of our proposed
approach. The comparative scenarios are broken into two sets, examining: (i) the
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Figure 3.10: Scalability Analysis - Number of Cameras/Strategies

Satisfaction Equilibrium’s benefits, and (ii) the benefits of the adoption of Reinforcement Learning. Regarding the first set of comparative scenarios, five different
approaches are presented: i) minimizing the energy (MEO) and ii) the time overhead (MTO), iii) determining the Nash Equilibrium (NE), vi) offloading the entirety
(OE), and v) random amount of the data to the MEC server. As shown, the novel
concept of SE resulted in the highest percent of satisfied cameras (Figure 3.11.a). In
Figure 3.11.b, different scenarios of FAAS’s navigation among the AoI are presented.
In the examined scenarios, the FAAS visits the area: i) closest to the current area,
ii) with the largest average energy constraint, iii) sequentially, vi) maximizing its
reward, v) randomly, and vi) with the largest average time constraint. The results
reveal that the SARSA algorithm produced an average FAAS’s reward closer to zero
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Figure 3.11: Percentage of Satisfied Cameras and FAAS’s Avg. Reward with respect to different offloading and FAAS’s policy approaches

compared to the other scenarios, thus indicating a better FAAS’s path in terms of
collecting valuable information from the surveillance system. Therefore, we conclude
that the proposed approach demonstrates superior performance among all the scenarios, achieving both the highest percentage of satisfied cameras and the largest
FAAS’s reward.

3.4.5

Summary

The problem of the IP cameras’ data offloading in a surveillance system consisting
of AoIs and assisted by MEC servers and a FAAS, in order the IP cameras to fulfill
their energy and time QoS prerequisites, is studied. Our introduced decision-making
framework lead the IP cameras to converge to an SE or a GSE point based only on
local information. Furthermore, the FAAS acts as an additional computing resource,
and its sequential decision-making problem (i.e., movement among the AoIs) is addressed via the SARSA algorithm, an RL technique that demonstrates good results
for real-world problems. The SARSA algorithm determines an optimal policy that
optimizes the FAAS’s long-term objective, which is constructed by several factors
(i.e., QoI, AoI’s performance, energy consumption).
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Figure 3.12: Prospect-theoretic Data Offloading in MEC

3.5

Cognitive Data Offloading in Mobile Edge Computing for Internet of Things

Data offloading to Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) servers is an attractive choice
for resource-constrained computing systems such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices,
towards reducing their computational effort. In this research work, we investigate
the potential of partial data offloading to MEC servers, under the perspective of
users’ cognitive IoT devices presenting loss averse and gain seeking behavior (Chapter 3.5.2). Due to the sharing nature of the access environment and the MEC server’s
computational characteristics, we treat the MEC server option as a CPR (Chapter
3.5.2) with uncertain payoff returned to the users, while the local computation capability is treated as a safe option for each user. Following the properties of Prospect
Theory, users’ prospect-theoretic utilities are formulated exploiting the local computing and offloading overhead options under probabilistic uncertainty. Such modeling
allows for the infusion of human awareness, inherent cognitive biases, and behavioral characteristics into the devices’ operation, their data offloading decisions, and
the edge computing environment that the devices are interacting with. Accordingly,
each user’s optimal offloaded data to the MEC server is obtained as the outcome of
a non-cooperative game, with users attempting to maximize their own utilities. The
existence and uniqueness of a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) are proven under the
probabilistic nature of the respective payoff functions, while a distributed algorithm
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that convergences to the PNE are designed. Numerical results are provided that
demonstrate the operation and superiority of the proposed framework under different IoT scenarios and behaviors, considering both homogeneous and heterogeneous
users.

3.5.1

System Model

Computation and Communication Model
: A set of ℵ = {1, . . . , i, . . . , N } collocated devices is considered, where each device
i ∈ ℵ has a computational intensive task Ti to be completed. Furthermore, we
consider the uplink of a wireless network, consisting of a base station (BS) acting as
a MEC server, with an upper-bounded computation capability for task execution.
We consider a quasi-static scenario, where the set of devices remains unchanged
during a computation offloading period. Data partitioned oriented applications are
considered where each device i ∈ ℵ has a computation task Ti = (Ii , Ci ), where Ii and
Ci denote the computation input bits and the total number of CPU cycles required to
accomplish the computation task Ti , respectively. We consider Ci = λi ∗Ii , where the
parameter λi (λi > 0) expresses the computational complexity of the task requested
by the device i, i ∈ ℵ and its value depends on the nature of the application, e.g.,
a higher λi expresses a more computation-intensive task. We assume that each
computation task Ti , can be arbitrarily partitioned into subsets of any size, so each
device can offload an amount of data bi ∈ [0, Ii ] to the MEC server and keep the rest
for local computing.
We have bi = 0, if user i ∈ ℵ decides to compute its whole task locally. We
consider a typical interference limited communication environment, where the MEC
server is the receiver of the users’ transmitted data and each user experiences the
interference imposed by the transmissions of the rest of the users in the examined
MEC IoT environment. Given the decision profile b = [b1 , b2 , . . . , bN ] of all users,
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the uplink data rate for the computation offloading of device i is [223]:
Ri = W ∗ log2 (1 +

Pi ∗ Gi
σ2 +

PN

j=1,bj 6=0,j6=i

Pj ∗ Gj

)

(3.27)

Pi the user’s i transmission power, Gi the channel gain between the device i and the
BS, and σ 2 is the background noise. An overview of the overall prospect-theoretic
data offloading in a mobile edge computing cognitive-enabled IoT environment is
depicted in Figure 3.12.
1) Offloading Overhead : A user i offloads bi ∈ [0, Ii ] amount of data to the MEC
server, where the latter executes this part of the task Ti on behalf of the user. The
user i has a total offloading overhead consisting of the following terms: a) the energy
consumption to transmit the data bi , b) the transmission time and c) the execution
time of the computation task at the MEC server. The energy consumption overhead
Oif,e is determined by the consumed energy during the transmission of the data bi
to the MEC server as follows: Oif,e =
given as: Oif,tr =

bi
.
Ri

bi ∗Pi
.
Ri

The transmission time overhead Oif,tr is

Similarly, the execution time of the offloaded data bi depends

on the computing resources (rate of return) Fif that the MEC server devotes to the
computation task of user i, as follows: Oif,t =

λi ∗bi
.
Fif

More details about Fif are

provided in Section 3.5.2.
Therefore, the total offloading overhead for user i, i ∈ ℵ to offload bi data can be
obtained as follows:
Oif (b) = wie ∗ Oif,e + wit ∗ (Oif,tr + Oif,t )

(3.28)

where wit , wie ∈ [0, 1], wit + wie = 1, denote the weights of the time delay and energy
consumption overheads, respectively, that can be tuned by each user according to
different priorities and considerations, e.g., low battery consideration (wie > wit ) or
delay sensitive application (wit > wie ). It is noted that the normalization of the
energy consumption and the time delay overhead is appropriately taken into account
in the weights wie and wit , so as both contributions to be treated fairly in terms of
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their order of magnitude and impact.
2) Local Computing Overhead : A user i executes (Ii − bi ) amount of data of its
computation task Ti locally on its device. In this case, the user i has a total local
computing overhead consisting of the following terms: a) the local execution time
overhead and b) the local energy consumption overhead. The local execution time
overhead is given as: Oil,t =

λi ∗(Ii −bi )
,
Fil

where λi ∗ (Ii − bi ) is the number of cycles

required for the local computation, and Fil denotes the local computation capability
(CPU cycles per second) of user i. Similarly, the local energy consumption overhead
of the user i, is given as: Oil,e = fi ∗ λi ∗ (Ii − bi ), where fi ∈ R+ denotes the consumed
energy per CPU cycle. Therefore, the total local computing overhead of the user i
is given as follows:
Oil (bi ) = wit ∗ Oil,t + wie ∗ Oil,e

(3.29)

Taking into account that a user may offload part of its computation task to the MEC
server, based on Equation 3.28 and Equation 3.29 its total experienced overhead is:
Oi (b) = Oil (bi ) + Oif (b)

(3.30)

It is highlighted that in Equation 3.30 we consider the total overhead that a
device experiences by executing part of its computation tasks locally and at the
MEC server, as if the two parts are not executed in parallel. If the two parts of
the computation task were executed in parallel, we could consider the largest term
instead, i.e., max(Oif,tr + Oif,t , Oil,t ), as the time delay overhead. Thus, Equation 3.30
could be written as Oi (b) = wit ∗ max(Oif,tr + Oif,t , Oil,t ) + wie ∗ (Oif,e + Oil,e ) and would
not affect the structure of the rest analysis, which would remain valid.

Devices’ Actual Utility
In this section, the users’ actual utilities expressing their satisfaction from executing
part of their computation task at the MEC server (CPR) and the rest locally at
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the device, are formulated. The exploitation of the MEC server’s computation capabilities via offloading part of the user’s computation task to the server provides a
corresponding satisfaction to the user, which depends on the server’s workload. This
satisfaction is captured by the rate of return function Fif , which is personalized based
on each device’s task’s computational complexity λi , and decreases as the total computation offloading by all devices increases due to the upper-bounded computation
capacity of the MEC server. Specifically, the MEC server provides its computation
capabilities to the users in a fair and proportional manner. Thus, the devices whose
computation tasks are characterized by higher computational complexity, i.e., λi ,
experience an improved rate of return as the MEC server managed to fulfill their
demanding computation tasks. The rate of return function for each device i, i ∈ ℵ is
formulated as:
Fif (bT ) = PN

λi

j=1,bj 6=0

where bT =

PN

j=1 bj

λj

∗ d(bT )

(3.31)

is the total amount of offloaded data by all the devices to the

MEC server and d(bT ) is the production function of the MEC server expressing its
computing performance with respect to the total data offloading. The production
function is formulated as follows:

 (1 −
d(bT ) =
 0

bT
)
bth

∗ FM EC if bT ≤ bth

(3.32)

otherwise

where FM EC [CPU Cycles/sec] denotes the MEC server’s upper bound computation
capability, which is shared among the different offloaded tasks. The parameter bth
denotes the MEC server’s received bytes threshold value, where if bT ≥ bth the MEC
server is considered unable to execute the offloaded tasks into a specific duration of
time, thus it "fails". This concept is well-known in the literature as the "Tragedy of
the Commons" [131]. As a result, in this case, it is more beneficial for the device i ∈ ℵ
to execute its whole task Ti locally. The consideration of including the MEC server’s
received bytes threshold value in our analysis captures the operation of a realistic
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MEC system, where if the MEC server was overwhelmed with data to process, then
it would become over-exploited concluding in increased delays. In that case, the
computing services offered by the MEC server to the devices become unsatisfactory
and of no value to them.
Proposition 1 The production function d(bT ), and each device’s i ∈ ℵ rate of return
function Fif (bT ), are strictly decreasing with respect to the total offloaded data bT .
The above proposition holds true in our environment, given that if the MEC
server becomes overloaded, the device’s choice of offloading part of its task to the
MEC server becomes less beneficial as the user suffers the burden of long computation
time delays stemming from the over-exploited MEC server. In the following analysis,
without loss of generality and for simplicity in the presentation, we consider wit =
wie = 1/2, ∀i ∈ ℵ, thus, each device has equal sensitivity to the time delay and
the energy consumption overhead. Each device is associated with an actual utility
function formulated as a linear combination of the overhead experienced by executing
a part of its computation task to the MEC server and the rest part locally. Thus, the
device’s actual utility can be formulated via combining Equation 3.28 and Equation
3.29 as follows:
zi (b) = bi ∗ (

3.5.2

λi
Fif

+

Pi + 1
1
) + λi ∗ (Ii − bi ) ∗ ( l + fi )
Ri
Fi

(3.33)

The Prospect of Data Offloading

Partial Offloading under Prospect Theory
In real mobile applications, users do not always adopt risk-neutral behavior, instead,
they tend to demonstrate different actions under losses or gains with respect to their
actual utility. Towards capturing the device-centric risk-based decision-making in
the MEC environment, the Prospect Theory is adopted (Chapter 3.5.2). Following

92

Chapter 3. Mobile Edge Computing

this behavioral model, individuals make decisions under risk and uncertainty of the
associated payoff of their choices, which is estimated with some probability.
Therefore, the users’ actual utility as expressed in Equation 3.33, is evaluated with
respect to a reference point (reference dependence property) [130]. This reference
point is considered as the zero point (i.e., ground truth) of the users’ actual utility.
Given the reference point and users’ offloaded data, they determine their prospecttheoretic probabilistic payoff. In our work, we consider as the reference point of each
user the corresponding experienced overhead, if the whole task was locally executed.
Users’ prospect-theoretic utility function is a concave function with respect to
the user’s actual perceived utility above the reference point, a convex function below
it, and has a greater slope in losses compared to the gains (loss aversion property),
as presented in Figure 3.13. This formulation is well-aligned with the observation
that the users weigh more the losses compared to the gains of the same amount
of overhead in terms of dissatisfaction and satisfaction, respectively (diminishing

Prospect-theoretic
utility u i(zi)

sensitivity property).
Gains
zi,0 : reference point

Losses

User's actual utility z i

Figure 3.13: Prospect-theoretic Data Offloading in MEC

MEC: A Common Pool of Resources
In the MEC environment under consideration, the MEC server is considered as a
Common Pool of Resources (CPR), since it is: a) non-excludable, in the sense that
all the users have access to arbitrarily offload their computation tasks to the server,
and b) rivalrous and subtractable for the users, as the reservation of computation
capabilities by one user from the MEC server, reduces the ability to reserve compu-
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tation cycles by another [131] (Chapter 3.5.2). Each user’s goal is to determine in an
autonomous manner the offloaded data bi to the CPR with some uncertainty in the
expected obtained outcome while maintaining its remaining amount of data (Ii − bi )
locally to be executed at the device, which is a "safe" computation resource in terms
of a priori knowing the total local overhead, so as to minimize its overall perceived
overhead. The probability of failure of the MEC server (CPR) is denoted by p(bT ).

Proposition 2 The MEC server (CPR) is characterized by the following properties.

1. The probability of failure p(bT ) is strictly increasing, convex and twice continuously differentiable with respect to bT ∈ [0, bth ), with p(bT ) = 1, ∀bT ≥ bth .

2. User’s i strategy set of offloading an amount of data to the MEC server is
Si = [0, min(Ii , bth )], ∀i ∈ ℵ.

It is noted that the corresponding probability of failure p(bT ) being strictly increasing with respect to bT , allows to properly capture the reliability characteristics
of the MEC server. Some examples of the MEC server’s probability of failure are the
logarithmic, the linear, or the exponential function with respect to bT . The choice
of an appropriate functional form could be based on various operational factors and
characteristics (e.g., the MEC server’s robustness to failure, non-linear server’s behavior to traffic loads and computing utilization, etc.), and assuming that satisfies
the properties in Proposition 2, it does not harm the validity of our analysis.
Here, without loss of generality and for demonstration purposes only, we consider
a linear probability of failure function given as follows: p(bT ) =

bT
.
bth

It is highlighted

that in the case of an underloaded MEC server, the probability of failure function
will return small values, thus, concluding to better experience and satisfaction for
the user that offloads its computation tasks to the MEC server.
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Prospect-Theoretic Utility
Based on the Prospect Theory, the prospect-theoretic utility of a user is defined as
follows [224]:

 (z − z )αi
if zi ≤ zi,0
i,0
i
ui (zi ) =
 −ki ∗ (zi − zi,0 )γi if zi > zi,0

(3.34)

where zi is the user’s i, i ∈ ℵ actual utility as defined in Equation 3.33 and zi,0
denotes the reference point of user’s prospect-theoretic utility. Each user’s reference
point zi,0 is defined as the actual utility that it experiences by executing its whole
task Ti locally at the device.
zi,0 = zi |bi =0 = λi ∗ Ii ∗ (

1
+ fi )
Fil

(3.35)

As stated earlier, we have omitted the weight wit = wie = 1/2 for simplicity in the
presentation. Each device’s i, i ∈ ℵ parameters αi , γi ∈ (0, 1] express the user’s
sensitivity to the gains and losses of its actual utility zi , respectively, as these were
described in Chapter 3.5.2. If the MEC server (CPR) does not fail due to the overoffloading of users’ data, then each user perceives an actual utility given by the
Equation 3.33. In this case, the actual perceived utility (overhead) is lower than
the reference point zi,0 , i.e, zi ≤ zi,0 , as at the reference point the user i executes
its whole task Ti locally. Therefore, via subtracting the actual utility zi (Equation
3.33) from the reference point zi,0 (Equation 3.35) and shaping the result according
to the first branch of Equation 3.34, we have ui (zi ) = [bi ( Fλil + λi fi −
i

Pi +1
Ri

−

λi α i
)] .
Fif

On the other hand, if the MEC server becomes overloaded and fails to serve the
users’ offloaded computation tasks, the users’ overhead is given by Equation 3.33
with bi = 0, as the users have to execute their whole tasks locally, though they
experienced the energy consumption and transmission time overhead from offloading
bi data to the MEC server, before the stage of failure is reached. Thus, user’s actual
utility is zi = zi,0 + Rbii + Rbii Pi and is greater than the reference point zi,0 . Therefore,
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by subtracting the reference point from user’s actual utility, the second branch of
Equation 3.34 can be written as ui (zi ) = −ki (bi PRi +1
)αi .
i
Following the aforementioned argumentation, and as per Equation 2.35, we can
readily rewrite the user’s prospect-theoretic utility (Equation 3.34) as follows:
ui (zi ) =


 [bi ( λil + λi fi −
F
i

Pi +1
Ri

−

λi
)]αi
Fif (bT )

if zi ≤ zi,0

(3.36)

if zi > zi,0

 −k (b Pi +1 )αi
i i Ri
∆

− F fλ(bi ) )αi >
Moreover, for notational convenience we define di (bT ) = ( Fλil +λi fi − PRi +1
i
i

∆

0 assuming that the server has not failed and i =

( PRi +1
) αi ,
i

i

T

and therefore Equation

3.36 can be written as:

 bαi d (b ) if z ≤ z
i T
i
i,0
i
ui (zi ) =
 −ki i bαi if zi > zi,0
i

(3.37)

The MEC server’s failure to serve the users depends on the total offloaded data
by all of them. Given that the probability of the MEC server’s failure is p(bT ), the
probability that the server survives and executes the offloaded computation tasks is
accordingly (1 − p(bT )). As a result, considering the probability of MEC server’s
failure, Equation 3.37 can be written equivalently as follows:

 bαi d (b ), with prob. 1 − p(b )
i T
T
i
ui (zi ) =
 −ki i bαi , with prob. p(bT )

(3.38)

i

Each user’s expected prospect-theoretic utility based on all users’ offloaded data
b = [b1 , b2 , . . . , bN ], and as per Equation 2.37 is given as follows.
E(ui ) = bαi i di (bT )(1 − p(bT )) − (ki i bαi i )p(bT )
= bαi i [di (bT )(1 − p(bT )) − ki i p(bT )]

(3.39)

∆

= bαi i gi (bT )
where gi (bT ) = di (bT )(1 − p(bT )) − ki i p(bT ) is the effective rate of return of the MEC
server for the user i, i ∈ ℵ.
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3.5.3

Optimizing Devices’ Overhead

Problem Formulation
The goal of each device is to minimize its perceived overhead from its computation
task’s execution via sophisticatedly and selfishly offloading part of the task to the
MEC server. This problem can be formulated as a maximization problem of each
user’s prospect-theoretic utility function, as follows:
max E(ui ) = bαi i gi (bT )
bi ∈Si

(3.40)

In the modeling considered in this work, the latency and energy factors have
been directly considered as part of the corresponding overheads, computed for both
offloading and local computing cases (i.e., Equation 2 and Equation 4), while their
combined optimization is treated and achieved through the solution of the optimization problem in Equation 3.40. Following the vision of ultra-reliable low latency
communications and respecting the energy limitations of the IoT devices, as part
of the emerging Tactile Internet [225], this problem could be further extended by
considering hard constraints on the required latency of the computation task and
the energy availability of the devices. Accordingly, these constraints are expected to
reduce the users’ strategy space and the corresponding feasible solution space.
The above maximization problem can be confronted as a non-cooperative game
(Chapter 2.1) among the users who act as players making the optimal decisions
about themselves in a selfish and distributed manner. Let G = [ℵ, {Si }, {E(ui )}]
denote the non-cooperative game among the N users, where each user’s strategy
space is Si = [0, min(Ii , bth )] and its payoff is its expected prospect-theoretic utility
function E(ui ). Towards solving the non-cooperative game, the concept of Nash
equilibrium is adopted. The Nash equilibrium (NE) of the non-cooperative game G
is the vector of users’ amount of offloaded data b∗ = [b∗1 , . . . , b∗i , . . . , b∗N ], where no
user has the incentive to change its own strategy (i.e., amount of offloaded data)
given the strategies of the rest of the users (Chapter 2.1 - Definition 1). Let b∗−i =
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[b∗1 , . . . , b∗i−1 , b∗i+1 , . . . , b∗N ] denote the vector of offloaded data of all users except user
i at the NE point (Chapter 2.1).
It is noted that a Prospect Theory-based game-theoretic approach is adopted to
treat the aforementioned problem, instead of other approaches, due to its distributed
and computationally efficient nature, while properly capturing the users’ behavioral
characteristics. The sequential best response dynamics mechanism is adopted to determine the game’s PNE, which as also confirmed later in the empirical evaluation,
converges fast to it and in a scalable manner, due to its best response nature, in contrast for example to other learning-based techniques, which need large exploration
and exploitation time to determine a stable solution. In addition, in several cases,
a large amount of reliable data and extensive time would be required for the proper
training of a supervised learning-based approach, for instance. However, a machine
learning (ML) based approach (and in particular reinforcement learning) could further complement the proposed framework and support the applicability of the best
response determining process, in terms of treating potential incompleteness of the
available information under uncertain environments, such as the communication and
computing environment.

Existence and Uniqueness of PNE
Let us denote the best response strategy Bi (b−i ) : S−i ⇒ Si of user i, as follows:
Bi (b−i ) = arg maxE(ui (bi , b−i )), b−i ∈ S−i

(3.41)

bi ∈Si

where b−i = [b1 , . . . , bi−1 , bi+1 , . . . , bN ] is the data vector of all users excluding user
i, and S−i = S1 × · · · × Si−1 × Si+1 × · · · × SN the corresponding mixed strategy.

Theorem 6 For each user i, i ∈ ℵ, its best response strategy exists and it is singlevalued, such that b∗i = Bi (b−i ) = arg maxE(ui (bi , b−i )).
bi ∈Si
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We adopt the notation b−i =

PN

j=1,j6=i bj

to depict the total offloaded data of all

users except user i, i ∈ ℵ. In order to prove the above theorem, we first present
Berge’s Theorem [226] and then we prove the following Lemmas 1 - 3.
Theorem 7 Let Θ and X be two metric spaces, and Γ : Θ ⇒ X a compact valued
correspondence. Let the function Φ : X × Θ → R be jointly continuous in X and Θ.
We define:
1. σ(θ) := arg maxΦ(x, θ)
x∈Γ(θ)

2. Φ∗ (θ) := max Φ(x, θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ
x∈Γ(θ)

If Γ is continuous at θ ∈ Θ, then
1. σ : Θ ⇒ X is compact-valued, upper hemicontinuous and closed at θ
2. Φ∗ : Θ → R is continuous at θ
Lemma 1 For each user i, i ∈ ℵ the following hold true:
1. b∗i = 0 if and only if b−i ≥ bi , where a value bi ∈ [0, bth ] exists.
2. b∗i > 0 and b∗i + b−i < bi , if b−i < bi and there exists an interval Ai ⊂ [0, bi )
such that gi (bi ) = 0.
Proof: Initially, we clarify that the user’s i, i ∈ ℵ best response strategy b∗i can either
be zero, i.e., Bi (b−i ) = b∗i = 0 or a positive value, i.e., Bi (b−i ) = b∗i ∈ Si , and the
best response value can never be equal to bth , i.e., b∗i = bth as in this case p(bth ) = 1,
thus the MEC server (CPR) fails and the user’s expected prospect-theoretic utility is
negative. The first order derivative of the effective rate of return of the MEC server
for the user i, i ∈ ℵ is given as follows:
∂di (bT )
∂p(bT )
∂gi (bT )
=
(1 − p(bT )) −
(di (bT ) + ki i )
∂bT
∂bT
∂bT
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It is obvious that

∂p(bT )
∂bT

> 0, as the probability of failure, i.e., p(bT ) is strictly

increasing with respect to bT . Also (1 − p(bT )) > 0. Moreover,

∂di (bT )
∂bT

< 0, since the

di (bT ) is strictly decreasing with respect to bT based on Proposition 1. Thus, gi (bT )
is strictly decreasing with respect to bT .
CASE A: If gi (0) ≤ 0, then gi (bi ) ≤ 0, ∀bi ∈ Si and E(ui ) ≤ 0. So, in this case
the only best response for the user i is the zero value, i.e., Bi (b−i ) = b∗i = 0. As a
result, bi = 0 and the interval Ai is not defined.
CASE B: If gi (0) > 0, then since gi (bth ) = −ki i < 0, we know that ∃bi ∈ [0, bth ]
such that gi (bi ) = 0 based on the Intermediate Value Theorem [227]. As a result, if
b−i ≥ bi then Bi (b−i ) = 0, as ∀bi 6= 0, it holds true that gi (bi + bi ) < 0 due to the
fact that gi (·) is strictly decreasing, thus E(ui (bi , b−i )) < 0. On the other hand, if
b−i < bi then gi (bi + b−i ) > 0, ∀bi ∈ (0, bi − b−i ). So, in this case ∃bi : gi (bi + b−i ) > 0,
thus, the zero value cannot be the best response for the user i, i ∈ ℵ, if and only if
b−i ∈ [0, bi ). Also, because of the positive value of the expected prospect-theoretic
utility at the best response, i.e., E(ui (b∗i , b−i )) > 0 it is true that b∗i + b−i ∈ (0, bi ),
and as a result the interval Ai exists and is defined as Ai = (0, bi )

Lemma 2 For each mobile user i, i ∈ ℵ, its best response b∗i is single-valued ∀b−i ∈
S−i

Proof: Based on Lemma 1, case A, we have shown that the best response strategy
is single-valued, i.e., Bi (b−i ) = 0 if and only if there exists a value bi ∈ [0, bth ] such
that b−i ≥ bi . Thus, in the following we examine the case B as presented in Lemma
1, where we have already shown that there exists at least one best response strategy,
i.e., Bi (b−i ) > 0. Given that there exists at least one best response strategy Bi (b−i ),
it should be one of the solutions of the expected prospect-theoretic utility’s first order
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derivative, as follows:
∂E(ui )
∂di (bT )
= [bai i
+ ai bai i −1 di (bT )](1 − p(bT ))
∂bi
∂bT
∂p(bT )
− bai i di (bT )
∂bT
∂p(bT )
− ki i [ai bai i −1 p(bT ) + bai i
]
∂bT
It is noted that
−ki [ai bai i −1 p(bT )

∂E(ui )
i)
= ∂E(u
, since bT
∂bi
∂bT
ai ∂p(bT )
+ bi ∂bT ] < 0. Thus,

(3.43)

T)
= bi + b−i . Also, −bai i di (bT ) ∂p(b
< 0 and
∂bT

to determine the root of Equation 3.43, it

should hold true:
∂di (bT )
+ ai bai i −1 di (bT )] > 0
∂bT
Calculating the second derivative of E(ui ) we have:
[bai i

(3.44)

2
∂ 2 E(ui )
∂di (bT )
ai ∂ di (bT )
](1 − p(bT ))
=
[b
+ 2ai bai i −1
i
2
2
∂bT
∂bi
∂bT

∂di (bT )
∂p(bT )
+ ai di (bT )]
∂bT
∂bT
2
∂ p(bT )
− bai i di (bT )
∂b2T

− 2bai i −1 [bi

− ki i [2ai bai i −1

(3.45)

∂ 2 p(bT )
∂p(bT )
+ bai i
]
∂bT
∂b2T

+ ai (ai − 1)bai i −2 [di (bT )(1 − p(bT )) − ki i p(bT )]

Specifically, due to the fact that bi satisfies (3.44),
∂p(bT )
∂bT

> 0 and

∂ 2 p(bT )
∂b2T

= 0, it is true that

∂ 2 E(ui )
∂b2i

∂ 2 di (bT )
∂b2T

< 0,

∂di (bT )
∂bT

< 0,

< 0, ∀bi ∈ (0, bi ), thus E(ui ) is strictly

concave. Moreover, given that di (bT ) is concave decreasing, the function from the
i (bT )
inequality (3.44), i.e., bai i ∂d∂b
+ ai biai −1 di (bT ), is decreasing with respect to bi . For
T
i (bT )
small values of bi , i.e., bi → 0 and b−i < bi it holds true that bai i ∂d∂b
+ai bai i −1 di (bT ) >
T
i (bT )
0. Defining C := sup{bi ∈ Si : bai i ∂d∂b
+ ai bai i −1 di (bT ) > 0}, inequality 3.44 holds
T

true only in the interval [0, C]. Thus, the expected prospect-theoretic utility function
has a unique maximum in [0, C].
Lemma 3 The best response strategy of the user i, i ∈ ℵ, b∗i : S−i ⇒ Si is continuous
for b−i ∈ S−i .
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Proof: The b∗i : S−i ⇒ Si is mapped to σ and the expected prospect-theoretic utility
is mapped to the function Φ (see the notation in Theorem 7). We compute b∗i ∈ Si
and define the correspondence Γ : S−i ⇒ [0, 1] for any joint strategies of users other
than i. Therefore, Γ is compact valued, and both upper and lower hemicontinuous.
Hence, b∗i is upper hemicontinuous from Theorem 7 and as it is single-valued (Lemma
2), is continuous.
Based on Theorem 7 and Lemmas 1 - 3, we proved that for each user i, its
best-response strategy Bi (b−i ) exists and is single-valued and continuous. Thus, we
proved Theorem 1.
Theorem 8 A pure Nash equilibrium b∗ = [b∗1 , . . . , b∗N ] of the non-cooperative game
G = [ℵ, {Si }, {E(ui )}] exists.
Proof: The strategy set Si , ∀i ∈ ℵ is a convex compact subset of the Euclidean
space and so is the joint strategy space, S = S1 × · · · × SN ⊂ R|N | . By defining
a mapping T : S → S such that T (b1 , . . . , bN ) = (b∗1 , . . . , b∗N ), from Lemma 2, T
is single-valued and from Lemma 3 is continuous. Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
guarantees the existence of a strategy profile s = {b∗i }i∈ℵ ∈ S that is invariant under
the best response mapping and therefore is a PNE of G [226].
The best response b∗i of user i, i ∈ ℵ satisfies the equation

∂E(ui )
|∗
∂bi bi

= 0. Based on

the latter condition and Equation 3.39, we define the function hi (bT ) =
which satisfies hi (b∗i + b−i ) = b∗i , when b∗i > 0.

−ai gi (bT )
∂gi (bT )
∂bT

= bi

Lemma 4 The function hi (bT ) is strictly decreasing with respect to bT , bT ∈ Ai ,
where Ai is as defined in Lemma 1.
Proof:We have that di (bT ) is decreasing, and that:
(
1 ∂hi (bT )
=−
ai ∂bT

∂gi (bT ) 2
)
∂bT

− gi (bT ) ∂

i (bT ) 2
( ∂g∂b
)
T

102

2g

i (bT )
∂b2T

(3.46)

Chapter 3. Mobile Edge Computing
i (bT )
T)
The numerator is equal to [ ∂d∂b
(1 − p(bT ))]2 + [ ∂p(b
(di (bT ) + ki i )]2 − gi (bT )ρ −
∂bT
T
T)
2di (bT ) ∂p(b
ki i , which is positive, and ρ =
∂bT

∂ 2 di (bT )
(1
∂b2T

2

p(bT )
− p(bT )) − di (bT ) ∂ ∂b
−
2
T

2

p(bT )
ki i ∂ ∂b
≤ 0. Thus, hi (bT ) is strictly decreasing.
2
T

Theorem 9 The pure Nash Equilibrium of G = [ℵ, {Si }, {E(ui )}] is unique.
Proof: We use the notation b∗T to denote the total amount of offloaded data at the
PNE point of the game G. The proof of Theorem 9 is based on the reduction to
absurdity. Let us suppose that we have two distinct PNE points, b∗T (1) , b∗T (2) . Without
∆

loss of generality we assume that b∗T (2) > b∗T (1) . We define the set Sup = {i ∈ ℵ :
b∗T < bi }, thus it includes every user with non zero amount of offloading data to the
P
MEC server. Thus, we have Sup2 ⊆ Sup1 . We have that j∈Sup1 hj (b∗T (1) ) = b∗T (1) ,
P
P
P
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
j∈Sup1 \Sup2 hj (bT (1) ) = bT (1) ⇒
j∈Sup2 hj (bT (1) ) +
j∈Sup2 hj (bT (2) ) = bT (2) . So,
P
P
∗
∗
∗
∗
j∈Sup2 hj (bT (1) ) ≤ bT (1) < bT (2) =
j∈Sup2 hj (bT (2) ). However, hi (bT ) is decreasing,
so hi (b∗T (1) ) > hi (b∗T (2) ), ∀j ∈ Sup2 , which is contradiction. So, b∗T (1) = b∗T (2) .
Algorithm - Convergence to PNE
A direct consequence of Lemma 4, is that the best response strategy of a user is
decreasing in the total amount of offloading data. As a result, G belongs to the
class of best-response potential games, thus, the sequential best response dynamics
converge to the PNE of the game G [228]. From Theorem 9 and Lemma 2, we
conclude that each user’s i best response is unique. Specifically, its best response
is zero if and only if the total offloaded data of the rest users is greater than its
threshold value, i.e., b−i ≥ bi . Otherwise, its best response must be the root of the
first order derivative of the expected prospect-theoretic utility, thus

∂E(ui )
∂bi

= 0.

Each user i in order to compute its best response, first receives the total amount
of offloaded data of the rest users, i.e., b−i and then determines if it is zero, i.e.,
whether b−i ≥ bi holds true. The later is satisfied if and only if gi (b−i ) ≤ 0. If
the user i finds that b−i < bi , then the best response b∗i exists and is single-valued
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(Theorem 1). Specifically, due to the existence of the unique root of
regarding that

∂ 2 E(ui )
∂b2i

< 0, thus

∂E(ui )
∂bi

∂E(ui )
∂bi

= 0, and

is strictly decreasing with respect to bi , then

the unique root ri∗ can be found via binary search into [0, bth ] with an approximation
, such that  → 0, and finally the best response to be b∗i = min(Ii , ri∗ ).
The complexity of the binary search is O(log2 bth ) [229]. In each iteration, N
users execute Algorithm 1 and given that the rest operations involve arithmetical
calculations and Ite iterations are needed for convergence to the PNE, the complexity
of the distributed algorithm is O(N ∗ Ite ∗ log2 bth ). It is noted that the iterations
scale very well with respect to the increasing number of users.

Algorithm 2 : Distributed Algorithm for Convergence to PNE
Input: Set of Users ℵ = {1, 2, . . . , i, . . . , N }
Output: Vector at PNE b∗ = [b∗1 , ..., b∗i , ..., b∗N ]
Ite = 0, bi = randi(0, min(bth , Ii )), ∀i ∈ ℵ
while PNE not reached do
Ite = Ite + 1
for i = 1 to N do
User i receives the vector b−i
if (gi (b−i ) ≤ 0) then
b∗i = 0
else
ri∗ = BinarySearch([0, bth ], )
b∗i = min(Ii , ri∗ )
end if
end for
Check convergence to PNE
end while
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3.5.4

Empirical Evaluation

In this section, we provide some numerical results illustrating the operation, features
and benefits of the proposed prospect-theoretic decision-making framework. We focus on the pure operational characteristics of our framework, in terms of efficiently
controlling the devices’ offloaded data. A scalability analysis is provided, and we
study our framework’s operation under heterogeneous devices. Finally, a comparative empirical evaluation of our approach against alternative offloading strategies
is provided. In particular, we consider a base station acting as a MEC server with
a coverage area of radius R0 = 50m and N = 50 devices. Device’s channel gain is
modeled as gi =

1
,
dθi

where di is the distance of device i, i ∈ ℵ from the MEC server,

and θ is the distance loss exponent (e.g., θ = 2). The transmission’s bandwidth
is considered W = 5MHz. Each device transmits with power Pi =

d2i
W att,
R02

which

is proportional to its distance from the MEC server. For each device we consider
Joules
Fil ∈ [0.1, 1] GHz and fi = 10−9 Cpu−Cycle
, ∀i ∈ ℵ [230]. A face recognition appli-

cation is considered with Ii ∈ [1000, 2000] KB and Ci ∈ [1000, 2000] Mega-Cycles
[231, 232]. In the following, unless otherwise explicitly stated, we assume homogeneous users with parameters ai = 0.2 and ki = 5, ∀i ∈ ℵ. For the MEC server we
P
6
consider that FM EC = 103 GHz and bth = 10% × 50
i=1 Ii = 6.92 × 10 Bytes.

Pure Operation of the Algorithm
Figure 3.14a presents for three indicative users the optimal amount of offloaded
data to the MEC server, as a function of the iterations required to converge to the
PNE point. We observe that for practical purposes less than twenty iterations are
required to reach the PNE, starting from randomly selected initial values of offloaded
data. Moreover, each device converges to a different amount of offloaded data, as its
decision-making is based both on the MEC server’s congestion, and its characteristics.
Devices’ characteristics are better captured by the factor
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λi ∗Ii
,
di ∗Fil

presented in Figure
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3.14b, which indicates that if a device has either high computation capability (Fil ) or
long distance (di ) from the server, then it desires to offload a lower amount of data
to avoid the transmission’s overhead. However, the more demanding is the device’s
application (i.e., increased value of λi ∗Ii ) the more the offloading action is desired by
the device, so as to reduce the local overhead by executing part of its application at
the server. Thus, the higher is the factor

λi ∗Ii
,
di ∗Fil

the more beneficial is for the device

to offload a larger amount of data to the MEC server.
Figure 3.14c illustrates the average expected overhead and prospect-theoretic
(PT) utility as a function of the iterations, while the MEC server’s probability of
failure is shown in the contained sub-figure. The results reveal that initially the
expected average overhead and prospect-theoretic utility, are decreasing and increasing respectively, while the probability of failure also increases, as initially, the MEC
server is not congested (low probability of failure) due to the initial random feasible
values of users’ offloaded data. Thus, the users have a high incentive to increase
their offloaded data to reduce their overhead and increase their expected prospecttheoretic utility. As time evolves, this trend leads to the MEC server’s overloading
(increased probability of failure) and the offloading action becomes less beneficial.
Therefore, after a certain point the total offloading at the MEC server reduces and
its corresponding probability of failure also reduces, while the users’ offloaded data
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Scalability Evaluation

Figure 3.15a illustrates the necessary time for convergence to PNE (and as contained
sub-figure the corresponding iterations), as well as the total amount of offloaded
data to the MEC server, as the number of users increases. It is observed that our
prospect-theoretic framework scales very well concerning the increasing number of
users, as for an almost ten-fold increase in the number of users, the execution time
increases at a significantly lower rate, i.e., a four-fold increase. Similar observations
follow concerning the actual number of iterations as well. Furthermore, Figure 3.15b
presents the average expected overhead and prospect-theoretic utility at the PNE
with respect to the increasing number of users. As the competition for MEC server’s
computing increases (i.e., increased number of users), the MEC server becomes more
congested, and this results in a higher probability of failure, as is depicted by the
contained sub-figure. In this case, the offloading action for each user becomes less
beneficial, and thus each user offloads a reduced amount of data while executing a
bigger portion of its task locally.
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Heterogeneous Devices - Loss Aversion
In this section, the impact of the users’ heterogeneous loss aversion prospect-theoretic
behavior on the achievable performance is studied. Specifically, the results presented
in Figure 3.16a and Figure 3.16b compare a scenario of homogeneous users (i.e., same
loss aversion parameter km for all users) against a heterogeneous scenario, where each
user i, i ∈ ℵ, is associated with a different personalized loss aversion index ki . For
a fair comparison, for all the users of the homogeneous group the considered loss
aversion parameter, km is equal to the average loss aversion parameter value of all
the members of the heterogeneous group. That is, km =

PN

i=1

ki

N

. The results reveal

that the heterogeneous environment leads to higher congestion levels of the MEC
server, as both the total amount of offloaded data and the MEC server’s probability
of failure, reach higher values (Figure 3.16a), when compared to the corresponding
ones of the homogeneous scenario. Furthermore, it is observed that the expected
prospect-theoretic utility (Equation 3.39) is decreasing with respect to the total
amount of offloaded data bT , and as expected the case of the heterogeneous users
achieves a lower average expected prospect-theoretic utility (Figure 3.16b), due to
the higher congestion levels of the MEC server. Furthermore, from Figure 3.16b we
note that the heterogeneous users, by offloading a greater amount of their tasks to
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Comparative Analysis
Considering the basic setting of homogeneous devices, a comparative study of the
proposed optimal approach and solution demonstrates its superiority and benefits
over alternative strategies. The comparative evaluation is performed concerning the
following metrics: achievable average expected overhead, MEC server’s probability
of failure, and the total amount of offloaded data. Specifically, we compare our approach, which assumes prospect-theoretic users (PT), to three different approaches,
that assume the following users’ behaviors: (a) overhead minimizers (OM) users,
who selfishly select their offloaded data to minimize their expected overhead, (b)
only offloading (OO) users, who are risk-seeking and offload their whole task to the
MEC server, and (c) only local (OL) computing users, who are risk-averse and keep
the task execution locally, to obtain the "safe" and guaranteed performance provided
by their own devices.
Table 3.3 summarizes the corresponding results. Based on the fourth column
of Table 3.3, we confirm that the OL users (last row) do not offload any data to
the MEC server as expected, the OO users offload all of their data, the OM users
offload a significant (but not the whole) amount of their data aiming at minimizing
their overhead, while the PT users consider the server’s probability of failure and
accordingly offload a moderate amount of data. Specifically, when we consider riskseeking (OO) or risk-averse (OL) users, they experience the worst overhead, as either,
they lead the MEC server to failure with probability 1 (case of OO users), or they
do not exploit its high computation capability by not offloading any part of their
task (case of OL users), respectively. Also, the overhead of the OO users is greater
than the one of the OL users, as the first ones have an extra overhead owing to
their transmissions. On the other hand, concerning the case of the OM users, even
though lower overhead is achieved compared to the previous cases since the users
inherently aim at neutral overhead minimization, the selfish users’ behavior does not
consider the MEC server’s failure probability, and eventually leads the MEC server

109

Chapter 3. Mobile Edge Computing

to overloaded status and high probability of failure. Finally, the PT users achieve
the lowest average expected overhead compared to all the other approaches, while
at the same time MEC server’s probability of failure remains at significantly lower
values.
Table 3.3: Comparative Evaluation
User’s
Nature
PT
OM
OO
OL

3.5.5

Average
Expected
Overhead
13.8927
14.2385
14.8586
14.3116

Probability
of Failure
0.2546
0.9438
1
0

Total
Offloaded
Data [Bytes]
1762475
6534778
76932000
0

Summary

A device-centric risk-based distributed approach was proposed to determine the
users’ IoT devices’ computation offloading volume in a wireless MEC environment,
taking into consideration the loss-averse and gain-seeking behavior of the users following the properties of Prospect Theory. The proposed model and approach, is
enabled by and enables cognition, and comes in contrast to the majority of existing methods in the literature, that adopt the expected utility maximization theory,
where the users are assumed as risk-neutral.
In our setting the MEC server acts as a common pool of resources - CPR (Chapter
2.3) with uncertain payoff returned to the devices, due to its shared nature and
the corresponding interdependence among the users’ devices, while the choice of
computation executed at the local IoT device was assumed to be a safe computation
option. Exploiting the local IoT device computing and total offloading overhead,
while taking into account each user’s cognitive biases and behavior, the optimal
amount of each user’s offloaded data to the MEC server was obtained as the outcome
of a non-cooperative game among the users.
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The existence and uniqueness of a PNE point were shown, and an algorithm
that converges to the optimal values of offloaded data for each user in a distributed
manner was designed. Detailed numerical results were obtained via modeling and
simulation, that demonstrated the operation features and superiority of the proposed
cognitive-enabled framework, under both cases of homogeneous and heterogeneous
users.

3.6

Risk-aware Data Offloading in Multi-access Mobile Edge Computing

Multi-access Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) enables resource-constrained mobile
devices to offload, either partially or completely, computationally intensive tasks to
a set of servers at the edge of the network. Given that the shared nature of the
servers’ resources introduces high computation and communication uncertainty, here
we extend the research work in Chapter 3.5 by considering users’ risk-seeking or
loss-aversion behavior in their final decisions regarding the portion of their computing tasks to be offloaded at each server in a multi-MEC server environment while
executing the rest locally. This is achieved by capitalizing on the power and principles of Prospect Theory (Chapter 2.3) and Tragedy of the Commons, treating each
MEC server as a Common Pool of Resources available to all the users, while being
rivalrous and subtractable, thus may potentially fail if over-exploited by the users.
The goal of each user becomes to maximize its perceived satisfaction, as expressed
through a properly formulated prospect-theoretic utility function, by offloading a
portion of its computing tasks to the different MEC servers. To address this problem and conclude to the optimal allocation strategy, a non-cooperative game among
the users is formulated and the corresponding Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE), i.e.,
optimal data offloading, is determined, while a distributed low-complexity algorithm
that converges to the PNE is introduced. The performance and key principles of

111

Chapter 3. Mobile Edge Computing

the proposed framework are demonstrated through modeling and simulation, while
useful insights about the users’ data offloading decisions under realistic conditions
and behaviors are presented.

3.6.1

System Model

Figure 3.17: Multi-MEC servers environment

A multi-access edge computing (MEC) system with multi-MEC servers, as shown
in Figure 3.17, is considered, where the users can offload part of their application
to the MEC system through a 5G heterogeneous network. The MEC servers can
be small data centers at the edge of the network and possibly managed by different
Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs). Following the existing literature in
the field of multi-access edge computing, the MEC servers reside at the Macro Base
Stations (MBSs) of the macrocells or the Access Points (APs) of the small cells, e.g.,
femtocells [179, 176]. Considering that typically the small cells and the macrocell
are overlapping, each user is assumed capable of potentially offloading part of its
data to all the MEC servers in the examined scenario. By offloading a portion of the
user application data to the MEC system, the computing performance and energy
consumption that the users observe, are significantly improved and reduced respectively, thus overall enhancing user experience. Data offloading decision is a dynamic
process that depends not only on the communication and computing environment
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but also on the type of users’ requested services. These services may impose different
time and energy constraints in the data offloading problem based on their real and
non-real-time nature. Accordingly, the users may request either elastic or inelastic
services, such as executing a machine learning algorithm for data analytics purposes
or online gaming, respectively.
In our model, we denote by U = {1, . . . , i, . . . , U } the set of users, and with
S = {1, . . . , s, . . . , S} the set of MEC servers in the system. Furthermore, each
user i ∈ U has a computing application to be completed, with a certain affordable
delay and energy consumption, related to the user’s energy availability. Specifically,
we denote by Ai = (Bi , Ci , φi , ti , ei ) the user’s i computing application, which is
characterized by specific features and requirements. In particular, let Bi denote the
total input bits and Ci the number of CPU cycles required for the execution of the
requested computing application. We set Ci = φi · Bi , where φi , φi > 0 describes
the application’s intensity, e.g., a higher value of φi expresses a more computing
demanding application. For application Ai , ti is the time constraint that the user i
requests regarding its completion, and ei denotes user’s i energy availability at its
own device.
In this research work, we assume that for each user i ∈ U, the application Ai can
be arbitrarily partitioned into subsets of any size, which can be offloaded to any of
the available MEC servers. We denote by bi = (bi,1 , . . . , bi,S ) the user’s i offloading
vector and bi,s is the amount of data that user i offloads to the MEC server s.
P
Thus, bi,s ∈ [0, Bi ] and s∈S bi,s ≤ Bi , ∀i ∈ U. It is noted that each user transmits
sequentially its data bi,s , ∀s ∈ S via exploiting its single-interface communication
capabilities and each MEC server’s wireless channel. Consequently, the amount of
P
data that will be executed locally at the device is: (Bi − s∈S bi,s ).
In a realistic multi-MEC servers system, the end-users sense their environment
and available options of the MEC servers. The user devices are sufficiently intelligent and make optimal data offloading decisions in an autonomous and distributed
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manner while expressing and considering the users’ risk-aware behavioral characteristics. On the other hand, having a centralized load balancer to control the users’
optimal data offloading, introduces several drawbacks in the system design and efficiency, which our proposed solution bypasses. First, the load balancer is a centralized
decision-making entity, which is prone to be a single point of failure that can be attacked, e.g., distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, and the system can miss
operate. Second, it is assumed that all the service operators owning the various
MEC servers will accept and trust the centralized load-balancer to control the data
offloading to them. Third, even in the simple case of considering risk-neutral rational
users, the users are burdened by signaling overhead to report their characteristics
to the centralized load-balancer. Fourth, in the case of risk-aware users, as considered in the proposed framework, the centralized load-balancer has no feasible way
to know the user’s behavioral characteristics and the users are reluctant to reveal
them due to privacy concerns. Based on the above description, we evangelize that a
distributed risk-aware data offloading in multi-MEC server environments is a more
realistic framework compared to a centralized approach.

Communication Model
Each AP/MBS operates and receives data over a dedicated communication link,
i.e., frequency band, thus, each user, while transmitting part of its data to a MEC
server, senses the interference from the rest of the users transmitting only to the
P
same MEC server, i.e., j∈Ns ,j6=i pj,s · gj,s , where the communication channel gain
between the user j and the MEC server s is denoted by gj,s , Ns = {j ∈ U : bj,s 6= 0}
is the set of users that offload part of their application to server s, and pi,s is the
user’s i transmission power to offload part of the data to server s. The signal-tointerference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) measured at the receiver side, i.e., MEC servers,
with respect to the transmission of user i is γi,s =

pi,s ·gi,s
σ02 +

P

j∈Ns ,j6=i

pj,s ·gj,s

, and given that

the bandwidth allocated to each communication link is W , the corresponding user’s
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achievable data rate, while communicating with server s, is [223]:
Ri,s = W · log(1 +

σ02

+

pi,s · gi,s
)
j∈Ns ,j6=i pj,s · gj,s

P

(3.47)

where σ02 indicates the variance of the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) of
the server s. The user i, by offloading bi,s amount of data to the MEC server s,
experiences an overhead consisting of: a) the transmission time [sec] of the data
m,t
Oi,s
=

bi,s
Ri,s

(3.48)

and b) the transmission energy consumption [Joules]
bi,s · pi,s
Ri,s

m,e
=
Oi,s

(3.49)

Computing Model
1) Multi-access Edge Computing Model : We assume that a strong computing resource
(e.g., a high-speed CPU) is available at each MEC server, while the computing
capability of each server is limited by the total amount of data b̃s that can process
at the same time, e.g., due to either limited memory storage or finite multi-core
architecture of the MEC server. The total computing capability of each MEC server
s, which is denoted by Fs [Cycles/sec], is shared among the users that select to offload
bi,s amount of data to the MEC server s. Thus, the computing capability that is
assigned to user i (e.g., through a virtual machine) in order to remotely execute part
of its application is expressed via user’s i return function Fi,s (b̄s ) that is given as
follows:
Fi,s (b̄s ) = P

φi

j∈Ns

where b̄s =

P

j∈Ns bj,s

φj

· fs (b̄s )

(3.50)

is the total amount of offloaded data to MEC server s, and

fs defines the server’s s production function expressing users’ perceived computing
satisfaction from the MEC server s, and is given as follows:

 (1 − b̄s ) · F , if b̄ ≤ b̃
s
s
s
b̃s
fs (b̄s ) =
 0
, otherwise

115

(3.51)

Chapter 3. Mobile Edge Computing

where b̃s denotes the received bytes threshold value that the MEC server can process
without failing its operation.
Proposition 3 Each MEC server’s s, s ∈ S, production function fs (b̄s ), and each
user’s i, i ∈ U return function Fi,s (b̄s ), are strictly decreasing with respect to the total
offloaded data b̄s at the MEC server s.
The return function of user i (Equation 3.50) is personalized based on the computing demand φi of its application, and due to Equation 3.51 decreases as the total
computing offloading b̄s increases.
User i can execute remotely its offloaded data by receiving a computing capability
Fi,s from the server, and the corresponding execution time is

φi ·bi,s
.
Fi,s

As a result, based

on Equation 3.48 user’s i total time overhead is calculated as follows:
bi,s
φi · bi,s
+
Ri,s
Fi,s

m,t
Oi,s
|total =

(3.52)

Based on Equation 3.49 and Equation 3.52 the relative MEC overhead that user i
experiences by deciding to offload part of its application to the server s, considering
both the user’s application time constraints and the user’s energy availability, is
formulated as follows:
m
Oi,s
(bi,s )

=

bi,s
Ri,s

+

φi ·bi,s
Fi,s

ti

+

bi,s ·pi,s
Ri,s

ei

(3.53)

P
m
and the overall multi-access edge computing overhead Oim = s∈S Oi,s
, is given as
X
φi
pi,s
1
+
+
)
(3.54)
Oim (bi ) =
bi,s · (
Ri,s · ti Fi,s · ti Ri,s · ei
s∈S
2) Local Computing Model : For the local computing model, user i ∈ U executes
P
Li = Bi − s∈S bi,s amount of data locally at its device. By denoting with lci
[Cycles/sec] user’s i local computing capability and with lei [Joules/Cycle] user’s i
energy consumption to process locally the data, the local computing execution time
is given as follows:
Oil,t =

φ i · Li
lci
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while user’s local energy consumption to process the data is determined as follows:
Oil,e = φi · Li · lei

(3.56)

Based on Equation 3.55 and Equation 3.56, the user’s relative overhead regarding
the local computing approach considering both the computing time and the energy
consumption overhead, is given as follows:
Oil (Li ) =

Oil,t Oil,e
1
lei
+
= φi · Li · (
+ )
ti
ei
ti · lci
ei

(3.57)

Actual Total Overhead
Based on Equation 3.54 and Equation 3.57, user’s i total overhead is given as follows:
Oi =

X
s∈S

bi,s · (

1
Ri,s · ti

+

φi
pi,s
1
lei
+
) + φi · Li · (
+ )
Fi,s · ti Ri,s · ei
ti · lci
ei

(3.58)

Note that each user i ∈ U with strategy bi = (bi,1 , . . . , bi,S ) can evaluate its experienced total overhead by receiving from each server s (via server’s broadcasting),
P
the total interference j∈Ns ,j6=i pj,s · gj,s , the overall applications’ levels of computing
P
intensity j∈Ns φj , and the total amount of offloaded data b̄s , without requiring any
additional information of the individual users.

3.6.2

The Prospect of Data Offloading

Risk-aware Behavior: The Tragedy of the Commons
In the multi-MEC servers’ environment, each MEC server constitutes a Common
Pool of Resources (CPR), since all the users can arbitrarily offload part of their
applications to the MEC servers for remote execution. Due to Equation 3.50 and
Equation 3.51 each MEC server s is rivalrous and subtractable, as the MEC server’s
computing capability is a shared resource among the users. Specifically, Equation
3.51 denotes that the b̃s is the received bytes threshold value for each MEC server s,
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thus if b̄s ≥ b̃s the MEC server s is considered unable to execute the receiving amount
of applications at the same time, so it "fails". This phenomenon is well known in
the literature as the Tragedy of the Commons [233]. As a result, in the case of the
CPR’s failure, it is more beneficial for the user i either to offload the bi,s amount of
data to another MEC server, or process the data locally.
Towards minimizing the perceived overhead, the user’s i goal is to determine in
an autonomous and distributed manner the offloading amount of data bi,s to each
MEC server s by accounting for the uncertainty of the expected outcome. The
uncertainty introduced by the shared computing environment drives the users to
exhibit a risk-aware behavior. Based on this uncertainty, we introduce the probability
of failure of each MEC server s, which is denoted by ps (b¯s ). The probability of failure
characterizes each MEC server and represents its probability to fail to serve the endusers’ computing requests due to the over-exploitation of its computing capabilities.

Assumption 1 Each MEC server’s s (CPR) probability of failure ps (b̄s ) is strictly
increasing, convex and twice continuously defferentiable with respect to b̄s ∈ [0, b̃s ),
with ps (b̄s ) = 1, ∀b̄s ≥ b̃s .

We consider a linear probability of failure function for each MEC server s, thus
ps (b̄s ) =

b̄s
,
b̃s

∀b̄s < b̃s , while ps (b̄s ) = 1, ∀b̄s ≥ b̃s in order to represent a smooth po-

tential failure of the MEC server, if its computing capabilities become over-exploited
by the users. Each user i with strategy bi , by offloading bi,s amount of data to the
MEC server s, should consider the server’s probability of failure ps , since in the case
that the server s "fails" to execute user’s i amount of offloaded data, the user has
to process the data locally. Given that the MEC server’s s probability of failure is
ps , then the probability that the server survives and executes successfully the total
received amount of offloaded data is accordingly (1 − ps ). Based on Equation 3.53,
Equation 3.57, and given ps , user’s i expected MEC overhead from the server s, is
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formulated as follows:
m
m
E(Oi,s
(bi,s )) = (1 − ps (b̄s )) · Oi,s
(bi,s )

+ ps (b̄s ) · (Oil (bi,s ) +

bi,s · pi,s
bi,s
+
)
Ri,s · ti
Ri,s · ei

(3.59)

where the last two factors in the second term refer to the additional communication
overhead in the case of the MEC server’s failure, as the user offloads its data to the
server, and then the server’s failure is observed.
Following the same reasoning as in Equation 3.54, and applying the operation
of expectation, the overall expected multi-access edge computing overhead that user
P
m
(bi,s )). Consequently, taking the expectai experiences is E(Oim (bi )) = s∈S E(Oi,s
tion of the overall MEC overhead, where the first term of Equation 3.58 becomes
E(Oim (bi )), the user’s i overall perceived expected overhead is given as follows:
E(Oi ) =

X

m
E(Oi,s
(bi,s )) + φi · Li · (

s∈S

1
lei
+ )
ti · lci
ei

(3.60)

where the overall local computing overhead remains the same (i.e., second term of
both Equation 3.58 and Equation 3.60).

Offloading Decision under Prospect Theory
To address the users’ subjectivity in decision-making under uncertainty, as they
tend to exhibit different decisions under losses or gains with respect to their actual
satisfaction, Prospect Theory (Chapter 2.3) has been adopted. Here, the reference
point for each user is the guaranteed overhead Oil (bi,s ) (Equation 3.57) that the user
i can obtain by processing the bi,s amount of data locally instead of offloading them
to the server s. To this end, the user’s i prospect-theoretic utility, when offloading
bi,s amount of data to the MEC server s is formulated as follows:

 (q − q )αi
, if qi,s ≤ qi,r
i,r
i,s
ui,s (qi,s ) =
 −ki · (qi,s − qi,r )γi , if qi,s > qi,r
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m
where qi,s = Oi,s
(bi,s ) is the user’s i actual perceived MEC overhead by offloading bi,s

amount of data to the MEC server s, as defined in Equation 3.53, and qi,r = Oil (bi,s )
denotes the reference point of the user’s i prospect-theoretic utility.
Considering the case that the MEC server s does not fail due to the users’ offloaded amount of data, the user’s i MEC overhead qi,s is calculated by Equation
3.53, and in this case, it is lower than the corresponding local computing overhead
qi,r (reference point), thus qi,s ≤ qi,r . As a result, based on user’s i first branch of
its prospect-theoretic utility (Equation 3.61), via subtracting qi,s from the reference
p

point qi,r , we have ui,s = [bi,s ( tiφlci i + leeiiφi − ti R1i,s − ti φFii,s − ei Ri,si,s )]αi . On the other hand,
if the MEC server s fails to execute the received amount of offloaded data due to the
fact that it is overloaded, then the user i has to process the bi,s amount of data locally,
thus its experienced overhead is given by Equation 3.57, while it has an extra communication overhead, as user i at first had to offload the bi,s amount of data to the MEC
server s. As a result, user’s i actual experienced overhead in the case of the MEC
server’s s failure consists of the local computing overhead qi,r (reference point) and
b

b

·p

the extra communication overhead, thus qi,s = qi,r + Ri,si,s·ti + Ri,si,s ·ei,si , and is greater than
the reference point qi,r . Therefore, based on the second branch of Equation 3.61, by
subtracting the reference point qi,r from user’s i actual multi-access edge computing
p

overhead qi,s , its prospect-theoretic utility becomes ui,s = −ki ·[bi,s ·( Ri,s1 ·ti + Ri,si,s·ei )]ai .
Furthermore, for notational convenience we define i = ( Ri,s1 ·ti +
hi,s (b̄s ) = ( tiφlci i +

lei φi
ei

−

1
ti Ri,s

−

φi
ti Fi,s

−

pi,s ai
) ,
ei Ri,s

pi,s
)ai ,
Ri,s ·ei )

and

considering that hi,s > 0 if the

MEC server s does not fail. Considering the probability of failure ps (b̄s ), the user’s
i prospect-theoretic utility can be written as:

ui,s


 bαi · h (b̄ ) , with probabil. 1 − p (b̄ )
i,s s
s s
i,s
=
α
 −ki · i · b i , with probabil. ps (b̄s )
i,s

(3.62)

Based on Equation 3.62, and as per Equation 2.37, each user’s i expected prospect-
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theoretic utility regarding MEC server s is formulated as follows:
E(ui,s ) = bαi,si · hi,s (b̄s )(1 − ps (b̄s )) − ki i bαi,si ps (b̄s )
∆

= bαi,si · erti,s (b̄s )

(3.63)

where erti,s (b̄s ) = hi,s (b̄s )(1 − ps (b̄s )) − ki i ps (b̄s ) is the effective rate of return of the
MEC server s for the user i.

3.6.3

Prospect-Theoretic Partial Offloading

Each user i has to sophisticatedly and selfishly determine its best offloading strategy
in order to maximize its overall perceived expected prospect-theoretic utility, i.e.,
P
s∈S E(ui,s ). In this process, there is a natural tradeoff between the user’s i overall
MEC overhead and its overall local computing overhead. To capture this tradeoff, we
introduce each user’s i satisfaction utility, which is expressed by its overall expected
prospect-theoretic utility subtracting its overall local computing overhead as follows.
si (bi , b−i ) =

X

E(ui,s ) − Oil (Li )

(3.64)

s∈S

where b−i = [b1 . . . , bi−1 , bi+1 , . . . , bU ] is the users’ offloading strategies’ vector
P
except for the user i, s∈S E(ui,s ) is the overall expected prospect-theoretic utility
P
that user i obtains, and Oil (Li ) is given by Equation 3.57, where Li = Bi − s∈S bi,s
is the amount of locally processed data.
Therefore, the ultimate goal of each user i is to maximize its perceived satisfaction utility si by determining its data offloading strategy bi . This problem can be
formulated as a maximization problem of user’s i satisfaction utility, and based on
Equation 3.57 and Equation 3.63 can be expressed as follows.
max si (bi , b−i ) =

X

bi ∈Γi

bαi,si · erti,s (b̄s ) − φi Li (

s∈S

lei
1
+
)
ti · lci
ei

S - times

z
}|
{
where Γi = [0, . . . , Bi ] × · · · × [0, . . . , Bi ] is the strategy set of user i.

121

(3.65)

Chapter 3. Mobile Edge Computing

Due to the non-cooperative and distributed nature of the above maximization
problem, it can be treated as a non-cooperative game among the users who act as
players making the optimal decisions about themselves in a selfish and distributed
manner. Let G = [U, {Γi }i∈U , {si }i∈U ] denote the non-cooperative game among the
users which set is U, where each user’s strategy space is Γi , and its payoff is the satisfaction utility si (Equation 3.64). Towards solving the non-cooperative game G, the
concept of Nash equilibrium is adopted (Chapter 2.1). The Nash equilibrium (NE) of
the non-cooperative game G is the strategy vector which consists of users’ offloading
vectors, b∗ = [b∗1 , . . . , b∗i , . . . , b∗U ], where no user has the incentive to change its own
strategy (i.e., at least the amount of offloading data at one MEC server s) given the
strategies of the rest of the users. We denote as b∗−i = [b∗1 , . . . , b∗i−1 , b∗i+1 , . . . , b∗D ]
the users’ offloading strategies vector except for user i at the NE point.
X
1
φi
1
φi
φi Li
E(Oi )|t =
[bi,s (
+
)(1 − ps (b̄s )) + bi,s (
+ )ps (b̄s )] +
Ri,s Fi,s
Ri,s lci
lci
s∈S
P
φ
Fi,s = P i φ (1− b̄s )Fs X
φi bi,s + b−i,s
1
φi Li
b̃s
j∈Ns j
j∈Ns φj
+
+ (
================
[bi,s (
))] +
Ri,s
Fs
lci
lci
ps =b̄s /b̃s ,b̄s =bi,s +b−i,s
b̃s
s∈S
(3.66)
E(Oi )|e =

X

[bi,s

s∈S

pi,s
pi,s
(1 − ps (b̄s )) + bi,s (
+ φi lei )ps (b̄s )] + φi Li lei
Ri,s
Ri,s

φi
j∈Ns φj

Fi,s = P

(1− b̄s )Fs

X
pi,s
bi,s + b−i,s
================
[bi,s (
+ φi lei (
)] + φi Li lei
R
ps =b̄s /b̃s ,b̄s =bi,s +b−i,s
b̃
i,s
s
s∈S

(3.67)

b̃s

Problem Formulation
Each user i aims at maximizing its satisfaction utility si , while at the same time experiencing a non-negative expected prospect-theoretic utility E(ui,s ) ≥ 0. If E(ui,s ) < 0,
then the bi,s amount of data that the user i offloads to the MEC server s, drives the
latter to a high probability of failure ps , thus the user’s offloading is not beneficial.
Additionally, each user aims at satisfying its time ti and energy ei constraints,
as follows: E(Oi )|t ≤ ti and E(Oi )|e ≤ ei , where E(Oi )|t and E(Oi )|e are given by
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Equation 3.66 and Equation 3.67, respectively. Therefore, the maximization problem
of user’s i satisfaction utility (Equation 3.65-3.67) can be formulated as follows:
maximize
bi ∈Γi

si (bi , b−i )




s∈S bi,s ≤ Bi ,




E(ui,s ) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S,
P

subject to

E(Oi )|t ≤ ti ,
E(Oi )|e ≤ ei

(3.68)
(Ci )










where (Ci ) denotes the group of the constraints that user’s i offloading strategy bi
should satisfy.
Existence, Uniqueness and Convergence of PNE
Let us denote as Ai the set of each user’s i strategy space, where Ai = Γi ∩ Ci ,
Ci = {bi ∈ Γi : bi satisfies (Ci )}. Thus, the non-cooperative game G is transformed
to G = [U, {Ai }i∈U , {si }i∈U ].
Theorem 10 The non-cooperative game G among the users is an n-person concave
game, where n = U .
In order to prove the above theorem, we first state the following Lemmas 5 - 8
Lemma 5 For each user i and each MEC server s there exists a value bth
i,s ≥ 0 such
th
th
that erti,s (bth
i,s ) = 0 and E(ui,s ) ≥ 0, ∀bi,s ≤ bi,s , while E(ui,s ) < 0, ∀bi,s > bi,s .

Proof : The first order derivative of the effective rate of return erti,s (b̄s ) of the MEC
server s, s ∈ S regarding user i, i ∈ U is given as follows:
∂erti,s (b̄s )
∂hi,s (b̄s )
∂ps (b̄s )
=
(1 − ps (b̄s )) −
(hi,s (b̄s ) + ki i )
∂ b̄s
∂ b̄s
∂ b̄s
It is obvious that

∂ps (b̄s )
∂ b̄s

(3.69)

> 0, since the MEC server’s s, s ∈ S probability of failure

ps (b̄s ) is strictly increasing with respect to b̄s . Also (1 − ps (b̄s )) > 0, and
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since the hi,s (b̄s ) is strictly decreasing with respect to b̄s based on Proposition 3. As a
result

∂erti,s (b̄s )
∂ b̄s

< 0, thus erti,s (b̄s ) is strictly decreasing with respect to b̄s . CASE A:

If erti,s (0) ≤ 0, then, erti,s (bi,s ) ≤ erti,s (0) ≤ 0, ∀bi,s ≤ Bi and E(ui,s ) ≤ 0 (Equation
3.63). So, in this case either bth
i,s = 0 or it is not defined since E(ui,s ) < 0, ∀bi,s ≤ Bi .
CASE B: If erti,s (0) > 0, then since erti,s (b̃s ) = −ki i < 0 due to ps (b̃s ) = 1, then
th
∃bth
i,s ∈ [0, b̃s ], such that erti,s (bi,s ) = 0 based on the Intermediate Value Theorem

[227].
Based on Lemma 5, the maximization problem in Equation 3.68 can be rewritten
as follows.
maximize
bi ∈Ai

si (bi , b−i )




s∈S bi,s ≤ Bi ,




th
0 ≤ bi,s ≤ bi,s , ∀s ∈ S,

P
subject to

E(Oi )|t ≤ ti ,
E(Oi )|e ≤ ei

(3.70)
(Ci )










where the second constraint in (Ci ) was replaced by 0 ≤ bi,s ≤ bth
i,s .
Lemma 6 For each user i and each MEC server s, the expected prospect-theoretic
utility E(ui,s ) is strictly concave ∀bi,s ∈ (0, bth
i,s ).
Proof: The expected prospect-theoretic utility’s first order derivative is given as
follows:
∂E(ui,s )
∂hi,s (b̄s )
= [bai,si
+ ai bai,si −1 hi,s (b̄s )](1 − ps (b̄s ))
∂bi,s
∂ b̄s
∂ps (b̄s )
− bai,si hi,s (b̄s )
∂ b̄s
∂ps (b̄s )
− ki i [ai bai,si −1 ps (b̄s ) + bai,si
]
∂ b̄s

It holds true that

∂E(ui,s )
∂bi,s

=

∂E(ui,s )
,
∂ b̄s

since b̄s = bi,s + b−i,s , where b−i,s =

Also, for the second term in Equation 3.71 holds true
for the last term holds true that −ki [ai bai,si −1 ps (b̄s ) +

124

(3.71)

P

j∈Ns ,j6=i bj,s .
∂p
(
b̄
that −bai,si hi,s (b̄s ) ∂sb̄s s ) < 0, and
bai,si ∂p∂sb̄(sb̄s ) ] < 0, since ∂p∂sb̄(sb̄s ) > 0.
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As a result, for the root of Equation 3.71, i.e.,

∂E(ui,s )
∂bi,s

= 0, since the last two terms

in Equation 3.71) are negative, it should hold true that:
[bai,si

∂hi,s (b̄s )
+ ai biai −1 hi,s (b̄s )] > 0
∂ b̄s

(3.72)

as (1 − ps (b̄s )) > 0. The expected prospect-theoretic utility’s second derivative is
formulated as follows:
2
∂ 2 E(ui,s )
ai −1 ∂hi,s (b̄s )
ai ∂ hi,s (b̄s )
+ 2ai bi,s
](1 − ps (b̄s )
=
[b
i,s
2
2
∂bi,s
∂ b̄s
∂ b̄s

∂hi,s (b̄s )
∂ps (b̄s )
+ ai hi,s (b̄s )]
∂ b̄s
∂ b̄s
2
∂ ps (b̄s )
− bai,si hi,s (b̄s )
∂ b̄2s
∂ 2 ps (b̄s )
∂ps (b̄s )
+ bai,si
− ki i [2ai bai,si −1
]
∂ b̄s
∂ b̄2s

ai −1
[bi,s
− 2bi,s

(3.73)

ai −2
[hi,s (b̄s )(1 − ps (b̄s )) − ki i ps (b̄s )]
+ ai (ai − 1)bi,s

Based on Equation 3.73, since bi,s satisfies Equation 3.72,
∂ps (b̄s )
∂ b̄s

> 0 and

∂ 2 ps (b̄s )
∂ b̄2s

= 0, it is true that

∂ 2 E(ui,s )
∂b2i,s

∂ 2 hi,s (b̄s )
∂ b̄2s

< 0,

∂hi,s (b̄s )
∂ b̄s

< 0,

< 0, ∀bi,s ∈ (0, bth
i,s ), thus E(ui,s ) is

strictly concave.
In the following Lemma, we prove that Ci = {bi ∈ Γi : bi satisfies (Ci )} is a
convex set, due to the fact that the group of constraints (Ci ) is a set of convex
functions.
Lemma 7 For each user i, its group of constraints (Ci ) is a set of convex functions.
(1)

gi

=

X

bi,s − Bi

s∈S
(2)

gi,s = bi,s − bth
i,s ,
(3)

gi,s = −bi,s ,

∀s ∈ S

(4)

= E(Oi )|t − ti

(5)

= E(Oi )|e − ei

gi

gi
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∀s ∈ S
(3.74)
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(2)

(3)

Proof: It is obvious that the functions gi,s and gi,s are convex functions ∀s ∈ S, as
linear functions with respect to bi,s . Moreover from [234], we know that each function
f of n-variables, with continuous partial derivatives and cross partial derivatives on
a convex set S, is convex if and only if its Hessian matrix H(x), where x ∈ S, is
positive semidefinite over the set S. Also, for each function f of n-variables, its
Hessian matrix H(x) is formulated as follows:




f
f
.
.
.
f
1n
 11 12



 f21 f22 . . . f2n 


.. . .
.. 
 ..
.
 .
.
. 


fn1 fn2 . . . ff n

(3.75)

where fij is the cross partial derivative of f , with respect to its j-th and its i-th
argument.
Furthermore, from [235] we know that an n × n matrix is positive semidefinite,
if and only if all its principal minors ∆k , ∀k = 1, . . . , n, are non-negative. In our
case S = Γi , since bi ∈ Γi , and Γi is a convex set as a cartesian product of convex
sets. Moreover, each function in Equation 24 has continuous partial derivatives, and
each function’s cross partial derivatives exist. For all the functions in Equation 3.74,
(n )

(n )

thus ∀n1 ∈ {1, 4, 5} and ∀n2 ∈ {2, 3}, it holds true that,
∀s, s0 ∈ S, s 6= s0 , and

(n1)
∂ 2 gi
∂b2i,s

6= 0,

(n2)
∂ 2 gi
∂b2i,s

∂gi 1
∂bi,s ∂bi,s0

= 0,

∂gi,s2
∂bi,s ∂bi,s0

= 0,
(n1 )

6= 0. Let us examine the convexity of gi

,

∀n1 ∈ {1, 4, 5} in Equation 3.74
(1)

gi : Based on Equation 3.74 and the definition of an n-variables function’s Hessian
Matrix, i.e., Equation 3.75, it is obvious that the Hessian matrix Hg(1) = 0S×S . As a
i

(1)

result all the principal minors of the Hg(1) are non-negative, thus the function gi

is

i

convex.
(4)

gi : Based on Equation 3.66, and given that ps (b̄s ) =
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b̃s

and Li = Bi −

P

s∈S bi,s ,
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(4)

the gi

is given as follows:
(4)
gi

=

X
s∈S

1
+
bi,s (
Ri,s

P

j∈Ns

φj

Fs

)

X φi b2i,s
b−i,s
+
(
+ bi,s
)
lci b̃s
b̃s
s∈S
X
φi
+ (Bi −
bi,s ) − ti
lci
s∈S
(4)

As a result, since

∂gi
∂bi,s ∂bi,s0

(3.76)

(4)

= 0, ∀s, s0 ∈ S with s 6= s0 , the function’s gi

Hessian

matrix is formulated as:


Hg(4)
i




=




0

0
..
.
0

∂ 2 gi
∂b2i,s

...

(4)
∂ 2 gi
2
∂bi,2

(4)

where based on Equation 3.76,



(4)

∂ 2 gi
 ∂b2i,1

=

..
.

...
..
.

0

...

2φi
lci b̃s

0 

0 

.. 
. 

(4) 
∂2g

(3.77)

i

∂b2i,S

> 0, ∀s ∈ S, thus the Hg(4) is a diagi

onal matrix, and all its elements are non negative. Therefore, the Hg(4) is positive
i

(4)

semidefinite, so the gi

is a convex function.

(5)

gi : Based on Equation 3.67, and given that ps (b̄s ) =
the

(5)
gi

b̄s
b̃s

and Li = Bi −

P

s∈S bi,s ,

is given as follows:
(5)

gi

(5)

As a result,

∂ 2 gi
∂b2i,s

=

2φi
lei b̃s

X φi b2i,s
b−i,s
(
+ bi,s
)
lei b̃s
b̃s
s∈S
X
X
pi,s
+
bi,s
+ φi lei (Bi −
bi,s ) − ei
Ri,s
s∈S
s∈S
=

(3.78)

> 0, ∀s ∈ S. Therefore, similarly with Hg(4) , the Hg(5) is a
i

i

diagonal matrix with non negative elements, therefore it is positive semidefinite, and
(5)

the function gi

is convex.

T
(n )
Based on Lemma 7, for each user i, the set Ci = Γi ∩ ( n1 ∈{1,4,5} Lev(gi 1 , 0)) ∩
(

T

n2 ∈{2,3}

(n )

Lev(gi,s2 , 0)), ∀s ∈ S is a convex set as an intersection of a convex set Γi
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and level sets of convex functions, which are necessarily convex sets (see Section 3.1.6
of [236]). Therefore, each user’s i strategy space Ai = Γi ∩ Ci in the non-cooperative
game G, is a convex set as an intersection of convex sets.
Lemma 8 Each user’s i, i ∈ U satisfaction utility si , is a concave function over the
strategy space Ai .
Proof: From [234], the satisfaction utility si is a concave function if and only if
its Hessian matrix Hsi is negative semidefinite over the convex set Ai . Based on
Equation 18, since
∂ 2 si
∂bi,s ∂bi,s0

∂ 2 si
∂bi,s ∂bi,s0

=

∂ 2 E(ui,s0 )
,
∂bi,s ∂bi,s0

= 0, ∀s, s0 ∈ S, with s 6= s0 , as

∂ 2 si
∂b2i,s
∂ 2 E(ui,s0 )
=
∂bi,s ∂bi,s0

then

=

∂ 2 E(ui,s )
∂b2i,s

and it holds true that

0. As a result, similarly with the

Hg(4) and Hg(5) , user’s i satisfaction utility’s Hessian matrix is given as follows:
i

i





Hsi = 




∂ 2 E(ui,1 )
∂b2i,1

0
..
.
0

0



..
.

...
..
.

0
..
.

0

...

∂ 2 E(ui,S )
∂b2i,S









0
∂ 2 E(ui,2 )
∂b2i,2

...

(3.79)

In other words, the Hessian matrix Hsi is a diagonal matrix and from Lemma 2,
each element of the matrix is negative. Therefore, for each leading principal minor
k
Y
∂ 2 E(u )
Dk , k = 1, . . . , S of the Hsi , it holds true that Dk =
hjj , where hjj = ∂b2 i,j .
i,j

j=1

Moreover, for k = 2ρ, (−1)k Dk > 0, and for k = 2ρ+1 again (−1)k Dk > 0, thus based
on [234] the Hessian matrix Hsi is strictly negative definite. Thus, the satisfaction
utility si is concave over the convex set Ai .
Based on Lemmas 5-8, each user’s i strategy space Ai is a convex set, and its
satisfaction utility si (bi , b−i ) is concave over the set Ai . Thus, the non-cooperative
game G is an n-person concave game, where n = U , so the Theorem 1 holds true. An
n-person concave game has at least one Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) [237], thus
the existence of at least one PNE point for the non-cooperative game G holds true.
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Finally, based on Theorem 10, Lemma 8 and [237], the following Theorem proves
the convergence of the users’ strategies to the PNE.
Theorem 11 Consider the user i and an S×S matrix function Xi in which (Xi )ss0 =
2

∂ si
0
T
is strictly
λi ∂s∂s
0 , ∀s, s ∈ S, and the constant choices λi > 0. Then, if Xi + Xi

negative definite, then the PNE of the game G is unique. Starting from any initial
offloading strategy b0 = [b1,0 , · · · , bU,0 ], bi,0 ∈ Ai , the continuous Best Response
(BR) dynamics converge to the unique PNE.
Proof: As we mentioned in Lemma 8, since
∀s, s0 ∈ S, with s 6= s0 , as

∂ 2 E(ui,s0 )
∂bi,s ∂bi,s0

∂ 2 si
∂bi,s ∂bi,s0

=

∂ 2 E(ui,s0 )
,
∂bi,s ∂bi,s0

and

∂ 2 si
∂bi,s ∂bi,s0

= 0,

= 0, the matrix Xi is given as follows:


 2
∂ E(u )
0
...
0
λi ∂b2 i,1
i,1




∂ 2 E(ui,2 )
0
λi ∂b2
...
0


i,2

Xi = 


..
..
.
..
..


.
.
.


2
∂ E(ui,S )
0
0
. . . λi ∂b2

(3.80)

i,S

thus, Xi = λi · Hsi . Also, due to the fact that Xi is diagonal it holds true that
Xi = XTi , so Xi + XTi = 2 · Xi . Furthermore, in Lemma 4 we proved that for each user
i, i ∈ U, its satisfaction utility’s Hessian matrix Hsi is strictly negative definite, so
since λi > 0 and Xi + XTi = 2 · Xi = 2λi Hsi , the Xi + XTi matrix is strictly negative
definite. Therefore, the non-cooperative game G has a unique NE point, and starting
from any initial point b0 the BR dynamics converge to the unique PNE point.

3.6.4

Towards Determining the Equilibrium

A Convex Optimization Approach
Each user’s i satisfaction utility si is a concave function over Ai (Lemma 8), thus the
function zi (bi , b−i ) = −si (bi , b−i ) is a convex function over the same space. Let us
denote each user’s i best response strategy b∗i (b−i ) : A−i ⇒ Ai considering the other
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users’ strategies, as follows:
b∗i (b−i ) = arg max(si (bi , b−i )), b−i ∈ A−i

(3.81)

bi ∈Ai

where b−i is the vector of the offloading strategies of all the users except user
i, as it was defined in Section IV, and A−i = A1 × · · · × Ai−1 × Ai+1 × · · · × AU
is the corresponding strategy space, thus ∀i ∈ U, b−i ∈ A−i . Each user’s i best
response strategy bi ∈ Ai should satisfy the group of constraints (Ci ) (Equation
3.70). Furthermore, considering that the function zi is a convex function over the
convex set Ai , each user’s i best response strategy can be formulated as follows:
b∗i (b−i ) = arg min(zi (bi , b−i )), b−i ∈ A−i

(3.82)

bi ∈Ai

Each user i in order to maximize its satisfaction utility si (Equation 3.64), should
equivalently minimize the convex function zi over the convex set Ai . Thus, each user
i during the continues BR dynamics solves the following optimization problem to
determine its best response strategy b∗i .
minimize
bi ∈Γi

zi (bi , b−i )




s∈S bi,s ≤ Bi ,




th
0 ≤ bi,s ≤ bi,s , ∀s ∈ S,

P
subject to

E(Oi )|t ≤ ti ,
E(Oi )|e ≤ ei

(3.83)
(Ci )










Moreover, assuming that each user i is able to satisfy its time and energy constraint
in (Ci ) by executing its whole application locally, i.e., bi = 0 ∈ Ai , the set Ai is
non-empty, and the above minimization problem is a nonlinear convex optimization
(n1 )

problem, where the function zi (bi , b−i ) is the objective function, and the gi
(n )

{1, 4, 5}, gi,s2 , n2 ∈ {2, 3} (Equation 3.74) are the inequality constraints.
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Algorithm and Complexity Analysis
In this section, the Distributed Algorithm for Convergence to the PNE (DACP) of
the non-cooperative game G is presented. The DACP algorithm is a decision-making
tool that runs at the beginning of the data offloading process and after it converges
to b∗ = [b∗1 , . . . , b∗i , . . . , b∗U ] the users know the data that should be offloaded to each
MEC server and the ones that should be processed locally. The DACP algorithm
is an iterative distributed sequential algorithm, where at each iteration only one
randomly selected user plays an action. At the first iteration (ite = 0), each user
selects randomly a feasible data offloading vector b∗i , ∀i ∈ U . Then, this is reported
to the MEC servers by a user’s broadcasting signal and each MEC server calculates
the b¯s , ∀s ∈ S, which then is broadcasted to all the users. At the next iteration of
the DACP algorithm, one user is randomly selected to make an action b∗i given the
values b¯s , ∀s ∈ S. The user makes action and broadcasts its decision to all the MEC
servers in order for the latter to recalculate the new values b¯s , ∀s ∈ S. The same
procedure is followed iteratively until the DACP algorithm converges (Line 15 of the
DACP algorithm). After the DACP algorithm converges, then each user has decided
its data offloading vector b∗i and performs the data offloading.
Specifically, each user, in order to compute its best response b∗i , first receives from
P
each MEC server the total amount of offloaded data b̄s , the interference j∈Ns pj,s gj,s ,
P
and the overall applications’ levels of computing intensity j∈Ns ,j6=i φj that have been
offloaded to this MEC server s. Then, each user, in order to construct its second
th
constraint in (Ci ), determines the bth
i,s , such that erti,s (bi,s ) = 0, ∀s ∈ S. From
∗
Lemma 1 the root ri,s
of the erti,s = 0 exists, and given that the erti,s is strictly
∗
decreasing, the ri,s
is unique and can be found via Binary Search into [0, b̃s ] with an
∗
approximation error  → 0, thus bth
i,s = min(ri,s , Bi ).

Each user has to solve the nonlinear optimization problem given in Equation 3.83
to determine its best response strategy. Since, as we have already proven, the problem
in Equation 3.83 is a convex optimization problem, the constrained local minimum
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is also a constrained global minimum. Thus, each user may apply any of well known
existing methods for solving constrained nonlinear optimization problems [238], and
conclude to the global minimum of zi (bi , b−i ) (Equation 3.83), while determining its
best response strategy b∗i . For demonstration purposes, we consider the sequential
quadratic programming (SQP) [239] method.
Regarding the Algorithm’s DACP complexity, each user i, is required to determine the bth
i,s , ∀s ∈ S. Given that the complexity of the Binary Search into the interval
[0, b̃s ], s ∈ S, is O(log2 b̃s ) [229], the complexity of the user i to determine all the bth
i,s
is O(S · log2 (max(b̃s )). Also, by denoting as O(∆) the complexity of solving the cons∈S

vex the optimization problem through sequential quadratic programming, and since
the rest operations involve only algebraic calculations, the complexity of each user i
to determine its best response b∗i at each iteration ite is O(∆ + S · log2 (max(b̃s )).
s∈S

Considering that U users execute the Algorithm DACP and given that Ite iterations
are needed for convergence to the PNE, the total complexity of the distributed Algorithm DACP for all the users is O(U · Ite · (∆ + S · log2 (max(b̃s )))). Finally, the
s∈S

complexity of the optimization problem O(∆) can be considered significantly greater
than the complexity O(S · log2 (max(b̃s ))), therefore the complexity of the Algorithm
s∈S

DACP is O(U · Ite · ∆).
In a nutshell, the DACP algorithm is a decision-making tool enabling the users
to determine their optimal data offloading satisfying their personal constraints (Ci ),
as presented in Equation 3.83, before they actually perform it. Also the DACP
algorithm needs only few iterations (i.e., less than five iterations) in order to converge,
thus the signaling overhead added to the end-users is rather limited, and in most cases
practically insignificant.

3.6.5

Empirical Evaluation

In this section, we provide a detailed numerical performance evaluation of the proposed prospect-theoretic framework, through modeling and simulation, illustrating
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Algorithm 3 DACP: Distributed Algorithm for Convergence to PNE
1: Input:
1: Set of users:

U = [1, . . . , i, . . . , U ]

1: Set of MEC Servers:

S = [1, . . . , s, . . . , S]

2: Output:
2: Profile Strategy at PNE: b∗ = [b∗1 , . . . , b∗i , . . . , b∗U ]
3: Initialization:
3: bi = [bi,1 , . . . , bi,s , . . . , bi,S ]
3: ite = 0, Convergence = 0
4: Iterative Procedure:
5: while Convergence == 0 do
6:

ite = ite + 1;

7:

f lag = 0;

8:

for i = 1 to U do

9:

for s = 1 to S do

10:

user i calculates the transmission uplink rate Ri,s

11:

∗
ri,s
= BinarySearch([0, b̃s ],);

12:

∗
bth
i,s = min(ri,s , Bi );

13:

end for

14:

b∗i = fmincon();

15:

if (|b∗i,s − bi,s | ≤  , ∀s ∈ S) then

16:

0

f lag = f lag + 1;

17:

end if

18:

bi = b∗i

19:

end for

20:

if (f lag == U ) then

21:
22:

Convergence = 1, Ite = ite;
end if

23: end while

the operation, features, and benefits of our approach. We focus on the pure operational characteristics of our prospect-theoretic framework, in terms of efficiently
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controlling the users’ offloaded data with respect to the heterogeneous multiple MEC
server environment. Furthermore, we provide a detailed study of our framework’s
operation under heterogeneous users regarding their loss-aversion characteristics, and
a scalability and fragility evaluation study is shown concerning an increasing number
of users and MEC servers. Finally, a comparative evaluation of our approach against
alternative approaches and offloading strategies is provided.
In our study, we consider a set of S = 3 heterogeneous MEC servers, with each
MEC server s, s ∈ S having a coverage area of radius Rs = 100m, and U = 50 users in
total. Each user’s i, i ∈ U channel gain is modeled as gi,s =

1
,
dθi,s

where di,s is the user’s

i distance from the MEC server s, i.e., di,s ≤ Rs , and θ is the distance loss exponent,
e.g., θ = 2. The system’s transmission bandwidth is considered W = 5M Hz, while
a representative value of the service uplink rate for video conference application is
Rf ix = 128 kbps. Each user i transmits to the MEC server s with power pi,s =

d2i,s
,
Rs2

thus each user’s i transmission power is normalized and proportional to its distance
from the corresponding MEC server.
,
Moreover, for each user i we consider lci ∈ [0.1, 1] GHz and lei = 10−9 CPJoules
U −Cycle
∀i ∈ U [230]. The considered application characteristics (e.g., face recognition application) are Bi ∈ [1000, 5000] KB and Ci ∈ [1000, 5000] Mega-Cycles. In the
following, unless otherwise explicitly stated, we assume homogeneous users with
prospect-theoretic parameters αi = 0.2 and ki = 5, ∀i ∈ U. Finally, for each MEC
P
server s, s ∈ S we consider that Fs ∈ [1, 4] · 103 GHz and b̃s ∈ [30, 70]% · 50
i=1 Bi .
Pure Operation of the Algorithm
Figure 3.18a presents the evolution of a specific user’s offloading strategy (bi,s , ∀s ∈ S)
at each MEC server s, as a function of the number of iterations and actual execution
time needed for the Algorithm DACP to converge at the PNE point. Firstly, we
observe that the user by starting from randomly selected feasible initial values, as
the amounts of the data offloading at each MEC server, converges in few iterations,
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Figure 3.18: Pure operation of the proposed framework - Users’ Perspective

i.e., less than five, at the unique PNE point. Indicatively we note that the DACP
algorithm needs approximately 1.5sec to converge to the Pure Nash Equilibrium
considering that 3 MEC servers and 50 users reside in the network, while significantly
smaller times are observed if smaller-scale systems are considered or enhanced devices
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Figure 3.19: Pure operation of the proposed framework - MEC Servers’ Perspective
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application with latency constraints 3sec (Figure 3.18b) and based on the decision of
the DACP algorithm a time overhead E(Oi )|t = 50msec is achieved for the execution
of the application.
As we also see in Figure 3.19a, where four different users are considered, each
user’s total amount of offloaded data converges to a stable point, while the difference
in the values of these points is due to the users’ heterogeneous characteristics, e.g.,
users’ application characteristics, users’ location inside the system. Furthermore, as
Figure 3.18b illustrates, the examined user determines its best response strategy (in
accordance to Equation 3.82) by satisfying its energy and time constraint at every
iteration, while at the same time its satisfaction utility converges to a stable point
(Figure 3.18c), as the user’s data offloading strategy at each MEC server converges
(Figure 3.18a). Also, the propagation time is negligible in our presented numerical results, as the maximum distance of each user from each MEC server is 100m.
Moreover, the convergence of the users’ average satisfaction utility and overhead are
presented in Figure 3.18d.
Figure 3.19b presents the total amount of offloaded data that each MEC server
collects by the users. MEC servers’ heterogeneous characteristics, in terms of insetting the users to offload part of their applications to the MEC servers, are better
captured by the incentive factor

b̃s
+ P Fs F
j∈S j
j∈SPb̃j
d
i∈U
P
P i,s
j∈S i∈U di,j

P

of each MEC server, which is pre-

sented in Figure 3.19c. The MEC server’s incentive factor indicates that the higher
the ability of a MEC server to process bigger amounts of data, i.e., b̃s , or the higher
the MEC server’s computation capability, i.e., Fs , then the higher is the incentive of
a user to offload part of its application to this MEC server to obtain an increased
satisfaction utility. Consequently, the higher is the MEC server’s incentive factor,
the greater is the amount of data that it gathers by the users (Figure 3.19b). Also
note, that each MEC server’s incentive factor is being influenced by the average distance of the users from the server since for small distances the users will experience
less communication overhead during their data offloading at this MEC server. Al-
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though MEC servers 1 and 3 collect a higher amount of data compared to server 2,
the latter one concludes to a higher probability of failure (sub-figure within Figure
3.19b). This phenomenon is observed since MEC servers 1 and 3 are assumed to have
a significantly higher threshold value b̃s than MEC server 2 (Figure 3.19d), which
enables them to process a higher amount of data.

In the following, we present some indicative results to study the tradeoffs in the
users’ offloading decisions concerning the MEC servers’ characteristics, i.e., threshold
value b̃s , computation capability Fs , and the average distance of the users from
each MEC server. In particular, we assume a scenario where each user initially
has the same distance from each MEC server, while the MEC server 3 has improved
computation capabilities compared to the rest of the servers, in terms of its threshold
value b̃s and its computation capability Fs . Then, the distance of the MEC server
3 from each user increases, thus, the users reduce their amount of data that they
offload to the MEC server 3 (Figure 3.20a). Specifically, the MEC server 3, due to
its improved computation capability gathered a greater amount of data at the initial
point, while then the amount of collected data decreases, as each user experiences a
greater communication overhead due to the increase of its transmission power and
time, which overturns the obtained computation benefit. Moreover, the users to
reduce their additional local amount of data due to the decrease of their offloaded
amount of data at the MEC server 3, they increase their corresponding amounts
to the rest of MEC servers, and this leads the MEC servers 1 & 2 to receive a
greater amount of data compared to the MEC server 3 (Figure 3.20a), after a specific
point. As a result, the values of the probabilities of failure for the MEC servers 1
& 2 increase, while MEC server’s 3 corresponding value decreases (Figure 3.20b).
Furthermore, due to the increase of the MEC server’s 3 distance from the users, each
user’s offloading is becoming less beneficial, and as a result, its satisfaction utility
decreases as it experiences a greater expected overhead (Figure 3.20c).
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Figure 3.20: Computation vs Communication Overhead

Scalability & Fragility Evaluation

Figure 3.21: Time & Offloaded Data - Scalability Evaluation

Figure 3.21 illustrates the necessary time for convergence to PNE (left-most subfigure), both for an increasing number of users and an increasing number of MEC
servers. It is observed that our prospect-theoretic framework scales very well with
respect to the increasing number of MEC servers, since the required execution time
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has a smaller increase rate when compared to the corresponding increase rate on the
number of servers. Moreover, as the number of the users increases, the framework’s
execution time follows almost a linear increasing trend with respect to the number
of users, and this indicates that the factor ∆ · Ite in our framework’s complexity
O(U · Ite · ∆) increases with a significantly lower rate compared to the increase of the
factor U . It should be clarified that the DACP algorithm is a decision-making tool
enabling the users to determine their optimal data offloading satisfying their personal
constraints (Ci ), as presented in Equation 3.83, before they actually perform it.

Figure 3.22: Probability & Overhead - Scalability Evaluation

Furthermore, in Figure 3.22 our framework’s performance in terms of the MEC
servers’ probability of failure, and users’ experienced expected overhead is studied.
The results reveal that by keeping the number of users constant and increasing the
number of MEC servers, the performance of the system improves since the average
amount of data that each MEC server receives from the users is reduced (Figure
3.21b), as the users have more choices/MEC servers to offload their data. Thus, the
average probability of the MEC servers decreases (Figure 3.22 left-most figure) (ps
is decreasing with respect to b̄s ), and the users experience lower expected overhead

139

Chapter 3. Mobile Edge Computing

(Figure 3.22 right-most figure).
On the other hand, by keeping the number of MEC servers constant and increasing the number of users, the exact opposite phenomenon is observed. In particular,
the MEC servers become more congested as the servers’ average received amount of
data increases (Figure 3.21 right-most figure), and as a result the average probability
of failure of the MEC servers also increases (Figure 3.22 left-most figure). Moreover,
since each MEC server is overloaded, the computation capability portion that each
user obtains (Fi,s , Equation 3.50) from each MEC server decreases, while at the
same time the communication overhead increases. As a result, each user experiences
a greater expected overhead (Figure 3.22 right-most figure).
In order to further study the effect of competition on the fragility of each MEC
server (i.e., treated as CPR) between a single and several self-interested users, we use
the Fragility under Competition (FuC) metric, which is defined as the ratio of the
fragility of a MEC server when there are several users to the fragility of the server
when there is only one user [130]. The fragility of the MEC server s is expressed by the
failure probability function, ps (b̄s ) which steadily increases as users’ total offloaded
bits (i.e., investment) b̄s increases. The fragility of MEC server s is expressed by
the failure probability function, which steadily increases as users’ total investment
increases. Specifically, the Fragility under Competition for each MEC server s is
given by F uCs =

ps (b̄∗s )
,
ps (b̄∗s,i )

where the numerator ps (b̄∗s ) is the probability of failure

function when the total investment in the server s at the Pure Nash Equilibrium
(PNE) point of N , N ≥ 2 homogeneous visitors is b̄∗s , whereas the denominator
ps (b∗i,s ) is the probability of failure function when considering a single user i (i.e.,
N = 1) who has the same risk preferences as the homogeneous group and its optimal
investment in CPR is b∗i,s .
Figure 3.23 depicts the MEC server average FuC value as a function of increasing
number of users, for different values of sensitivity parameter a. In particular, we
observe that the FuC value of a MEC server rises as the number of users grows,
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Figure 3.23: Fragility under Competition

then depending on the sensitivity parameter a, it reaches a peak and after that
remains stable, regardless of the number of users. Based on Theorem 1 and Lemma
1 the total investment in a MEC server s at the PNE is smaller than bth
i,s , while
Assumption 1 states that probability of failure is an increasing function of b̄s , and
thus ps (b̄s ) < ps (bth
i,s ). As a consequence, FuC is upper bounded which is confirmed
by our numerical evaluation results. Figure 9 also illustrates that the FuC bound
decreases when visitors have a smaller sensitivity parameter a, thus they become
more risk-averse. This confirms that the bounds are influenced by the sensitivity
parameter and the specific CPR characteristics.

Comparative Evaluation
Considering the basic scenario of homogeneous users, a comprehensive comparative
study of the proposed optimal approach, against several other alternatives is presented. The comparative evaluation is performed concerning the following metrics:
users’ achievable average expected overhead and MEC servers’ probability of failure.
We compare our approach to six other approaches that differ with respect to the
users’ behaviors, as follows:
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(a) non-prospect-theoretic (NPT) users, but expected overhead minimizers instead.
Each user i determines its best response b∗i that minimizes its perceived expected
overhead (Equation 3.59), (b) a full game-theoretic offloading approach (only nonpartial offloading is permitted) (GOFF) [175], where a non-cooperative game is formulated among the users. Each user i determines its best choice ch∗i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , S},
in terms of which MEC server to select to offload its whole application (data),
(chi = 0, if the user i keeps its application for local execution), that minimizes
its perceived expected overhead (Equation 3.60),
(c) a single MEC server environment (SMEC), where a single only MEC server with
the average capabilities of the three MEC servers of the basic setting is placed,
instead of a multi-MEC servers environment,
(d) only local (LOC) computing users, who are risk-averse and keep the task’s execution locally to obtain the guaranteed, though limited, the performance provided
by their device,
(e) full offloading users (FULL), who are risk-seeking, and offload their whole task
to the multi-MEC servers environment, by choosing randomly a MEC server s, thus
b∗i = Bi ,

1

1
0.8

Average PoF

Average Expected Overhead

(f) each user i determines its best response b∗i = [b∗i,1 , · · · , b∗i,S ] randomly (RAND),
P
such that s∈S bi,s ≤ Bi .

0.6
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0
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0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

NPT GOFF SMEC LOC RAND FULL

(a)

PT

NPT GOFF SMEC LOC RAND FULL

(b)

Figure 3.24: Comparative Evaluation

Specifically, Figure 3.24a illustrates the users’ average experienced overhead, and
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Figure 3.24b indicates the MEC servers’ average probability of failure for each different approach. The results reveal that our proposed approach achieves the best
performance in terms of both experienced overhead and probability of failure, while
the LOC, RAND, and FULL alternatives achieve the worst performance. In particular, in the LOC approach, the users perceive the highest expected overhead, since
they keep the whole application for local execution, and thus they obtain the worst
performance in terms of time and energy overhead due to the limited local computing characteristics of the devices. On the other hand, under the RAND and FULL
approaches which offload either part (RAND) or the whole application (FULL), respectively, the users experience lower overhead. However, under the FULL approach,
the MEC servers become overloaded, and thus the highest average probability of failure is observed.
Furthermore, as Figure 3.24a presents, the NPT approach achieves the secondbest performance after our approach. This is due to the pure benefits stemming
from the optimization of the partial offloading, while under the GOFF approach the
users offload their whole application without taking advantage of the potential for
partial offloading. This leads the MEC servers to higher levels of congestion, with
a higher probability of failure (Figure 3.24b), and as a result since the uncertainty
of the MEC servers’ successful operation increases, it is expected that the users will
execute greater amounts of data locally, and the expected overhead (Equation 3.60)
increases accordingly.
On the other hand, under the NPT approach, the users make their offloading
decisions to simply minimize their perceived expected overhead, without evaluating
however their perceived overhead regarding the guaranteed performance that they
would obtain if executed the offloading amount of data locally. Consequently, the
MEC servers conclude to significantly higher probability of failure (Figure 3.24b),
while the users obtain the worst performance compared to our prospect-theoretic
approach, where the users’ decisions offloading strategies are based on the tradeoff
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between the perceived performance and the one that they would experience from their
local device (Figure 3.24a). Finally, the SMEC prospect-theoretic strategy results in
a relatively good performance in terms of MEC servers’ average probability of failure
owing to the consideration of the risk-based behavior modeling, however, since there
is only one single MEC server, the users enjoy limited computation capabilities, while
the communication overhead increases and the MEC server’s computation capability
is shared among all the users. As a result, the SMEC strategy results in relatively
higher expected overhead compared to the NPT and GOFF.

3.6.6

Summary

A novel approach towards establishing each user’s optimal data offloading decisionmaking process within a multiple MEC servers environment is introduced. The users’
risk-aware attitudes are considered due to the computing uncertainty imposed by the
multi-MEC system. The users can offload part of their computing tasks to the MEC
servers and execute the rest locally. Each MEC server is considered as a Common
Pool of Resources (Chapter 2.3), serving the users’ computing requests, and can
potentially fail due to over-exploitation. The users demonstrate different risk-aware
data offloading behaviors, which are captured in a holistic prospect-theoretic utility
function, following the principles of Prospect Theory. The goal of each user is to
maximize its perceived satisfaction, as expressed by the prospect-theoretic utility
function, by offloading its computing tasks to the MEC servers.
A non-cooperative game among the users is formulated and the corresponding
Pure Nash Equilibrium is determined, while a distributed low-complexity decisionmaking algorithm that converges to the PNE is also introduced. Detailed numerical
results were presented highlighting the operation and superiority of the proposed
framework with respect to the users’ resource-constrained computing systems’ perceived overall overhead.
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Redesigning Resource Management
in Wireless Networks
The rise in popularity of smartphones, along with the need for personalized services with different Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, has created an increased
interest in energy-efficient resource management frameworks in wireless networks,
where user actions and decisions are interdependent. Our focus is placed on the
transformation and treatment of the uplink power control problem under the perspective of game theory in satisfaction form. The novel concept of Minimum Efficient
Satisfaction Equilibrium (MESE) is introduced and its properties are thoroughly investigated. In particular, considering that each user is associated with a cost function
concerning its actions, the MESE point defines each user’s transmission power that
satisfies its QoS prerequisites with the lowest cost (Chapter 2.1.2). We prove that
at the MESE point, not only the system achieves the lowest possible cumulative
cost, but also each user individually is penalized with the minimum cost compared
to the corresponding cost of any Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium (ESE) point. The
existence, uniqueness, and benefits of the MESE are thoroughly studied, while a
distributed and low complexity algorithm based on the Best Response Dynamics
that converges to the MESE point is proposed. Through modeling and simulation,
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the performance and inherent attributes of the proposed novel resource management
framework are evaluated, and its benefits are revealed.

4.1

Related Work

The massive expansion of mobile devices and traffic is creating competitive communication environments that induce constraints regarding the availability of their
resources, thus making the problem of resource management even more challenging and demanding. In such competitive and distributed communications systems,
users evolve with others, while their decisions and actions are interdependent. Thus,
given this setting and responding to the need for distributed solutions, Game Theory (Chapter 2.1) arises as a natural choice and a powerful tool to cope with users’
selfish and competitive behavior regarding the resource orchestration process within
the emerging 5G networks.
The majority of the existing literature, regarding resource management in wireless
networks, focuses on the Expected Utility Maximization problems, where the users
aim at maximizing their utility in a selfish manner targeting the highest possible
performance [240]. Various resource management problems have been considered
in the recent literature, dealing with: (1) a single resource to be allocated to the
users, e.g., power control [241, 242], rate control [243], (2) the allocation of multiple
resources, e.g., power and rate control [244] or sub-channel, rate, and power allocation
[245, 246]. In those approaches, the non-cooperative game theory is adopted to
formulate the resource management problems and their solutions conclude to Nash
equilibrium points which are stable operational points for all the users in the network.
However, it is well-known that the Nash equilibrium points stemming from users’
selfish decision-making are generally inefficient. Thus, a first step towards addressing
this challenge and guide the selfish users towards a more efficient operating point was
the introduction of the pricing mechanisms, where the users are penalized concerning
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their resources’ consumption [247, 248]. Despite the relative improvements that have
been obtained by adopting the concept of resource pricing, still, those approaches
could not address the main disadvantage of the Nash equilibrium points holistically.
In particular, customized heuristic pricing mechanisms are required each time to treat
different resource types and address different networking environments. Furthermore,
even when pricing is considered, in principle each user still aims at maximizing his
own perceived Quality of Service (QoS). Thus the realization of the aforementioned
maximization goal ultimately does not offer a notifying difference to the experienced
satisfaction.
Therefore, the unprecedented need of rethinking the resource orchestration process arises in 5G wireless networks towards accommodating and successfully addressing the QoS demands of the significantly increasing number of users. Towards
this direction, a new concept of equilibrium is introduced: Satisfaction Equilibrium,
where the users aim to satisfy their minimum QoS prerequisites instead of targeting
at QoS maximization [249, 250]. Perlaza et al. in [85] and [251] have discussed in
detail the definition of the Satisfaction Equilibrium (SE) and the general conditions
for examining its existence. Also, they have introduced the concept of users’ effort
to achieve the SE, thus proposing a refinement of the SE, namely the Efficient SE
(ESE). At the ESE point, all the users conclude to a resource allocation point, i.e.,
strategy, which requires the lowest effort to satisfy their minimum QoS prerequisites.
In [252] and [253], the concepts of SE and ESE are applied in a simplified uplink
power control problem considering interference channels in a single-cell wireless communication environment. Additionally, reinforcement learning algorithms have been
introduced in [254] and [255] to determine the SEs and ESEs under different conditions. Nevertheless, the aforementioned approaches are still primitive concerning the
resource allocation problem within the uplink transmission power environment. As
a result, many interesting properties that emerge when the satisfaction equilibrium
framework is applied to this setting have not been revealed yet. Our work aims at
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filling this gap, and focuses on the transformation and treatment of the uplink power
control problem under the perspective of game theory in satisfaction form.

4.2

Contributions

We study in detail the satisfaction equilibrium points (Chapter 2.1.2) for QoS provisioning in wireless networks, where user actions and decisions are interdependent.
This is achieved via examining the uplink power control problem for a general set
of users’ realistic utility functions, which are increasing with respect to the user’s
uplink transmission power and decreasing with respect to the intracell interference.
A representative example (but not limited to this one) is the Shannon’s formula. The
novel concept of Minimum Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium (MESE) is introduced,
which is shown to be of special interest among the satisfaction equilibrium points
that have already been proposed in the literature, i.e., Satisfaction Equilibrium (SE)
and Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium (ESE).
Assuming that each user is associated with a cost function of arbitrary form with
respect to its actions, at the MESE point each user transmits at a power level that
satisfies its QoS prerequisites with the lowest cost. It is worthwhile noting that we
prove that at the MESE point, not only the system achieves the lowest possible
cumulative cost, but also each user is penalized with the minimum cost compared to
the corresponding cost at every other ESE point. The existence and uniqueness of
the MESE point is thoroughly studied.
A distributed and low complexity Minimum Effort Best Response Dynamics algorithm is proposed, which is based on the best response dynamics behavioral rule
and converges to the MESE point that is also the most energy-efficient from all the
existing ESEs. A series of experiments are performed to evaluate the performance
and attributes of the proposed novel resource management framework which is based
on games in satisfaction form. A basic comparative study demonstrates its superi-
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ority and benefits in terms of power savings and improved network capacity, against
approaches targeting energy-efficiency and/or utility maximization.

4.3

Rethinking Uplink Power Control

The introduced definitions and concepts in Chapter 2.1, along with the pressing
need for cost-efficient (i.e., energy-efficient) solutions in the era of wireless communications, motivate and support the rethinking and redefinition of the power control
problem in wireless networks. Let us consider K transmitter/receiver pairs denoted
by index k ∈ K. For all k ∈ K, transmitter k uses power level pk ∈ Ak , with Ak
generally defined as a compact sub-lattice. For each player k ∈ K, we denote pmin
k
and pmax
the minimum and maximum power levels in Ak , respectively. For every
k
pair of devices (i, j) ∈ K 2 , gij is the channel gain coefficient between transmitter i
and receiver j.
As it was introduced in Chapter 2.1, a game in satisfaction form is defined as [253]
Ĝ = (K, {Ak }k∈K , {fk }k∈K ), where K = {1, . . . |K|} represents the set of players, Ak
is the strategy set of player k ∈ K, uk (ak , a−k ) represents player’s k payoff (i.e.,
utility function), and fk (a−k ) = {ak ∈ Ak : uk (ak , a−k ) ≥ uthr } determines the
set of actions of player k that allows its satisfaction, that is its payoff to be above a
threshold value uthr , given the actions a−k played by all the other players. A strategy
profile is denoted by a vector a = (a1 , . . . , a|K| ) ∈ A, A = A1 × · · · × Ak × · · · × A|K| .
For the rest of this section, we will assume and study uplink power control games
in which each player has a utility function that is increasing with respect to its
transmission power and decreasing concerning the total summation over the powers
of the rest of the players, as the latter quantity acts as interference to the examined player’s transmission. One representative example of such utility function that
satisfies the aforementioned realistic assumption, is the commonly adopted Shannon
capacity which is given by:
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uk (pk , p−k ) = log2 (1 +

W
p g
bps
Pk kk
)[
]
2
Rf ixed σk + j6=k pj gjk Hz

(4.1)

where σk2 is the noise variance at receiver k, Rf ixed is the fixed requested service data
rate and W the system’s bandwidth.
The considered QoS requirement for each user k is to have a channel capacity
bps
]. The satisfaction correspondence
uk (pk , p−k ) higher than a given threshold uthr [ Hz

of user k is subsequently expressed as:
fk (p−k ) = {pk ∈ Ak | uk (pk , p−k ) ≥ uthr }
P
σk2 + j6=k pj gjk
Rf ixed uthr
(2
− 1)
}
= {pk ∈ Ak | pk ≥
W
gkk

(4.2)

In the above inequality, note that if a user raises its transmission power then
some other users may also have to increase their transmission powers as well to
get satisfied. Also, given the strategy profile of the other users p−k , the following
statement is valid for each user k:
p ∈ fk (p−k ) ⇒ ∀p∗ ∈ Ak : p∗ ≥ p, p∗ ∈ fk (p−k ).

(4.3)

Thus, given the strategies of the other users, i.e, p−k , there is a transmission
SP
power pM
which on one hand satisfies the QoS prerequisites of the examined user
k

k, but on the other hand playing with a lower transmission will leave the user unsatisfied. Contrary, if the user transmits with a greater power, then the user will
SP
remain satisfied. We will refer to that power pM
as the Mininum Satisfying Power
k

(MSP) of user k given p−k . Note, that under the assumption we made about the
monotonicities of the utility functions, the inequality 4.3 will hold true for the rest
of our analysis.
As we can observe from the definition of the games in satisfaction form, the
existence of an SE depends on the feasibility of the constraints imposed on the
player’s utility functions. In the following subsection, we examine the existence of
an ESE in the uplink power control game Ĝ = (K, {Ak }k∈K , {fk }k∈K ) with cost
functions {ck }k∈K and payoff/utility functions {uk }k∈K (Equation 4.1).
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4.3.1

Existence of ESE

To prove the existence of at least one ESE point in the uplink power control game Ĝ
in our setting we first mention the Tarski and Knaster’s fixed point theorem [256].
Theorem 12 (Fixed point theorem) Let L be a complete lattice and let f : L →
L be an order-preserving function. Then, the set of fixed points of f in L is also a
complete lattice.
Let A be the set of the strategy space of the game Ĝ as defined above. Let us
also define the lattice L = hA, i, where  is the component-wise less or equal.
Note that L is a complete lattice as all of its subsets have both a supremum and an
infimum. The next step is to construct an appropriate function g : L → L. For that
purpose, we will use the notation BRk (p−k ) as the best response function of a user
k, while the strategies of the rest of the users are p−k . That is, the transmission
power pk ∈ Ak : pk = arg minpk ∈fk (p−k ) c(pk ). Let us define the function g : L → L as
follows:
g(p) = (BR1 (p−1 ), . . . , BR|K| (p−|K| )) ∀p ∈ A
Note that if fk (·) 6= ∅ for every user k, then BRk (p−k ) ∈ Ak , ∀p−k ∈ A−k , ∀k ∈ K.
Following those definitions we conclude to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If an uplink power control game in satisfaction form Ĝ with cost
function {ck }k∈K and utility function {uk }k∈K (Equation 4), has the fk functions for
every user k non empty for every input then it possesses at least one ESE.
Proof: The proof comes from the Theorem 12. As mentioned, L is a complete lattice.
0

0

We can also note that ∀p, p ∈ A : p  p it holds that:
(BR1 (p−1 ), . . . , BR|K| (p−|K| )) 
0

0

(BR1 (p−1 ), . . . , BR|K| (p−|K| ))
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Or equivalently g(p)  g(p ). That means that for every user k, when the rest of the
users have played p−k and then they increase their powers, k’s best response will be a
greater or equal transmission power than it was. The latter holds true because of the
monotonicity we assumed on the utility functions, and thus either k’s best response
will still satisfy user’s k QoS prerequisites or user k should increase its transmission
power in order to be satisfied, thus, inevitably playing an action (transmission power)
that is related to a greater cost than before. In that fashion, we also proved that
g is an order-preserving function. Following the previous analysis, Tarski-Kraskel’s
theorem ensures the existence of a fixed point of function g. That is, ∃p ∈ A :
p = g(p) ⇔ (p1 , . . . , p|K| ) = (BR1 (p−1 ), . . . , BR|K| (p−|K| )

4.3.2

Existence of MESE

In the previous subsections, we proved that under some assumptions the set of all
the ESEs {E} of the game Ĝ is not empty. Let us now define a binary relation c
in {E} such that:
a c b ⇔

|K|
X

ck (a−k ) ≤

k=1

|K|
X

ck (b−k )

k=1

Note that c is a total ordering for the set {E}. Thus, {E} possesses at least one
minimum value. That means that:
∃e∗ ∈ {E} : ∀e ∈ {E}, e∗ c e
Note that e∗ is an MESE for the game Ĝ. So, under the same assumptions as before,
we can easily prove the existence of at least one MESE.

4.3.3

Uniqueness and Benefits of MESE

In the followings, we provide some propositions that hold in the considered uplink
power control game, to show the main benefits of the MESE point and the specific conditions under which it is unique. We will assume that the fk functions are
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non empty for every input and every player k, where this assumption ensures the
possession of at least one ESE (Proposition 4).
Proposition 5 In an uplink power control game Ĝ as mentioned above, if an action
profile p+ is an SE of the game and it holds that ∀k ∈ K, ∀pk ∈ Ak : pk ≥ p+
k , ck (pk ) ≥
+
∗
ck (p+
k ) there exists one action profile p that is an ESE in which it holds that ck (pk ) ≥

ck (p∗k ), ∀k ∈ K.
Proof : For the proof we exclude the powers pd : pd > p+
k , ∀k ∈ K. Thus, the modified
0

0

strategy space is denoted by Ak , and the corresponding game is Ĝ . In the game
0

Ĝ , we know that the strategy p+
k will satisfy the user k, ∀k ∈ K, regardless the
strategies of the rest of the users (Equation 4.3). We can now apply proposition 1,
which proves the existence of an action profile p∗ that is an ESE for Ĝ0 . As it is an
ESE in that game we have that:
∀k ∈ K, ∀pk ∈ A0k : pk ∈ fk (p∗−k ),

ck (pk ) ≥ ck (p∗k )

(4.4)

0
Because by default p+
k is the maximum transmission power of the set Ak of the
+
∗
∗
k th user in Ĝ0 , it means that p+
k ≥ pk and consequently ck (pk ) ≥ ck (pk ) based on

Equation 4.4. So, the above statement combined with our assumption regarding the
monotonicity of the utility function, enables us to conclude to the following statement
regarding the initial game Ĝ:
∀k ∈ K,

∀p ∈ Ak : p ∈ fk (p∗−k ),

ck (p) ≥ ck (p∗k )

Due to the above statement and given that p∗ is certainly an SE in Ĝ, we conclude
that p∗ is also an ESE in Ĝ. By proving that, we have also proven implicitly that
P
P
+
∗
k∈K ck (pk ) ≥
k∈K ck (pk ).
Note that by assuming increasing utility function with respect to user’s k transmission power and decreasing with respect to the total power of the rest of the users,
we gain an ascending monotonicity of the cost functions in the set of ESEs in a way
that is described by the following proposition.
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Proposition 6 In an uplink power control game Ĝ let two action profiles p∗(1) , p∗(2)
∗(1)

∗(2)

∗(1)

be ESEs. Then for each user k it holds that ck (pk ) > ck (pk ) iff pk

∗(2)

> pk .

Proof: This proposition is proven via the reductio ad absurdum, as follows. If
∗(1)

∗(2)

∗(1)

ck (pk ) > ck (pk ) and it was pk

∗(2)

< pk , it would mean that in the strategy profile
∗(2)

p∗(1) user k would remain satisfied if it played pk

(Equation 4.3), which reduces its
∗(1)

cost. That is a contradiction because p∗(1) is an ESE. In addition, pk
∗(1)

∗(2)

∗(1)

hold because ck (pk ) 6= ck (pk ). Now, assume that pk

∗(2)

= pk

can’t

∗(2)

> pk . That would mean
∗(1)

that in the strategy profile p∗(2) user k would remain satisfied if it played pk . Thus,
∗(1)

∗(2)

because those action profiles are ESEs, it should hold that ck (pk ) > ck (pk ).
Let us now use those propositions in order to prove the following statement that
enables us to study the plurality of the set of all the MESE points.
Proposition 7 For any two MESEs p†(1) , p†(2) it holds that:
†(1)

†(2)

∀k ∈ K

ck (pk ) = ck (pk ),

Proof : Let {E} be the set of action profiles that are ESEs. Let us now denote two
†(1)

MESEs of the game, p†(1) and p†(2) such that for one user k it holds that ck (pk ) 6=
†(2)

ck (pk ). In order for them to be MESEs the following should hold:
∀p∗ ∈ E,

X

ck (p∗k ) ≥

k∈K

X

†(1)

X

ck (pk ) =

k∈K
†(1)

†(2)

ck (pk )

(4.5)

k∈K
†(2)

†(1)

As assumed, there is one user k that ck (pk ) 6= ck (pk ) and consequently pk
†(2)
pk .

Without loss of generality,we assume that

†(1)
ck (pk )

<

fact that p†(1) and p†(2) are ESEs, from Proposition 6 we

†(2)
ck (pk ).
†(1)
get pk

6=

Because of the
†(2)

< pk . Thus,

the total summation over the costs of all users in p†(1) would be lower than the
one of p†(2) if they do not differentiate in any other strategy. This, denotes that
†(1)

†(2)

there should be one other user j (j 6= k) that cj (pj ) > cj (pj ). With the same
†(1)

argument it holds that pj

†(2)

†(1)

> pj . Let p+ be an action profile with p+
k = pk

†(2)

and

+
p+
j = pj . Note that p has lower summation over the costs of users k, j from both
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p†(1) and p†(2) . Continuing in that fashion, p+ strategy profile picks for every user k
†(1)

the power that gives k the lower cost over pk

†(2)

and pk . Because of Proposition 6,
†(1)

†(2)

the transmission power would always be the lower of the two. If ck (pk ) = ck (pk ),
+
let p+
k be the lower transmission power of the two. Note that p is an SE as each
†(1)
user k was satisfied by playing p+
or at p†(2) while all of the other
k either at p

users have played greater or equal transmission powers (Equation 4.3). So, at p+ it
holds that:
X

ck (p+
k) <

k∈K

X

†(1)

ck (pk ) =

X

†(2)

ck (pk )

(4.6)

k∈K

k∈K
+

Note that in order to construct p we chose strategies between two ESEs. Thus,
because of Equation 4.3 and Equation 2.11 we get that ∀k ∈ K, ∀p ∈ Ak : p ≥
+
+
†
p+
k , ck (p) ≥ ck (pk ). Thus, applying Proposition 5 on p gives us an ESE p with
X
X
ck (p+
ck (p†k )
)
≥
(4.7)
k
k∈K

k∈K

Combining inequalities 4.6 and 4.7 we conclude:
X
X
X
X
†(2)
†(1)
ck (pk )
ck (p†k ) ≤
ck (p+
c
(p
)
=
)
<
k
k
k
k∈K

k∈K

k∈K

k∈K

†(1)

which leads to contradiction with Equation 4.5 as p† is an ESE. So, ck (pk ) =
†(2)

ck (pk ), ∀k ∈ K which completes the proof.
The above proposition, shows that every MESE point gives the same cost to a
given user. Consequently, if ∀k ∈ K, ∀p1 , p2 ∈ Ak : (p1 6= p2 ), ck (p1 ) 6= ck (p2 ) (which
is a common case in the uplink power control), then the MESE point is unique. The
following proposition shows that each user achieves the minimum cost at a MESE
point compared to the experienced cost at any ESE point.
Proposition 8 In the considered uplink power control game, let p† be a MESE of
the game and {E} the set of ESEs, it holds that ck (p†k ) ≤ ck (p∗k ), ∀k ∈ K, ∀p∗ ∈ E.
Proof: For the proof let us study the strategy profile p that:
∀k ∈ K,

∀p∗ ∈ E,

pk = arg min
ck (p∗k )
∗
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Thus, the strategy profile p picks for each user the power that gives the lowest
cost for the user over all its strategies that belong to the set of ESEs. In case of a tie
(more than one strategies that minimize the cost), it picks the lower strategy from
those. Let us focus on a random user k. Let p∗ be one ESE such that pk = p∗k . So,
from all the ESEs of the game, p∗ gives the lowest cost to user k, ck (p∗k ). Because of
Equation 4.8:
∀i ∈ K, ci (pi ) ≤ ci (p∗i )
For the users i0 that holds ci0 (pi0 ) < ci0 (p∗i0 ), Proposition 3 gives pi0 < p∗i0 . For
all users i00 that holds ci00 (pi00 ) = ci00 (p∗i00 ) the way that we broke the ties gives us
pi00 ≤ p∗i00 . So, combining the above statements we have proven that ∀i ∈ K, pi ≤ p∗i .
Owing to the above, user k will certainly be satisfied in strategy profile p because
it was satisfied at the ESE p∗ in which the other users have played greater or equal
transmission powers (Equation 4.3). The above analysis holds for every user k, thus
every user in strategy profile p is satisfied, thus p is an SE. Note that in order
to construct p, we chose strategies between strategy profiles that are ESEs. Thus,
based on of Equation 4.3 and Equation 2.11 we get that ∀k ∈ K, ∀p ∈ Ak : (p ≥
pk ), ck (p) ≥ ck (pk ). Now, we can apply Proposition 5 that gives us an ESE p† that:
∀k ∈ K ck (pk ) ≥ ck (p†k )
X
X
ck (pk ) ≥
ck (p†k )
k∈K

(4.9)

k∈K

Taking into consideration Equation 4.8, we can note that only the equality can hold
in inequalities 4.9 so
∀k ∈ K ck (pk ) = ck (p†k )
X
X
ck (pk ) =
ck (p†k )
k∈K

k∈K

Note that we cannot find an ESE that has lower total cost than p. Thus, p† is an
MESE. Because of Proposition 4 every MESE assigns the same cost to a given user.
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That means that every MESE allocates to each user the minimum cost that it could
have in an ESE as exactly p does.
One final observation is that if the cost function of every user is increasing concerning its transmission power, MESE would be unique and there would not exist
any strategy profile that satisfies all of the users and simultaneously allocates on
any user lower cost value than the MESE does. That can be easily concluded if one
applies Proposition 5 on the unique MESE.

4.3.4

Algorithm & Convergence

We present a distributed algorithm that converges at a Minimum Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium (MESE) of the game Ĝ = (K, {Ak }k∈K , {fk }k∈K ). For this purpose
we first introduce the Best Response Dynamics (BRD) in the context of a game in
satisfaction form.

Best Response Dynamics
Best Response Dynamics is defined as the behavioral rule in which each user always
chooses its uplink transmission power to be its best response (BR) as defined earlier,
depending on the uplink transmission power of the rest of the users. In the context
of this thesis, the dynamics should not be sequential but asynchronous. This means,
that each user can play a strategy whenever it has a response from the rest of
the users, however the users should not choose their strategies simultaneously. As
shown in [253], when the BRD start from an SE as an initial strategy profile, they
converge monotonically to an ESE. The algorithm that is studied in the following
section is the BRD starting with the action profile associated with the lowest effort
for each user. We will show that the considered monotonicity of the utility function
reduces the complexity for each user to determine its best response. Thus, an efficient
implementation of BRD is achieved in our setting.
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Minimum Effort Best Response Dynamics
Initially, each user k pre-processes its data with the Preparation Phase of the Minimum Effort Best Response Dynamics (MEBRD) algorithm. Note that after executing the preparation phase of the MEBRD algorithm, each user k has computed the
vector Sk []. The element Sk [j] denotes the uplink transmission power that provides
the minimum cost over the powers Pk [j], . . . , Pk [|Ak | − 1]. Therefore, if the Minimum
SP
= Pk [i] ∈ Ak , ∀k ∈ K given p−k then
Satisfying Power (MSP) is a power pM
k

BRk (p−k ) = Sk [i].
Algorithm 4 Preparation Phase
1: Sort in ascending order all powers pk in a vector Pk [];
2: power ← Pk [|Ak | − 1];
3: min ← ck (power);
4: Sk [|Ak | − 1] ← power;
5: for p ← |Ak | − 2, 0 do
6:

if ck (Pk [p]) ≤ min then

7:

Sk [p] ← Pk [p];

8:

power ← Pk [p];

9:

min ← ck (Pk [p]);

10:
11:
12:
13:

indexOf M in ← p;
else
Sk [p] ← power;
end if

14: end for
15: M sp ← Pk [0];
16: IndexOf M sp ← 0
17: play Sk (0);

After the preparation phase, each user chooses the power that minimizes its
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cost function.

Therefore, the starting strategy profile of the dynamics will be:

pstart = (S1 [0], . . . , S|K| [0]). Then, each user who is in turn to play executes the
Turn Phase of the MEBRD algorithm. The auxiliary vectors Sk [] will help each user
to calculate its MSP in every turn with a binary search. Due to the monotonicity of
the utility function and the fact that each user either does not change or increases its
transmission power at each turn (as we will prove in the convergence section), user k
.
should only do binary search from the MSP of its previous turn to its current pmax
k
With the binary search each user k is searching for the smallest value in Pk [] that
satisfies uk (p, p−k ) ≥ uthr , which is the MSP of player k given p−k . The algorithm
stops when no one user has a new best response strategy to play.
Algorithm 5 Turn Phase
1: if still satisfied then
2:

do not change transmission power;

3: else
4:

[M sp, IndexOf M sp] ← BinarySearch(Pk [], M sp, |Ak |, uk (), p−k );{Finds new
lower limit (as the vector p−k has changed) using binary search in Pk [] from
previous Msp to Pmax using the utility function of the player}

5:

play Sk (IndexOf M sp); {When all of Pk [indexOf M sp] to Pk [|Ak − 1|](=
Pmax )) strategies satisfies you play the power that gives the lowest cost}

6: end if

Convergence
In this section we prove that the above algorithm converges, under finite number of
steps, to an MESE of the considered uplink power control game. To conclude this,
we prove a set of propositions as follows:
Proposition 9 The MEBRD algorithm monotonically converges to a strategy profile
p† ∈ A.
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Proof: In the first turn of each user k, it examines whether it is satisfied or should
increase its power to get satisfied. Because of the dynamics, it will not choose a
lower transmission power as everyone started with the one that is associated with
the lowest cost, Sk (0). This fact shows that in the first round, each user k is either
playing again Sk (0) (if it is still satisfied) or increases its power.
Since the utility functions uk are decreasing with respect to the total summation
over the powers of the users, if a set of users increases its power levels and no user
does the opposite, an individual that kept its power unchanged, is now satisfied by
greater power levels than before (or with the same ones). Taking into account the
above fact and that in the first round all users either raised their powers or held the
same values, we can conclude to the following statement. In every turn all users will
either keep the power levels of the previous turn (if they are still satisfied) or increase
them (to get satisfied). It is noted that because of the assumption that fk () will be
not empty for every p−k , user k will always have a best response. Therefore, for each
user k its sequence of played strategies {pk } is increasing through a finite set, so, its
strategy eventually converges (monotonically) to a strategy p†k .
Proposition 10 p† is an ESE.
Proof: In this algorithm, when the turn phase of a user k is running, it chooses
the transmission power that satisfies it but also has the minimum cost. When the
previous power that the user selected, is not still the one mentioned above it should
change strategy when its turn comes. Due to proposition 6, all users will eventually
converge to a transmission power that has those two properties. Thus, because of
the dynamics and its eventual convergence, p† is an ESE.
Proposition 11 p† is a MESE.
Proof: Let p∗ = (p∗1 , . . . , p∗|K| ) be an ESE of the game and p† = (p†1 , . . . , p†|K| ) be the
strategy profile that our algorithm converges. Before we continue note that based on
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Equation 2b, 6 it holds that:
Sk (0) ≤ p∗k

∀k ∈ K,

(4.10)

Is there a possibility for one player i, to hold p†i > p∗i ?
Following Equation 4.10 and due to the fact that in every turn a user cannot
decrease its power, in order for this to happen, a user j from all the users, has played
a power that exceeds its p∗j during one of its turns. Let p be the strategy profile of
the game right before this turn. Because of the above we have:
∀k ∈ K,

pk ≤ p∗k

(4.11)

∈ Aj that
Thus player j played a transmission power pexc
j
pj ≤ p∗j < pexc
j

(4.12)

Since the strategy profile p∗ = (p∗1 , . . . , p∗|K| ) is an ESE, from Equation 2.11, Equation
4.3, we also get that:
∀p ∈ Aj : (p ≥ p∗j ),

cj (p) ≥ cj (p∗j )

(4.13)

Because of the fact that p∗ is an SE, we get that p∗j ∈ fj (p∗−j ). Because of
Equation 4.11, and the fact that the utility functions are decreasing with respect to
the total summation of the powers of the other users we obtain that:
p∗j ∈ fj (p−j ).

(4.14)

Combining Equation 4.12, Equation 4.13, and Equation 4.14 user’s j best re∗
sponse can be neither pexc
j , nor any power that is strictly greater than pj . Thus,

user j will not play a power that is greater than p∗j . So the answer to the previously
stated question is negative.
Considering the above argument, it holds that, ∀k ∈ K, p†k ≤ p∗k . Furthermore,
since the action profiles p∗ and p† are ESEs, it holds that for every user k:
∀p ∈ Ak : p ≥ p†k ,
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∀p ∈ Ak : p ≥ p∗k ,

ck (p) ≥ ck (p∗k )

(4.16)

But as we have proven for each user k it holds that p∗k ≥ p†k , therefore based on
Equation 18a we conclude:
∀k ∈ K,

ck (p†k ) ≤ ck (p∗k )

Consequently,
X
k∈K

ck (p†k ) ≤

X

ck (p∗k )

k∈K

Given that the above analysis is valid for every ESE p∗ , it will also hold true for one
MESE. So p† is a MESE.
One corollary of the above is that since it holds that:
∀p∗ ∈ E, ∀k ∈ K,

p†k ≤ p∗k

(4.17)

we also proved that from all the ESEs, p† is the most efficient one in terms of power.
Complexity
In this subsection, the complexity of the algorithm is studied in the case of the
users are playing sequentially in a given order. Let us concentrate on one user k
to specify its CPU time complexity excluding the time that other users take to
make their decisions. At first, user k should sort the array Pk [] so that would be
a O(|Ak | · log2 (|Ak |)) time complexity. In every cycle of turns, someone should
always increase its power, or else the algorithm converged to p† . The worst case
is bound by the case where the game would have C = |A1 | + · · · + |A|K| | cycles
of turns. So, in C − |Ak | cycles, user k will find out, in constant time, that it is
satisfied. On the other hand, in |Ak | cycles of turns the user should do one binary
search in Pk [] to find out its next move. Therefore, for all of the cycles it will
totally spend O((C − |Ak |) + |Ak | · log2 (|Ak |)). Thus, the total time complexity is
O((C − |Ak |) + |Ak | · log2 (|Ak |)). Note, that if each user has the same cardinality in
its strategy space, N , the total complexity will be O(|K| · N + N · log2 (N )).
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4.3.5

Empirical Evaluation

In this section, we provide some indicative numerical results to evaluate the performance of the MEBRD algorithm, while at the same time demonstrating the key
benefits of the MESE point. For demonstration purposes, the utility function of each
user is assumed to follow Equation 4. The distance dk , ∀k ∈ K from the base station
is randomly and uniformly distributed within the range of 1 to 50 m. The gain gk
of each user k is inversely proportional to the square of its distance dk , i.e., gk =

1
.
d2

Each user is assumed to have a finite number of power levels, while its maximum
transmission power is 1W att.
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Figure 4.1: Convergence of the MEBRD algorithm in a 2-user uplink power control
game

Figure 4.1 presents, for a two-user uplink power control game, the steps of the
MEBRD to converge to an MESE point with respect to each user’s transmission
power, assuming either increasing cost function (Figure 4.1a) or arbitrarily randomly
chosen cost function (Figure 4.1b). The colored region represents all the strategy
profiles that are SEs and each point’s color depends on the cumulative cost of the
two users, where the light and dark color represents a high and low cost, respectively.
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It is noted that in Figure 1a each user starts with its lowest transmission power and
monotonically converges to the unique MESE which is also the SE that charges each
user with the lowest possible cost and power. Please also note that in Figure 4.1a
and Figure 4.1b, the linear trend of the satisfaction region stems from the selection
of the uthr value, which in our case represents the utility that each user would gain
if it transmitted with an intermediate power, i.e., 0.5W , in its feasible power range.
In the rest of this section, we consider increasing cost function with respect to user’s
transmission power.
0.8

MESE

Cost
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Figure 4.2: Cost of various ESE points vs user ID

Assuming that each user is capable of achieving its QoS prerequisites, it is highly
possible for the game to possess multiple ESEs. In Figure 4.2, we compare the
cost allocation of different ESEs (multiple curves) of an uplink power control game
with four users. We confirm that the MESE achieves the lowest cumulative cost
by assigning to each user the transmission power associated with the lowest effort
compared to every ESE, as claimed in Proposition 8
Complexity Evaluation
The time complexity of the MEBRD algorithm mainly depends on the number of
users in the system and the number of the discrete transmission power levels that
each user possesses. Consequently, Figure 4.3 presents the behavior of the execution
time of the MEBRD algorithm with respect to the number of each user’s discrete
transmission power levels. Considering a system with 35 users we observe that the
algorithm can handle efficiently (i.e., less than 10 sec runtime) a large number of
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power levels (i.e., 65536), and thus it can be also used as an approximation for a
continuous set of power strategies.
The time complexity of the MEBRD algorithm depends also in every parameter
of the game, such as for instance each user’s threshold uthr , above which the user
is satisfied. For example, if each user is satisfied by gaining a very low bit rate,
most of the transmission powers will satisfy the user independently of the power of
the others, hence the MESE that the MEBRD algorithm converges will consist of
low transmission powers and it will converge fast. Specifically, Figure 4 presents the
time needed for the MEBRD to converge to its MESE as a function of the number
of users in the system, assuming 150 different transmission power levels available to
each user. In particular two cases are studied with respect to each user’s threshold
parameter uthr : (a) high threshold (Figure 4.4a) and (b) low threshold (Figure 4.4b).
In the latter case, it is easier to satisfy the requirements and more SEs are expected
to exist. Please also note that the low thresholds are selected such that the game
even with 400 users in the system will possess at least one equilibrium. The top curve
in each subgraph (referred to as Static) represents the time needed for the MEBRD
algorithm to converge. For example, when the game consists of a lower number of
users (e.g., 100) each user is satisfied easily, thus experiencing a fast convergence. On
the other hand, when the number of users is approaching 400, the algorithm needs
more iterations to converge. After that number, the system does not possess any
equilibrium points. In this case, the number of required iterations decreases since
each user makes greater steps increasing its transmission power in order to meet its
QoS prerequisites and eventually fail.
The second curve in the two subgraphs of Figure 4.4 (referred to as Dynamic
Entrance) denotes the time needed in order the MEBRD algorithm to converge,
when each run of the MEBRD is not independent as before. In contrary, f ive users
every time enter the game, while the previous number of users had converged to the
MESE and use this point in order to initialize their strategies in the new run. As the
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algorithm does not need to be in sequential turns, it will still converge to the MESE
for the new number of users, while lower convergence time than before (top curve) is
observed. Last it is observed that in the latter case the time needed for convergence
is not necessarily strictly increasing with respect to the number of users.
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Figure 4.3: Execution time of the MEBRD algorithm as a function of the number
of each user’s transmission power levels
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Figure 4.4: Execution time of the MEBRD algorithm as a function of the number
of users in the system

Comparative Evaluation
In this subsection, we compare the MESE as a strategy profile, with the corresponding ones that an Energy Efficiency Maximization or Shannon Maximization algorithm
would obtain, with respect to different performance metrics. Specifically, in this scenario, six users are considered in the system that is located at decreasing distances
from the base station. Therefore, users with lower ID have the highest distances
from the base station, thus worse channel conditions. With reference to the energy

166

Chapter 4. Redesigning Resource Management in Wireless Networks

efficiency maximization case, a utility function that represents the achievable data
rate over corresponding consumed power (expressed in bits/joule) was adopted, as
typically defined and used in corresponding literature [241]. In both cases of Shannon and energy efficiency utilities we set Rf ixed = 64Kbps and W = 106 Hz. In
particular, Figure 4.5a suggests that for the first 3 users (the 3 users that are the
farthest from the base station) the energy efficiency maximization algorithm, as expected, scores higher in the energy efficiency metric. However, as shown in Figure
4.5b this happens at the cost that each of the three users transmits with a very high
transmission power compared to the MESE, hence gaining a higher bit rate than
their QoS prerequisites (Figure 4.5c). Thus, the MESE strategy profile converges to
quite low transmission powers, while assigning to each user bit rate that is close to its
threshold (green line in Figure 4.5c) and therefore satisfying each user’s requirement.
The other two strategy profiles do not properly adapt to the users’ needs, since they
either exceed the threshold forcing the users to transmit with high power, or leave
the users unsatisfied.

4.3.6

Summary

We adopted the game theory in satisfaction form, towards properly re-defining and
treating the uplink power control problem in wireless networks, for a general set of
users’ realistic utility functions, which are assumed to be increasing with respect
to the user’s uplink transmission power and decreasing with respect to the intracell interference. Given this setting, we initially defined and discussed the different
equilibrium points, i.e., Satisfaction Equilibrium, Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium,
and Minimum Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium. Among those, the MESE appeared
to be of high theoretical and practical interest, and therefore its properties were
thoroughly examined.
In particular, it is shown that at the MESE point, for any arbitrary cost function,
each user transmits with a power level that satisfies its QoS prerequisites with the
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of strategy profiles for MEBRD, Energy-Efficiency Maximization and Shannon Maximization

lowest cost not only from its own perspective but from the whole system’s perspective as well. The existence and uniqueness of the MESE point were shown and a
distributed Minimum Effort Best Response Dynamics algorithm was introduced to
determine the MESE point. Detailed numerical and comparative results were presented to highlight and reveal the benefits of the MESE point compared to other
types of equilibrium (e.g., ESE point) and the superiority of the proposed novel
resource management framework in terms of power savings and improved network
capacity.
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5.1

Learning and Game theoretic Demand Response
Management

The combined problem of power company selection and Demand Response Management in a Smart Grid Network consisting of multiple power companies and multiple
customers is studied via adopting a distributed learning and game-theoretic technique. Each power company is characterized by its reputation and competitiveness.
The customers who act as learning automata select the most appropriate power
company to be served, in terms of price and electricity needs’ fulfillment, via a distributed learning-based mechanism. Given customers’ power company selection, the
Demand Response Management problem is formulated as a two-stage game theoretic
optimization framework, where at the first stage the optimal customers’ electricity
consumption is determined and at the second stage the optimal power companies’
pricing is calculated. The output of the Demand Response Management problem
feeds the learning system in order to build knowledge and conclude to the optimal power company selection. A two-stage Power Company learning selection and
Demand Response Management (PC-DRM) iterative algorithm is proposed in or-
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der to realize the distributed learning power company selection and the two-stage
distributed Demand Response Management framework. The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated via modeling and simulation and its superiority against
other state-of-the-art approaches is illustrated.

5.1.1

Related Work

Smart Grid Network
The growing number of users and their demands, as well as the ever-increasing competitive environment in which electricity providers are called upon to coexist, testify
that new smart distribution networks need to be studied and developed. The existing network is therefore under great pressure from the various challenges and needs
arising from the environment, consumers, market, and infrastructure issues. These
challenges and needs are more important and urgent than ever and have led the
network to expand and enhance its functions to smarter features with the help of
fast-growing technologies. The shift in the development of transmission networks to
be smarter has been briefly defined as "Smart Network". Some of the key goals of
these new smart energy distribution networks are to optimally serve the needs of
consumers as well as the healthy profitability of electricity companies [257].
The term "Smart Network" has been in use since the end of 2003 and the first
appearance of the term dates back much earlier. There are several definitions of
the "Smart Network" that focus on either its operation or its technology. The common point of all, is the application of digital processing and communications to the
electricity grid, with data flow and management being done by a centralized system
called "Smart Grid" [258].
The idea of a smart grid is an electricity grid that can intelligently integrate the
actions of all users connected to it, generators or consumers, in order to provide an
efficient, economical and secure electricity supply. A smart network uses innovative
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products and services, combined with intelligent monitoring of the network status
[259].
The Smart Network connects supply and demand by enabling both producers and
consumers to set their operating needs more flexible and sophisticated. For example,
consumers are only able to consume at high prices for extremely important reasons
and to shape their consumption according to the information they have about the
present consumption price. On the other hand, producers with high flexibility can
adjust their sales price to maximize their profits, while at the same time depending on
their electricity generation costs, they can offer consumers discount periods, thereby
expanding their advertising influence and gaining more users.
Coupled with the smart grid features offered, the liberalization of the electricity
market that began last decade, or even earlier, especially in the United States of
America, has led to the increasing establishment of smart grids. Consumers now
have the option of choosing the company from which they purchase electricity. In
Massachusetts, the electricity market was liberalized in 1997 [260], in Maryland in
1999 and in Texas in 2002 [261]. The liberalization of the electricity market forces
to creation of a more effective, flexible, and reliable electricity system.

Demand Response Management
With the increasingly demanding challenges of the growing electricity needs, aging
infrastructure, and the integration of renewable green energy resources, a new way
of addressing these demands will need to be developed by electricity distribution
networks. As we have already mentioned, new smart electricity distribution networks
face these challenges by managing the concept of demand response. Essentially,
demand response management refers to the implementation of techniques to control
energy consumption by consumers, improve energy efficiency and reduce the cost
of electricity generation from electricity companies [262, 263, 264, 265]. One of the
key objectives of demand response management is to reduce the differences between
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electricity consumption and average consumption in the network so that there is a
balance between demand and supply [266]. Modeling the problem of managing the
demand response is very important for achieving the goals of the Smart Grid Network.
Specifically, there are several different models of this problem, but the common point
is the aim of balancing consumers’ demand for electricity and determining the best
plan for electricity supply and pricing from companies’ side, in order to increase and
reduce companies’ profit and generation cost, respectively.
In [267] the authors study the demand response management problem in a centralized manner, by using a finite-horizon Markov decision process (MDP) and a linear
programming technique, in order to maximize companies’ profit and determine the
energy load in a real-time electricity market. On the other hand, a decentralized
approach of the demand response management problem is studied in [268], where
the authors formulate the problem of managing the demand response as a nonconvex optimization problem, where convex relaxation techniques are applied, and
the companies’ optimal pricing is determined. A different formulation of the demand
response management problem is followed in [269], where the notion of micro-grids is
developed in the electricity market in order to fulfill power demand in specific regions.
The authors address the problem of demand response management by constructing
a Stackelberg game with a unique equilibrium solution. The notion of micro-grids is
also studied in [270], where the authors examine the demand response management
problem for multiple energy resources (i.e., Fuel cells, PhotoVoltaic modules), and
they propose a two-stage stochastic programming approach to minimize the operational cost in energy management.
In [271], a price prediction model with the use of an Artificial Neural Network
is introduced by the authors, while the costumers adopt a Reinforcement Learning
mechanism in order to deal with the uncertainty in the feature prices and make optimal decisions regarding their home appliances. A quite similar method, in terms of
the construction of a predictive model, is followed in [272], where the customers use
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the prediction control in order to manage in an autonomous manner their ON/OFF
periods and determining their optimal decisions for the demand response management problem. A neural network is also used in [273], where the authors introduce
a smart grid model that considers the power consumption and the customers’ satisfaction, while a projection neural network is used for minimizing the electricity cost
for all the users. Furthermore, the demand response management is studied also in
[274], as the costumers utilize renewable energy resources, which are controlled by
cloud servers, and the use of current security mechanisms (i.e., RSA, AES, ECC) is
studied for security purposes.
An incentive-based demand response management optimization framework is introduced in [275], where the customers efficiently determine their optimal households’
energy consumption during peak hours, while in [276] the authors address the peak
loads in an electricity market by introducing quality of service metrics for the customers, and a data analytical management scheme. The proposed scheme is based
on the analysis of consumers’ consumption data gathered from smart homes. On the
other hand, in [277] the authors implement a heuristic demand response technique
for consumption scheduling of appliances, in order to decrease the peak to average ratio of power demand. The authors use stochastic programming, and communication
requirements, in order to schedule customers’ consumption in real-time. The authors
in [278] highlight the importance of the use of auto-configured devices, and based
on that they design an adaptable energy management system, in order to determine
the customers’ demand response. The Pareto optimal demand response management
based on energy costs and load factor is studied in [279], where the authors introduce
a multi-objective optimization problem and its Pareto optimality is determined. The
demand response management problem has been studied also in the era of multiple
data centers, wherein [280] the authors introduce an approach to dynamically adjust
the datacenters’ load to balance the unstable solar input into the energy grid.
Moreover, in [281] the authors implement a large-scale optimization approach
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in a distributed manner, in order to control and support the demand response of
residential appliances. This scheme is based on a hierarchical control and a coordination system, that enables the exchange of information between the utility and the
management system. A hierarchical-based system is also used in [282], where the
authors introduce a dynamic pricing response algorithm, that considers both the service providers’ profit and customers’ costs. The hierarchical decision-making is made
based on a Reinforcement Learning mechanism, where the Q-learning algorithm is
adopted to solve the decision-making problem. In [283] the authors examine and
consider models from the marketplace in order to design demand response management to match power supply and meet customers’ demands. The authors in [284]
propose distributed algorithms for electricity companies and consumers, in order to
maximize social welfare. [285] presents a new algorithm for finding the optimal time
of use of electricity.
In addition, it is equally important to apply game theory for modeling the demand response management problem, as game theory is proved to be quite effective
in dealing with complex interactions. The authors in [286] formulated the problem as
a non-cooperative N-person game, and a distributed demand response management
strategy is proposed in order to achieve the minimum energy cost. Network congestion is also studied in [287] and a load management strategy modeled as a "Smart
Network" game is proposed. The authors in [288] studied the planning of home energy consumption through a Stackelberg game, in which the electricity companies
are the leaders of the network and the consumers adjust their demands.
The key point of all the above research is that in smart electricity distribution
networks, there is only one company that supplies electricity to consumers. However,
as we have already pointed out, the liberalization of the electricity market now gives
consumers the option to choose between many energy providers [289], [290], [291],
which brings new challenges to the interaction between companies and consumers.
It is therefore imperative to study the problem of managing the demand response
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in an environment where many electricity companies coexist. The first survey in
this multi-company and multi-consumer environment is presented in [285], but the
authors do not take into account the power functions of the electricity companies.
To this end, the need to develop new smart energy distribution networks to meet
all the growing demands has become an urgent need in modern society. The customers’ demands are now directly linked to smart electricity distribution networks,
where the use of utility functions and the demand response management with new
theoretical models, demonstrate a vital role. In such smart grids, the characteristics
of the Demand Response Management (DRM), Network Economics (NE), and electricity company choice shape the market [286]. The theory of Network Economics
aims to determine the price of electricity, in order for a successful penetration on the
electricity market to be achieved [292]. The process of selecting electricity companies
aims to bridge the gap between the electricity companies and the customers, while at
the same time enables consumers to make the best choice in terms of saving money,
and the companies to meet the electricity demands of the network [293].
In [287], the problem of managing the demand response is dealt with only the
customers’ point of view, as the authors study the problem of the load control by
applying a distributed energy consumption planning to customers and a dynamic
pricing strategy to companies. Real-time power planning is calculated by adopting
a Stackelberg game model, where the power company is the leader, setting realtime price and customers planning their devices’ electricity consumption. A similar
approach is discussed in [294]. The problem of load balancing and peaks avoidance
is studied in [295], where an incentive-based algorithm for home load management
is proposed, reducing overall energy costs and taking into account the satisfaction of
the users. Also, aiming at load balancing, the authors in [296] propose an optimal
game pricing strategy for smart grid networks, by optimizing the value per day time
period, so that the electricity load of the network remains in an equilibrium state
rather than in peak values.
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The home demand response management problem is studied in [297], taking into
account the underlying power distribution network and the associated constraints.
The Demand Response Management problem is formulated as a flow power problem,
and a distributed algorithm is proposed to determine the optimal demand planning,
while allowing communications between the electricity supplier and the households.
The direct interaction between the electricity company and the customer is studied
in [298], where the problem of allocating a certain amount of load adjustment by the
electricity company to the customers is examined, with the aim of minimizing the
total loss of the consumer.
In [299], the authors study the interaction between an energy provider and multiple customers through a Stackelberg game approach, and propose an algorithm that
aims to control the loads of the users’ devices. A similar approach is being studied
in [289] and [300], involving multiple electricity companies and multiple customers,
where the aim of the Stackelberg game is to maximize the revenue of each electricity
company and minimize the amount of payment that each customer makes.

5.1.2

Contributions

We jointly study the combined problem of optimal power company selection by the
customers based on a reputation and competitiveness distributed learning framework, and the problem of demand response management based on a game theoretic
approach. We assume the existence of an open electricity market, and we formulate
it as a Smart Grid Network, which consists of multiple power companies and customers. Each power company is associated with a reputation and competitiveness
factor per timeslot, while the customers acting as RL-agents adopt the Stochastic
Learning Automata methodology (Section 2.2.3) in order to select the power company that they will served from. The learning power company selection algorithm
runs once at the beginning of each timeslot. To fully capture the interaction between
the power companies and the customers in the Smart Grid Network, the demand

176

Chapter 5. Smart Technologies

response management problem is modeled as a two-stage non-cooperative game.
At the first stage, the customers by considering the companies’ pricing policies,
determine their optimal electricity consumption that maximizes their utility, while
at the second stage, given the optimal customers’ consumption, the power companies evaluate their optimal pricing policies that maximize their profit. Moreover,
in our work, the non-shiftable and shiftable customers’ demands are treated with
different priority. Following the proposed two-stage non-cooperative game-theoretic
approach, the customers and the power companies can interact and finally reach the
Nash Equilibrium point, if proper strategies are selected on both sides. It is noted
also, that the demand response management optimization problem consists of multiple iterations at the beginning of each timeslot, thus it is of a different time scale
compared to the distributed learning power company selection algorithm.
The following specific contributions and innovations of this work are described in
detail, in order to achieve the aforementioned key objective.
1. A distributed learning framework is proposed towards implementing the customers’ power company selection at the beginning of each timeslot. The selection probabilities of each customer are updated by considering power companies’ reputation and competitiveness factors. The reputation and competitiveness factor of each power company reflects the provided discount, its achievable
peak-to-average ratio, and its penetration to the electricity market.
2. Representative power companies’ and customers’ profit and utility functions,
respectively, are introduced to capture their behavior within the electricity market. Specifically, power companies’ profit function reflects the tradeoff between
the company’s revenue and its corresponding electricity generation cost. On
the other hand, each customer’s utility function reflects the tradeoff between
the satisfaction of its electricity demands and its corresponding total cost based
on a fair pricing policy by considering the electricity consumption of the rest
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of the customers in the Smart Grid Network.
3. Following the distributed learning-based power company selection process by
the customers, the optimization problem of maximizing customers’ utility function and power companies’ profit function, is formulated as a two-stage game.
The Nash Equilibrium point of the two-stage game is achieved based on the
selection of appropriate strategies from the customers and power companies,
while a distributed algorithm that obtains the aforementioned equilibrium
point, is proposed.

5.1.3

System Model

Figure 5.1: Smart Grid Network

Figure 5.1 shows a graphical representation of the considered Smart Grid Network, consisting of multiple users and multiple power companies. There is twoway communication between companies and consumers that is achieved through a
centralized Service Provider (SP) management system. In essence, this centralized
management system acts as an intermediary connection between power companies
and customers, with which customers and companies are connected through power

178

Chapter 5. Smart Technologies

connection (solid lines), while two-way communication connections (dotted lines)
enable the connectivity between companies and customers. The centralized management system allows for the exchange of information, including the power companies’
prices and customers’ load demand. Each customer is equipped with an Energy
Management Controller (EMC), which coordinates the power consumption among
customer’s smart appliances and is aware of appliances’ shiftable and non-shiftable
electricity demand and consumption.
A fundamental novelty that differentiates this work from the recent relevant literature, is that each consumer is informed through the centralized management system
about the network’s total energy consumption, and as a result, each customer’s privacy is maintained. The information of the energy consumption, allows us to apply
price fairness criteria regarding the consumption price of each customer and so in the
Smart Grid Network can coexist harmonious consumers of different economic levels.
We define as J = {1, · · · , j, · · · , J} the set of electricity power companies, and
with I = {1, · · · , i, · · · , I} the set of customers that exist in the Smart Grid Network.
The whole operation time is divided in T timeslots, where T = {1, · · · , t, · · · , T }
denotes the corresponding set. Moreover, As,i , Ans,i denote the set of appliances
characterized by shiftable and non-shiftable electricity consumption of customer i, i ∈
I, respectively, while customer’s i overall set of appliances is denoted as Ai = As,i ∪
Ans,i .

Utility and Customers’ Characteristics
The considered Smart Grid Network consists of multiple customers and power com(t)

panies. Each customer i, i ∈ I is characterized by its demand di [KW h] of electricity
units per operation timeslot t towards meeting the needs of its appliances a, a ∈ Ai .
Based on the availability of the generated electricity by the power companies and
(t)

its corresponding price, customer i consumes ei,j [KW h] amount of electricity via selecting the power company j, j ∈ J. At each operation timeslot t, each customer i is
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served exclusively from one company, while the power company selection of each customer i can vary for different timeslots. In this work, we assume that the power com(t)

(t)

panies are able to cover customers’ demands, thus ei,j ≤ di , ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T.
(t)

We denote as xa,i the demand of customer’s i appliance a ∈ Ai for the timeslot t,
(t)

and xa,i,j the corresponding electricity consumption of customer’s i appliance a, a ∈
Ai from the j th power company. Then, the shiftable and non-shiftable electricity
consumption of customer i in timeslot t from j th power company are determined
P (t)
P (t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
xa,i,j . Thus, it is concluded that ei,j =
xa,i,j and Xns,i,j =
as Xs,i,j =
(t)
Xs,i,j

+

a∈As,i
(t)
(t)
Xns,i,j ≤ Xs,i

a∈Ans,i

+

(t)
Xns,i

=

(t)
di ,

(t)

where Xs,i =

P
a∈As,i

(t)

(t)

xa,i and Xns,i =

P

(t)

xa,i .

a∈Ans,i

At each operation timeslot t, every customer i aims at satisfying its needs for
electricity consumption, while giving higher priority to its non-shiftable appliances’
(t)

electricity needs Xns,i . It is noted that in a competitive market, as the one assumed
here, though the customer i requests and buys electricity from a power company j,
it should also consider the total electricity consumption of the rest of the customers,
P P (t)
(t)
ei0 ,j , in the current timeslot t, as the electricity consumption of
i.e., E−i =
j∈J i0 ∈I,i0 6=i

the rest of the customers in the Smart Grid Network contributes to the configuration
of the prices announced by the power companies, as it is presented in the following
subsection. This key feature is one of the essentials elements of this work, which
differentiate it from similar research work, where each customer’s utility function
has been formulated considering only its personal electricity consumption. Each
P P (t)
ei,j in
customer i is informed about the total electricity consumption E (t) =
j∈J i∈I

the Smart Grid Network via the centralized SP and through the communication
network. As a result, each customer i is able to deduct its personal consumption
(t)

(t)

(t)

ei,j , i.e., E−i = E (t) − ei,j , and no privacy issues are related to this broadcasted
(t)

information (i.e., E (t) ) by the SP, since each customer’s consumption ei,j is hidden
with the total consumption.
Each customer’s i satisfaction function is formulated as an increasing concave
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Relative Consumption

Figure 5.2: Customer’s Satisfaction Function

(t)

(t)

function si (ri ) with respect to the relative customer’s consumption, i.e., ri

=

(t)

ei,j

(t)

E−i

. As Figure 5.2 demonstrates, customer’s i satisfaction increases rapidly till
(t)

its relative non-shiftable consumption, i.e.,

Xns,i
(t)

E−i

, is satisfied, while after that point

its satisfaction increases slowly till it fulfils its relative shiftable electricity needs,
(t)

i.e.,

Xs,i

(t)
E−i

(t)

. Also, for values greater than its overall relative consumption, i.e.,

di

(t)

E−i

, its

satisfaction is saturated, because there are no other real needs to cover via consuming
additional electricity.
Here, without loss of generality, we adopt a logarithmic customer’s satisfaction
function with respect to its relative electricity consumption, as:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

si (ri ) = si (ei,j , e−i ) = k · log(1 + λ · ri )

(5.1)

(t)

where e−i denotes the vector of all customers’ electricity consumption excluding
customer i, and the parameters k, λ ∈ R+ determine the slope of the concave function
to reflect its priority to fulfill its relative non-shiftable consumption prerequisities.
Furthermore, another major novelty introduced in this work is the proposal of a
relatively fair pricing policy for the customers that is applied by the power companies
that exist in the Smart Grid Network. Specifically, the power companies charge
(t)

each customer i based on its relative electricity consumption, i.e., ri
(t)

(t)

=

ei,j

(t)

E−i

, and

not based only on its overall consumption ei,j . Based on this pricing policy, the
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power companies provide the incentive even to the low budget customers to buy an
affordable amount of electricity in terms of cost, thus still satisfying, while limiting
the high budget customers’ greedy behavior who aim to dominate the Smart Grid
Network. As a result, the benefits of the proposed fair pricing policy are two-fold:
1. customers are satisfied due to fair charges of electricity consumption
2. the power companies attract more customers, thus increase their profit in a
long-term period and improve their penetration in the market.
(t)

This fair pricing policy for each customer i based on its relative consumption ri , is
formulated as:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

F P Pi (ri ) = F P P (ei,j , e−i ) = γi · ri · pj

(5.2)

(t)

$
where, pj [ KW
] is the price that is announced by the power company j, j ∈ J for
h
(t)

the timeslot t, t ∈ T, and γi

is a time-varying parameter capturing the dynamics
(t)

of customer’s i behavior, i.e., smaller γi

reflects customer’s i dynamic behavior to

spend money in order to buy more electricity.
Finally, each customer’s i, i ∈ I utility function is formulated via capturing its
(t)

satisfaction, i.e., si (ri ) with respect to its relative electricity consumption, as well
as its dissatisfaction due to the associated charges (i.e., pricing), as follows:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

Ui (ei,j , e−i , p(t) ) = si (ri ) − F P Pi (ri )
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(5.3)

= si (ei,j , e−i ) − F P Pi (ei,j , e−i )
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

= k · log(1 + λ · ri ) − γi · ri · pj
(t)

(t)

(t)

where p(t) = (p1 , · · · , pj , · · · , pJ ) denotes the vector of the announced prices by
the power companies in timeslot t, t ∈ T.
Welfare and Characteristics of Power Companies
(t)

Each power company j, j ∈ J generates an amount gj [KW h] of electricity units
per timeslot t, while the generation cost of each electricity unit from the j th power
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(t)

$
company in timeslot t is cj [ KW
]. In this work, we assume that each power comh
(t)

(t)

pany j is able to generate the overall needed amount of electricity, thus gj = Ej =
P (t)
ei,j . The peak customers’ electricity consumption in the j th power company is
i∈I
P (t)
(t)
EPj = max Ej = max ei,j , while the corresponding average consumption over T
t∈T

t∈T i∈I

(t)

P

operation timeslots in the j

th

power company is Eavgj =

t∈T

P P

Ej

T

t∈T i∈I

=

T

(t)

ei,j

. More-

over, using the peak customers’ electricity consumption EPj and the corresponding
average consumption Eavgj , we define the peak-to-average (PAR) ratio in customers’
electricity consumption of the j th power company as P ARj =

EPj
Eavgj

.

Each power company aiming to achieve a low peak-to-average ratio power consumption, so as to maintain the smooth electricity generation during the day. Also,
customers prefer to be served by companies that maintain low peak-to-average rations, as through this way they "feel" more "safe" that they will be satisfied effectively
and fulfil their electricity requirements.
A fairly effective way for the power companies to maintain low peak-to-average
ratio, is to provide incentives to the customers to shift their consumption from highpeak to off-peak for specific periods of the day. Moreover, the power companies
could benefited by the policy of announcing discounts to the customers, regarding
their billing prices. Through this way, it is able the electricity needs among the
customers to be balanced, and as a result the power companies to maintain low peakto-average ratio, and at the same time the announcements of discounts to provide
incentives to the customers to select the power company, which will result in a longterm improvement of the power company’s profit.
Discount strategy is a fairly common technique with which companies manage to
win more customers and improve their profit in a long term period. The effectiveness
of this technique has already been studied in literature and has been applied in several
different fields, as in tourism. The power companies of the Smart Grid Network
by studying and analyzing the consumption habits of the customers, are able to
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determine the most appropriate and effective discounts for their electricity prices.
Each power company is interested to increase its reputation and competitiveness
in the electricity market. In a nutshell, each power company’s reputation increases as
P
(t)
the total price discounts, i.e., t∈T fj , offered to the customers increases, throughout the day, as well as if the company maintains low peak-to-average ratio. In this
work, we formulate the competitiveness of each power company j, j ∈ J via its penetration to the electricity market, which is translated to the electricity consumption
served by the j th power company over the total electricity consumption in the Smart
P
t∈T

Grid Network, i.e., Compj =

(t)

P P

Ej

E (t)

=

t∈T i∈I

(t)

ei,j

P P P
j∈J t∈T i∈I

(t)

ei,j

Consequently, each power company j, j ∈ J is characterized by a reputation and
competitiveness score RCj , which is considered by the customers throughout the
power company selection process, and is formulated as follows:
RCj =

X

(t)

fj ·

t∈T
(t)

where, fj

1
· Compj
P ARj

(5.4)

is the discount that is announced by the power company j, j ∈ J to the

customers during the timeslot t, t ∈ T.
The profit of each power company is constructed by considering the revenue and
the costs of the power company by billing its customers and generating the needed
electricity, respectively. Specifically, each power company’s j, j ∈ J profit function is
formulated as follows:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

Pj (Ej , pj ) = Rj (Ej , pj ) − Cj (Ej )
(t)

(5.5)

(t)

where, Rj and Cj express the revenue and the generation cost of the j th power
(t)

company, respectively. The power company’s j revenue Rj per timeslot t depends
on the amount of sold electricity to the customers that selected to be served by the
P (t)
(t)
(t)
specific company, i.e., Ej =
ei,j , the company’s price pj per electricity unit, and
i∈I

the discount

(t)
fj

that the company announces to the customers on that timeslot. As
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a result, the power company’s j revenue is formulated as:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

Rj (Ej , pj ) = (1 − fj ) · pj ·

X

(t)

ei,j

i∈I

= (1 −

(t)
fj )

·

(t)
pj

·

XX

(t)
xa,i,j

(5.6)

i∈I a∈Ai

On the other hand, the power company’s j cost for generating the overall amount
of electricity that the customers demand, is expressed as:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

Cj (Ej ) = cj · Ej = cj ·

X

(t)

ei,j

(5.7)

i∈I
(t)

where cj

denotes the power company’s j electricity production cost per unit of

electricity for the timeslot t.

5.1.4

Modeling of the Smart Grid Network as a Distributed
Learning System

Figure 5.3: Smart Grid Network as a Learning System

Power companies build their reputation and competitiveness for a long time to
attract more customers and increase their profits. On the other hand, each company’s reputation and competitiveness factor contribute significantly to the customers’ choices regarding the power company that they select to be served by. Consequently, the Smart Grid Network can be studied as a learning system, where the
customers act as RL agents, i.e., stochastic learning automata that interact with
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the environment and determine an optimal policy of selecting a power company.
Figure 5.3 presents the Smart Grid Network as a learning system and the relationship between the learning automata and the environment. Specifically, each
customer/learning automaton at each operation timeslot t has an action vector
P j
αi = 1, thus the action vector αi (t) repαi (t) = (αi1 , · · · , αij , · · · , αiJ ), where
j∈J

resents the customer’s i power company selection for the timeslot t (Section 2.2.3).
Towards making their decision, the learning automata consider the output set
β(t) = (e(t) , p(t) ), i.e., e(t) is the vector of all customers’ electricity consumption,
and p(t) the pricing vector that contains the power companies’ prices, as this is
determined by solving the Demand Response Management problem, which is analyzed in Chapter 5.1.1. The solution of the Demand Response Management problem
refers to customers’ and companies’ optimal electricity consumption and prices, respectively. Based on the learning automata chosen actions and the corresponding
reaction of the environment, the reward probability rj (t) that is associated with
the power company that the customer selected to be served by, is obtained as
rj (t) =

RC
P j ,
RCj

thus 0 ≤ rj (t) ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ J. Essentially, the reward probability

j∈J

rj (t) updates with a higher or a lower probability the customer’s selection, regarding the power company j that was selected and with which its reward probability
rj (t) is associated with. The action probability vector of customer i is defined as
Pri (t) = (P ri,1 (t), · · · , P ri,j (t), · · · , P ri,J (t)), where P ri,j represents the probability
of the customer i to select the power company j for the timeslot t. Each customer’s i
probability vector is updated based on the concept of Stochastic Learning Automata
, and the update rules, as these were introduced in Section 2.2.3, are formulated as
follows:
RCj
· P ri,j (t), if j (t+1) 6= j (t)
P ri,j (t + 1) = P ri,j (t) − b · P
RCj

(5.8)

j∈J

RCj
P ri,j (t + 1) = P ri,j (t) + b · P
· (1 − P ri,j (t)), if j (t+1) = j (t)
RCj
j∈J
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where 0 < b < 1 is the learning step parameter that controls the convergence and
the complexity of the learning algorithm. Essentially, Equation 5.8 represents customer’s selection probability update rule for the next timeslot for the company that
was selected, while Equation 5.9 represents the update rule that is followed for the
rest selection probabilities of the customer, thus for the ones that are associated with
the rest power companies. In that way, the customer acting as a learning automaton, increases its probability of selecting the same power company j based on the
achievable reward probability rj (t) of that company, thus the customer explores its
environment and converges to the power company that provides a good reward (i.e.,
reputation score).
It should be noted that initially, the overall Smart Grid Network needs no prior
knowledge of the reward and action probabilities, and thus the initial power company
selection by the users can be simply assumed as P ri,j (t) = J1 , ∀j ∈ J. The customers,
in a long-term period converge to the most cost-efficient solution of power company
selection per operation timeslot t, given also that the overall policies of the power
(t)

(t)

(t)

companies (i.e., cj , pj , fj , ∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T) do not change rapidly within a long
time period. Finally, it is also highlighted that other learning techniques, such as
exponential learning, Q-learning, etc., could be also adopted instead of the learning
automata approach that was selected in that work due to the scalable and lowcomplexity nature.

5.1.5

Demand Response Management: Problem Formulation
& Solution

The Demand Response Management (DRM) problem is formulated considering the
iterations and interactions of both the power companies and the customers. Before
the DRM problem, the customers have already selected the power companies that
they want to serve by, based on their stochastic learning methodology described
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in Section 5.1.4. Each power company j, j ∈ J aims at maximizing its profit (i.e.,
Equation 5.5), by considering the customers’ electricity consumption, and it aims to
(t)∗

converge to the optimal announced price pj

per timeslot t, t ∈ T. On the other

hand, each customer’s i, i ∈ I goal is to maximize its utility function (i.e., Equation
5.3), given the announced electricity prices by the power companies, and determine
(t)∗

in a distributed manner its optimal electricity consumption ei,j . The distributed
(t)∗

nature in determining both the optimal prices pj , ∀j ∈ J, and each customer’s
(t)∗

optimal consumption ei,j , ∀i ∈ I is a key component in the formulation and solution
of the DRM problem to support the vision of independent and deregulated electricity
markets, where no centralized entity is required, as both the customers and the power
companies act as distributed decision-makers.
Each power company’s j, j ∈ J, and each customer’s i, i ∈ I DRM optimization
problem, is formulated as follows:


(t)
(t)
(t) (t)
(t)
(t) (t)
(t)
Pj (Ej , pj ) = Rj (Ej , pj ) − Cj (Ej )

(t)∗
X (t) 
X (t)
pj = arg max 

(t)
(t)
(t)
ei,j
ei,j − cj ·
= (1 − fj ) · pj ·
(t)
p

(5.10)

j

i∈I

(t)∗

ei,j

i∈I

 (t) (t) (t)

(t)
(t)
Ui (ei,j , e−i , p(t) ) = si (ri ) − F P Pi (ri )




(t) (t) (t)
(t) (t)
= arg max  = si (ei,j , e−i ) − F P Pi (ei,j , e−i )



(t)
ei,j
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
= k · log(1 + λri ) − γi · ri · pj

(5.11)

As Equation 5.10 and Equation 5.11 depict, the decisions about the optimal prices
by the power companies and the optimal electricity consumption by the customers
are interconnected problems, as the decision of the one (i.e., power companies) should
act as an input to the other (i.e., customers) and vice versa. As a result, the DRM
problem is studied as a two-stage game, where at the first stage, the optimal electricity consumption of the customers is determined via formulating the maximization
problem of their utilities (i.e., Equation 5.11) as a non-cooperative game among the
customers. At the second stage, each power company, given the optimal electricity
consumption of the customers, determines its optimal pricing policy that maximizes
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its profit (i.e., Equation 5.10). The interaction and feedback among power companies
and customers endure until both conclude to their optimal decisions.

Customers’ Optimal Consumption Response
In the first stage of the DRM problem, each customer i, i ∈ I determines its optimal electricity consumption for timeslot t, t ∈ T, by considering its power company
selection and the announced price by the corresponding company. We define as
i
h
(t)
(t)
G = I, {Si }, {Ui } the non-cooperative consumption response game among the
customers, which consists of the infinite set of customers I = {1, · · · , i, ·, I}, the
(t)

(t)

(t)

strategy space Si = [0, di ] of each customer i, ∀i ∈ I and its utility function Ui .
The non-cooperative consumption response game G can be expressed as follows:

max
(t)

ei,j ∈Si



(t)
(t)
(t)
U = si (ri ) − F P Pi (ri )
 i

(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
= k · log(1 + λri ) − γi · ri · pj
(t)

(5.12)

(t)

s.t. 0 ≤ ei,j ≤ di

Here, we adopt the concept of the Nash Equilibrium (NE), as this was introduced
in Section 2.1, at which no customer can improve its utility by unilaterally changing
its electricity consumption. Towards proving the existence and uniqueness of the NE
of the non-cooperative game G, it suffices to show that for every timeslot t, t ∈ T,
(t)

each customer’s i strategy space Si

is a non-empty, convex and compact subset of
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

the Euclidean space RI , and the utility function Ui (ei,j , e−i , pj ) is continuous in
(t)

(t)

ei,j and quasi-concave in Si as explained in [301].
Theorem 13 In the non-cooperative consumption response game G, customer’s i
(t)

(t)

best response strategy to a given electricity consumption vector e−i is BRi (e−i ) =
0

(t)∗

ei,j , as provided in Equation 5.13, where si−1 is the inverse function of the first
0

derivative of the customer’s i satisfaction function si , and τ = limr(t) →∞ si−1
i

189

Chapter 5. Smart Technologies

(t)


(t)
(t)
(t)


di
if 0 ≤ γi · pj ≤ τ



0 −1
0 −1
(t)
(t)
(t)
= min{d(t)
,
E
·
s
(0)}
if
τ
<
γ
·
p
≤
s
i
−i
i
i
j
i (0)




0
(t)
(t)

0
if γi · pj > si−1 (0)

(t)∗

BRi (e−i ) = ei,j

(5.13)

(t)

(t)∗

Proof: Towards determining customer’s best response strategy BRi (e−i ) = ei,j , the
(t)

first and the second order derivatives of customer’s utility function Ui
to

(t)
ei,j

with respect

are used:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

∂Ui (ei,j , e−i , pj )

1

=

(t)

(t)

∂ei,j

E−i
(t)

(t)

(t)

i
h 0
(t)
(t)
(t)
· si (ri ) − γi · pj

(t)

∂ 2 Ui (ei,j , e−i , pj )

=

(t)2
∂ei,j

1

00

(5.14)

(t)

· si (ri )

(t)
(E−i )2

(5.15)

(t)

(t)

Each customer’s satisfaction function si (ri ) is an increasing concave function with
(t)

(t)

(t)

00

respect to ri , thus si (ri ) < 0 and
(t)
si (ri )
0

Since

(t)

(t)

(t)

∂ 2 Ui (ei,j ,e−i ,pj )

i

is a strictly decreasing function (due to
(t)

0

0

< 0. We set τ = limr(t) →∞ si−1 .

(t)2
∂ei,j

(t)
si (ri )
00

< 0) and as si (ri ) > 0,
(t)

(t)

0

0

(t)

0

we know that τ < si (ri ) ≤ si (0) and 0 ≤ τ < si (0). Hence, for 0 ≤ γi · pj ≤ τ ,
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

∂Ui (ei,j ,e−i ,pj )

we have

(t)

> 0 and thus Ui

(t)
∂ei,j

(t)

is an increasing function of ei,j . In this

case, the best response strategy for customer i, i ∈ I is to demand its maximum
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

electricity consumption, i.e., di . So, for 0 ≤ γi · pj ≤ τ , we have BRi (e−i ) = di ,
(t)

(t)

(t)

0

∀i ∈ I. For τ < γi · pj ≤ si (0), the equation
(t)

0

(t)

(t)

(t)

0

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

∂Ui (ei,j ,e−i ,pj )
(t)

∂ei,j

= 0 is equivalent to

(t)

(t)

0

si (ri ) = γi · pj ⇔ r̂i = si−1 (γi · pj ), ∀i ∈ I. Note that as si (ri ) is a strictly
0

(t)

decreasing function, its inverse (i.e., si−1 ) exists, and that r̂i is a decreasing function
(t)

(t)

00

(t)

(t)

(t)

of γi · pj . Since si (ri ) < 0 for all ri and hence
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

∂Ui (ei,j ,e−i ,pj )
(t)
∂ei,j

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

∂ 2 Ui (ei,j ,e−i ,pj )
(t)2
∂ei,j

< 0, the roots of

(t)

= 0 maximize Ui (ei,j , e−i , pj ) for the given electricity consumption
(t)

(t)

of the rest users, i.e., e−i . An one-to-one relation exists between ri

(t)

and ei,j , and

(t)

thus the best response electricity consumption in response to e−i that maximizes
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)∗

(t)

(t)

(t)

0

(t)

(t)

Ui (ei,j , e−i , pj ) is also unique and is equal to ei,j = E−i · r̂i = E−i si−1 (ai · pj ).
(t)∗

(t)

(t)∗

(t)∗

If ei,j > di customer i, i ∈ I does not request for ei,j . In this case, since ei,j is the
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(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)∗

unique maximizer of Ui , then Ui is an increasing function of ei,j in ei,j ≤ di ≤ ei,j
(t)

(t)

for fixed e−i . Therefore, the best response to e−i is the maximum value of customer’s
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

electricity consumption, i.e., BRi (e−i ) = di . This implies that for τ < γi · pj ≤
(t)

0

(t)

(t)

0

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

si (0), BRi (e−i ) = min{di , E−i · si−1 (γi · pj )}. For γi · pj
(t)

∂Ui

(t)
∂ei,j

(t)

< 0, thus Ui

0

> si (0), we have

(t)

is a decreasing function of ei,j . In this case, the imposed price
(t)

by the companies is extremely high for customers to afford it, thus BRi (e−i ) = 0,
∀i ∈ I.
Based on Theorem 13 that determines each customer’s i, i ∈ I best responses
(t)

(t)

strategy BRi (e−i ) = ei,j and considering the quasi-concavity property with respect
(t)

(t)

to ri of customer’s utility function Ui , the existence and uniqueness of the NE of
the non-cooperative game G is derived as follows:
Theorem 14 The Nash Equilibrium of the non-cooperative consumption response
game G exists and is unique.
Proof: The NE is by definition the fixed point in the best response function set
(t)∗

(t)

(t)

(t)

that satisfies ei,j = BRi (e−i ). In the two cases, where 0 ≤ γi · pj
(t)

(t)

γi · pj

≤ τ and

0

> si (0), the fixed point of the best response function set is unique, i.e.,
(t)∗

(t)

(t)∗

maximum electricity consumption, i.e., ei,j = di or no consumption, i.e., ei,j = 0,
(t)

(t)

0

respectively. In the third case, where τ < γi · pj ≤ si (0), the uniqueness of the NE
point can be proved via adopting the concept of standard function [301], [302]. A
function f (x) is characterized as standard if it satisfies the following properties [223]:
1. Positivity: f (x) > 0
2. Monotonicity: if x ≥ x0 , then f (x) > f (x0 )
3. Scalability: ∀a > 1, a · f (x) ≥ f (a · x)
If a fixed point exists in a standard function, then it is unique [301], [302]. As it is
(t)∗

(t)

(t) (t)

0

shown in [223], ei,j = BRi (e−i ) for τ < γi pj ≤ si (0) (i.e., Equation 5.13) can easily
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(t)

(t)

0

be shown that it is a standard function. Thus, in the case that τ < γi · pj ≤ si (0)
the NE exists and is unique.
Finally, as we have already mentioned, the customers’ optimal electricity consumption, as this is determined in Equation 5.13 will act as input to the optimal
pricing problem, where each power company determines the optimal price.
Companies’ Optimal Pricing Response
In the first stage of the DRM optimization problem, the optimal electricity of each
customer was determined, while in the second stage each power company aims to
maximize its profit (i.e., Equation 5.5) in a distributed manner, via calculating the
optimal price to be announced. Combining Equation 5.10, 5.13, the optimal pricing
problem based on customers’ optimal consumption response can written as follows
[209].

(t)∗

pj



(t)
(t)
(t) (t)
(t)
(t)
Pj = Rj (Ej , pj ) − Cj (Ej )

"
#


X

k
1 
(t)
 = (1 − fj(t) ) · p(t)
E−i · ( (t) (t) − ) 
j ·
λ 
= arg max 
γi pj


i∈I
(t)


"
#
pj


X
k
1


(t)
(t)
− cj
E−i ( (t) (t) − )
λ
γi pj
i∈I

(5.16)

The optimal pricing problem in response to customers’ consumption, as it is
rewritten in Equation 5.16, is a function only of power company’s price.
Theorem 15 Each power company’s j, j ∈ J optimal price that maximizes its profit,
given customers’ optimal response consumption, is given as:

(t)∗
pj


=


k·λ·

(t)
cj

(t)

·

P
i∈I

(t)

(1 − fj ) ·

P

E−i
γi (t)

 12



(t) 

(5.17)

E−i

i∈I

Proof: Given customers’ optimal consumption response that is determined in the first
stage of the DRM optimization problem, the profit function of each power company
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j, j ∈ J is written as follows:
"
(t)
(t) (t)
Pj (Ej , pj )

= (1 −

(t)
fj )

·

(t)
pj

·

k
(t)
E−i ( (t) (t)
γi · pj

X
i∈I

"
−

(t)
cj

·

X
i∈I

k
(t)
E−i ( (t) (t)
γi · pj
(t)

Considering the first order derivative of Pj
(t)

(t)

(t)

∂Pj (E−i , pj )
(t)

∂pj

1
− )
λ

#
1
− )
λ

#

(5.18)

(t)

with respect to pj , we have:

(t)
X E−i
X (t) c(t)
1
j ·k
(t)
E−i + (t)2 ·
= − (1 − fj ) ·
(t)
λ
pj
i∈I
i∈I γi
(t)

(t)

(5.19)

(t)

As a result, the critical points of the profit function Pj (E−i , pj ) are as follows:

(t) 
(t) P E−i
k · λ · cj ·
(t)
γ

i∈I i 
(t)∗
(5.20)
pj = 
P (t) 


(t)
(1 − fj ) · E−i
i∈I
(t)

The second order derivative of the profit function Pj
(t)

(t)

(t)

∂ 2 Pj (E−i , pj )

= −2 ·

(t)2

∂pj

(t)
cj

·

k
(t)3

is given as follows:
·

pj

(t)

As observed by Equation 5.21, it holds true that

(t)
X E−i
(t)

i∈I

γi

(t)

(t)

∂ 2 Pj (E−i ,pj )
(t)2
∂pj

(5.21)
(t)∗

< 0, thus the pj

as

(t)

determined in Equation 5.20 maximizes the company’s j, j ∈ J profit function Pj .

5.1.6

PC-DRM Algorithm

In this section, each step of the PC-DRM algorithm is presented and analyzed, and
its pseudo code is presented as well. The steps of the PC-DRM algorithm can be
summarized as follows:
1. Initialization Phase: At the beginning of the first timeslot, (i.e., t = 0),
each customer i, i ∈ I initializes its probability vector by following a normal
(0)

distribution, thus P ri,j =

1
,
J

∀i ∈ J, ∀j ∈ J. Consequently, each customer
(0)

chooses a power company according to its initial probability vector Pri .
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2. Power Company Selection - PC: At every other timeslot t, t ∈ T, such
that t > 0 each customer i, i ∈ I chooses a power company to be served
(t)

from, according to its probability vector Pri . If ∀i ∈ I, ∃j, j ∈ J such that
(t)

P ri,j → 1, then stop. Otherwise, ite = ite + 1, where ite denotes the iteration
of the DRM part of the algorithm.
3. Customers’ Optimal Consumption Response: Given that all the customers have selected their company that they will be served from, the power
companies announce their prices and the total electricity consumption (i.e.,
E (t) ) in the Smart Grid Network. Each customer i, i ∈ I determines its optimal
(t)

consumption response based on Equation 5.13, as ei,j |ite
4. Companies’ Optimal Pricing Response: Given customers’ optimal electricity consumption. each power company determines its optimal prices based
(t)∗

on Equation 5.16, as pj |ite
(t)∗

(t)∗

(t)∗

5. Checking for Convergence: if |ei,j |ite+1 − ei,j |ite | → 0 and |pi,j |ite −
(t)∗

pi,j |ite+1 | → 0, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, then the two-stage non-cooperative game has
converged to its NE point. Otherwise go to Step 3.
6. Stochastic Learning Automata: Each power company j, j ∈ J determines
(t)

its reward probability rj , and it is broadcasted to the customers. Each customer i, i ∈ I updates its probability vector Prti based on Equation 5.8 and
5.9. Return to Step 2.
The PC-DRM learning distributed algorithm can be summarized as follows:
The PC-DRM distributed algorithm can be characterized as a low complexity algorithm (as it is also confirmed by the numerical results in Section 5.1.7), due to the
constant in terms of complex operations that are made both in the customers’ and
companies’ side. Furthermore, due to its low complexity the PC-DRM algorithm
can be installed and realized through the customers’ smart meters in a real-time
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Algorithm 6 PC-DRM Algorithm
(0)
1
1: Input/Initialization: I, J, di(t) , γi(t) , c(t)
j , P ri,j = J ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T
(t)∗
(t)∗
(t)∗
(t)∗
2: Output: NE point e = (e1 , · · · , eI ), p = (p1(t)∗ , · · · , p(t)∗
J ) ∀t ∈ T
3: for each timeslot t, t ∈ T do
4: Ite = 0, Convergence = 0
5: Each customer i, i ∈ I selects a power company based on Pr(t)
i
6: while not Convergence do
7:
Ite = Ite + 1
8:
for i = 1 to I do
(t)∗
9:
Customer i determines its ei,j based on Equation 5.13
10:
end for
11:
for j = 1 to J do
(t)∗
12:
Power Company j determines its optimal price pj
based on Equation 5.16
13:
end for
(t)∗
(t)∗
14:
if (Ite > 0 && |ei |ite − e(t)∗ |ite−1 | → 0 && |pj |ite − p(t)∗ |ite−1 | → 0, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J) then
15:
Convergence = 1
16:
end if
17: end while
18: end for

manner, while from the companies’ point of view, the proposed algorithm can run
at the companies’ management and decision-making center. Finally, in Section 5.1.7
it is shown that the action customers’ selection probabilities converge fast, something that indicates and confirms the efficiency of the stochastic learning automata
methodology, that we propose in this work.

5.1.7

Empirical Evaluation

In this Section, a detailed numerical performance evaluation and comparative study
of the proposed framework is conducted through modeling and simulations. The
results illustrate the operation, features, and benefits of the proposed demand response management framework. Initially, we focus on the operation performance of
our framework, in terms of the obtained optimal customers’ consumption responses
and companies’ prices. Moreover, the distribution of the customers to the available
companies in the Smart Grid Network is studied, and the corresponding power com-
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panies’ profit values are presented. Furthermore, the operation and the convergence
of the distributed learning algorithm (i.e., stochastic learning automata) is illustrated, while the Demand and Response Management optimization problem to its
stable solution, is presented as well. In addition, a detailed comparative evaluation
of our approach against other alternative approaches is provided, and the differences
with respect to the achieved customers’ and companies’ satisfaction, and customers’
electricity energy consumption, are discussed.
On our base experimental scenario, we considered a Smart Grid Network consisting of J = 5 power companies, and I = 100 customers. Also, we considered k = 1000,
(t)

λ = 100 and as a learning step b = 0.6, while the γi parameter of each customer is
randomly generated. Each company has constant characteristics throughout the day
(t)

(t)

(i.e, generation cost cj , and discount policy fj ), while the corresponding values
that were used are:
1. f = {.0285, .027, .029, 0.3, .028}
2. c = {.255, .245, .265, .285, .265}
Pure Operation of the PC-DRM Algorithm
At first, we focus on the power companies’ selection process, via adopting the proposed distributed learning framework (i.e., Section 5.1.4). Each power company
j, j ∈ J aims to improve its market profile by achieving a low peak to average ratio
(i.e., P ARj ) and high competitiveness (i.e., Compj ). As we mentioned before, the
low P ARj factor indicates that the power company j balances the customers’ electricity consumption over time via avoiding great consumption peaks, which may not
be able to support. On the other hand, the high competitiveness factor Compj of
the power company expresses the company’s penetration in the market, in terms of
the customers’ portion that it serves.
Specifically, Figure 5.4a and Figure 5.4b present each power company’s j, j ∈ J
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Figure 5.4: Pure operation of PC-DRM

peak to average ratio P ARj and competitiveness factor Compj as a function of
the PC-DRM algorithm’s timeslots until the convergence of the distributed learning
mechanism. Based on the considered configuration of this experimental setup, it is
observed that the power companies 1 and 5 maintain the lowest P AR and competitiveness factor Comp. Moreover, it is noted that both the P AR and Comp factors
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are determined by the solution of the DRM optimization problem, via the customers’
optimal consumption to which the two-stage game-theoretic part converges at each
timeslot.
Furthermore, Figure 5.4c depicts each company’s j reputation and competitiveness factor RCj , (i.e., Equation 5.4) as a function of the PC-DRM algorithm’s timeslots. The results illustrate that the power companies 1 and 5 build a higher reputation
and competitiveness factor RC in the market, compared to the rest, since they both
achieve a lower P AR (i.e., Figure 5.4a) and a higher competitiveness factor (i.e.,
Figure 5.4b). Consequently, these two power companies create a better profile in the
market, and the customers by learning and adapting their selection via the stochastic
learning automata methodology, they have a higher average selection probability for
these two companies (i.e., Figure 5.4d, and these two companies attract a higher
portion of customers (i.e., Figure 5.4e over the timeslots. Specifically, as Figure 5.4e
demonstrates, these two companies serve almost 90% of the market’s customers, with
company 1 absorbing almost 70%, as it achieves the highest reputation and competitiveness score, (i.e., Figure 5.4c), while company 5 with the second-best profile in
the market serves approximately 20% of the market’s customers.
Considering the DRM optimization problem, which in this work is studied via
adopting a two-stage non-cooperative game-theoretic solution, Figure 5.4f presents
two indicative customers’ optimal energy consumption as a function PC-DRM algorithm’s timeslots until its convergence to the stable customers’ association to the
power companies. As the customers converge to their stable power company selection, while at the same time they determine their optimal electricity consumption
(t)∗

(i.e., ei,j - Equation 5.11) for each timeslot by converging to the NE point of the
non-cooperative game, their optimal electricity consumption converges to feasible
values, while fulfilling their non-shiftable electricity needs (i.e., Min-consumption
curves), as a higher priority is given to them, while at the same time the customers
(t)∗

(t)

do not over-consume electricity, thus ei,j ≤ di , ∀t ∈ T. Moreover, as Figure 5.4f
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illustrates, both of the presented customers consume a higher level of electricity than
their non-shiftable demands, which confirms that the proposed framework achieves
satisfies both the non-shiftable and a portion of the shiftable electricity needs of the
market’s customers.
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Figure 5.5: Companies optimal prices and perceived profits

Additionally, Figure 5.5a and Figure 5.5b depict the power companies’ prices
and profit values’ convergence, as a function of PC-DRM algorithms’ timeslots, respectively. It is noted that Figure 5.5a refers to indicative prices units per unit
of electricity consumption (e.g.,

$
).
KW h

Based on Figure 5.4f, 5.5a, and 5.5b, it is

concluded that the DRM optimization problem converges to its final NE point, as
the association between customers and power companies converges to its stable case,
where both the customers and the power companies maximize their utilities and
profits, leading them to low feasible low energy consumption and pricing policies,
respectively. Moreover, it is worth to be noted, that company 5, which absorbs
the second-highest portion of the markets’ customers, is not the company with the
second-lowest price in the market (i.e., company 3 has a lower price), which indicates
that the announcement of a lower price by a company does not guarantee the absorbing of a higher portion of customers, as the customers select their power companies
based on their market’s profiles (i.e., reputation and competitiveness score), which
depict the overall power companies’ behavior in the market through the timeslots.
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In addition, as Figure 5.5a illustrates, the companies 1 and 5 due to their higher reputation and competitiveness score (i.e., Figure 5.4c) converge to higher profit values
compared to the rest of power companies, as this concludes to improved customers’
preference to be served by these companies as we mentioned in Figure 5.4c. Finally,
the power company 2 has not been selected by any customer (Figure 5.4c) in the
scenario under consideration, and therefore its announced price is zero and it is not
present in Figure 5.5a.

Comparative Evaluation
In this section, we provide a detailed comparative evaluation study of the proposed
PC-DRM framework against other approaches either from the recent literature or
different implementation alternatives, highlighting the benefits of the PC-DRM algorithm in terms of customers’ energy consumption and satisfaction. It is noted
that for fairness and completeness purposes in the comparison, the power companies’ profit values, as well as the convergence time of the different frameworks, are
also evaluated and discussed.
Specifically, we evaluate the proposed PC-DRM framework against to five different approaches:
1. The demand response management algorithm (referred to as Evo) as proposed
in [292], where the association of the customers to power companies is modeled as an evolutionary game and the customers form a population which is
associated with only one company, as an outcome of the evolutionary game.
2. An alternative variation of the proposed PC-DRM algorithm-referred as MLdc,
where the customers update their selection probabilities (i.e., Equation 5.8,
(t)

5.9) by using the reward probability rj =

(t)

fj

(t)
cj

, in order to capture the profile

of each power company j, j ∈ J, in terms of its announced discounts and
costs of the electricity generation. As a result, the customers select a power
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company based only on monetary-related power companies’ characteristics (i.e.,
(t)

(t)

discount fj , and production cost cj ), without considering the electricityrelated characteristics of each power company, i.e., peak to average ratio P ARj
and competitiveness factor Compj . The DRM optimization problem is solved
based on the DRM part of the PC-DRM algorithm.
3. A variation of the PC-DRM algorithm - referred as MLlp, by using as a reward
(t)

probability the rj =

1
(t)∗ ,
exp pj

which is based on the power company’s j, j ∈ J

(t)∗

optimal price pj . Specifically, the MLlp approach proposes to the customers
as the best power company choice, the one with the lowest price.
4. The Random algorithm, where each customer is associated randomly to a power
(t)

company, as each customer maintains an equal probability P ri,j =

1
J

of select-

ing each power company. The companies’ prices and customers’ consumed
electricity are determined based on the DRM optimization part (i.e., the noncooperative game) of the PC-DRM framework.
5. The best discount and cost - referred to as Bdc algorithm, which associates all
(t)

the customers with the power company j, j ∈ J that maintains the best

fj

(t)

cj

factor and the DRM optimization problem is also solved based on DRM part
of the proposed PC-DRM framework.
Figures 5.6a, and 5.6b depict customers’ perceived average utility and optimal
energy consumption, respectively, as a function of the number of timeslots that all
the comparative frameworks need to converge to stable customers’ association to
the power companies. As it is shown, the proposed PC-DRM algorithm achieves
the highest customers’ utilities (i.e., Figure 5.6a), and among the lowest customers’
electricity consumption (i.e., Figure 5.6b). This trend stems from the holistic consideration of the power companies’ characteristics, i.e., both the monetary and the
electricity-related characteristics, as these are captured by the reputation and competitiveness factor Equation 5.4. Moreover, the MLdc variation of the PC-DRM
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Figure 5.6: Customers’ utility and overall consumed energy

algorithm, which considers only the power companies’ monetary-related characteristics to perform the customers’ association with the power companies, achieves similar
customers’ utilities and electricity consumption, showing the significance of the monetary factors. This happens mainly because the monetary factors contribute in the
optimal power companies’ pricing policy (Equation 5.10) and customers’ consumption response (Equation 5.11), thus they affect the power companies’ electricityrelated factors (i.e., PAR, Comp). As a result, our proposed framework consists of
a more general and holistic approach compared to MLdc, by avoiding possible high
peaks of consumption in the case where power companies aim to attract the customers by high discounts in short-term periods, thus the sufficient satisfaction of the
customers’ is guaranteed by the PC-DRM approach in a long-term period.
On the other hand, the approaches that do not provide the opportunity to the
customers to learn from their past decisions (i.e., Bdc, Random approaches) achieve
the lowest customers’ utility and high electricity consumption. Specifically, each
customer selects its power company at a single time, by not exploring the Smart
Grid Network environment for better choices. Furthermore, the Evo [292] algorithm,
which is based on the outcome of an evolutionary game-theoretic approach, associates
all the customers to only one power company, leading in that way into a monopoly
scenario where the customers achieve significantly lower average utility, while at the

202

Chapter 5. Smart Technologies

same time their electricity consumption increases. Finally, the MLlp algorithm leads
the customers to select the power company with the lowest price, thus they tend
to consume more electricity, which creates a domino effect, as the customers’ cost
increases, and their perceived average utility decreases.

Figure 5.7: Power companies’ welfare and algorithms’ convergence time

Figure 5.7 includes comparatively, the achieved power companies’ profit values,
the average profit, and the actual convergence time (in seconds) for all the comparative approaches. As it is shown, the PC-DRM and MLdc algorithms present
similar companies’ average profit values, while the PC-DRM proposed framework
presents significantly lower complexity by achieving almost a five-fold reduction in
convergence time. This is observed, since, in an open electricity market, where the
power companies have similar monetary-related characteristics (i.e., production cost,
discounts), the customers may flip among the companies, thus the MLdc approach
has a delayed convergence. The more holistic approach of the PC-DRM algorithm,
where electricity-related characteristics are also considered, contributes to customers’
faster decision-making in selecting the most appropriate company for receiving service from. The Random and Bdc algorithms, which allow the customers to make a
single time power company selection have the lowest convergence time compared to
all the other approaches. As we already mentioned, the last two algorithms present
quite poor performance in terms of customers’ utility and electricity consumption.
Finally, both Evo and MLlp approaches to achieve similar results in terms of com-
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panies’ profit values and convergence time.

5.1.8

Summary

The joint problem of power company selection and demand response management in
a competitive open electricity market of a Smart Grid Network, consisting of multiple power companies and multiple customers is studied. Initially, a low complexity
distributed learning approach is proposed, where the customers acting as learning
automata explore the environment (i.e., market) and select a power company to
be served from autonomously. Then, the demand response management problem
- DRM, is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative, where at the first stage the
customers determine their optimal electricity consumption that maximizes their perceived utility and a stable point (i.e., Nash Equilibrium) is achieved, while at the
second stage each power company determines its optimal pricing policy that maximizes its profit. Moreover, a distributed iterative and low complexity algorithm
is introduced to jointly implement the power company selection and the demand
response management processes.
A detailed performance evaluation of the proposed approach was conducted via
modeling and simulation, and the presented results confirmed the superiority of the
proposed PC-DRM framework, in terms of the achieved customers’ and companies’
satisfaction, customers’ energy consumption, and implementation complexity.
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5.2

A Risk-aware Social Cloud Computing Model

A flexible resource sharing paradigm is introduced, to enable the allocation of users’
computing tasks in a social cloud computing system offering both Virtual Machines(VMs) and Serverless Computing(SC) functions. VMs are treated as a safe
computing resource, while SC due to the uncertainty introduced by its shared nature,
is treated as a common pool resource, being susceptible to potential over-exploitation.
These computing options are differentiated based on the potential satisfaction perceived by the user, as well as their corresponding pricing while taking into account
the social interactions among the users. Considering the inherent uncertainty of the
considered computing environment, Prospect Theory and the theory of the Tragedy
of the Commons are adopted to properly reflect the users’ behavioral characteristics, i.e., gain-seeking or loss-averse behavior, as well as to formulate appropriate
prospect-theoretic utility functions, embodying the social-aware and risk-aware user’s
perceived satisfaction. A distributed maximization problem of each user’s expected
prospect-theoretic utility is formulated as a non-cooperative game among the users
and the corresponding Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE), i.e., optimal computing jobs
offloading to the VMs and the SC, is determined, while a distributed low-complexity
algorithm that converges to the PNE is introduced. The performance and key principles of the proposed framework are demonstrated through modeling and simulation.

5.2.1

Related Work

The remarkable growth of social networks over the last decade - evidenced by the
more than 2.8 billion Facebook users and the 187 million Twitter users in 2021 has concluded to new solutions for communication networks and mobile computing.
It is predicted that by 2021, more than 67% of the overall enterprise information
technology infrastructure and software development will be served by cloud-based
offerings [303].
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The Social Cloud Computing is arising as a resource sharing framework, which
exploits the users’ social ties to improve the services offered by the cloud providers.
In [304], the trust levels among users in social networks are exploited to create
a dynamic social cloud computing environment, where the users are sharing their
cloud computing resources, creating a volunteer social cloud computing environment.
In [305], the authors tackle the problem of placing the users’ computing tasks over
multiple clouds considering the social-aware services and the users’ social ties. While
social cloud computing is still in its infancy, a new cloud computing solution is coined
by the industry, named Serverless Computing (SC), where the users’ computing
tasks are defined as a workflow of event-triggered functions [306]. In contrast to the
model of Virtual Machines (VMs), where the users are renting the VMs from the
cloud provider and the resources could remain idle in the case of sporadic requested
computing tasks, concluding to unwanted monetary cost, the SC model allows the
users to offload computing tasks to the cloud provider, who remains responsible to
manage the infrastructure and respective resources [307]. The users run stateless
functions at the cloud providers’ servers and are charged concerning the allocated
memory and the actual required CPU time of executing them [308], thus promising
a more cost-efficient and flexible model compared to the VMs. Example platforms
supporting the SC model include: AWS Lambda [309], Google Cloud Functions [310],
etc.

Motivation: However, all these efforts in social cloud computing and serverless
computing have been progressing in isolation from each other. Thus, despite the
advances that have been achieved in both these areas independently, the lack of joint
consideration and exploitation of the users’ social relation and the available VMs
and SC by the cloud provider, limits their potential exploitation and adoption in a
realistic scenario.
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5.2.2

Contributions

We aim to fill the aforementioned research gaps by introducing a risk-aware social
computing framework, which exploits the computing capabilities of the available
VMs and SC offered by the cloud provider while accounting for the users’ social ties
and their risk-aware behavior. The latter stems from the risk imposed by the shared
nature of the SC, which may become non-responsive due to its over-exploitation.
1. Each user dynamically offloads part of its computing jobs to the VMs and/or
the SC. Fixed price is assumed for the use of VMs, while a social-aware SC pricing
is considered based on the "social importance" of a user within the system. A
holistic user’s actual utility function is introduced to capture the user’s satisfaction
by executing its jobs in a specific time frame while considering the corresponding
price.
2. Each VM is characterized as a "safe resource", as it is exclusively rent by a user,
and accordingly, the user enjoys guaranteed computing service. In contrast, the SC
is typically more cost-efficient, having the potential of providing high satisfaction to
the user. Given that its computing resources are shared among many users, it is
characterized as Common Pool Resource (CRP) - Chapter 2.3, which introduces risk
in users’ decisions to offload their computing jobs to it, as it can potentially become
over-exploited. To this end, we capture this phenomenon via adopting the theory
of the Tragedy of the Commons (Chapter 2.3). The problem of users’ risk-aware
offloading decision to the VMs and the SC, is formulated by using our introduced riskaware decision-making framework (Chapter 2.3.2). Each user’s prospect-theoretic
utility function is introduced by considering its actual utility, its behavioral patterns,
and the probability of the SC’s failure (i.e., non-responsiveness).
3. The problem of each user determining the number of computing jobs that will be
offloaded at the SC and the VMs, is formulated as a maximization problem of its
expected prospect-theoretic utility, and treated as a non-cooperative game among the
users. The existence and uniqueness of a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) are shown,
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while a distributed and low-complexity algorithm is introduced, and its convergence
to the unique PNE is proven.
4. A series of simulation experiments is performed to evaluate the performance of the
proposed risk-aware social computing framework. A comparative study demonstrates
its superiority, in terms of user’s satisfaction and proper system operation.

5.2.3

System Model

A Cloud Provider (CP) consisting of Virtual Machines (VMs) and Serverless Computing (SC) functions is considered. A set of N = {1, · · · , N } users is assumed, while
a set of T = {1, · · · , T } time slots is defined, where Dt denotes the duration of each
(t)

time slot t. Each user i has a number Ji

of computing jobs that want to offload to

the CP for remote execution per time slot. In the VMs case, a user can reserve a
VM with its operating system and predefined on-demand computational and storage
capabilities, while in the SC the user executes its serverless instance as an application
in a common operating system without any control over the resources on which the
(t)

job is executed. Given a specific type of VMs, we define as λvm (Dt ) the maximum
(t)

number of jobs that can be executed by the VM in the duration Dt , where λvm (Dt )
is an increasing function of the duration Dt . Each user i aims at determining the
(t)

(t)

(t)

number λi (λi ≤ Ji ) of computing jobs to be executed at the SC, while the rest
(t)

(t)

(Ji − λi ) jobs are offloaded to the VMs.
With respect to the social aspects of the cloud computing system, we define
an overlay virtual representation of the system as follows: S = {N, E, W}, where
the users N = {1, · · · , N } may interact with each other. Specifically, the edge set,
i.e., interactions, is denoted as E = {(i, j) : ei,j = 1, ∀i, j ∈ N}, where ei,j = 1
indicates the existence of information flow from user i to user j. The weight set
W = {wi,j , ∀i, j ∈ N} is defined, where wi,j ∈ R depicts the strength of the interaction
(e.g., criticality of information) that is exchanged between the source user i and
the destination user j, while wi,j = 0, ∀i, j ∈ N such that ei,j = 0. Therefore,
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each user is characterized by its social factor fi =

ω1

P

j∈N,j6=i

P
wi,j +ω2 j∈N,j6=i wj,i
P
,
j∈N fj

where

ω1 , ω2 ∈ [0, 1], ω1 + ω2 = 1 depict the weights of a user’s interactions by acting as a
sender or receiver of information, respectively.
(t)

In the VMs case, each user is charged based on the reserved VMs: pi,vmp =
(t)

(t)

Ji −λi

(t)
λvm (Dt )

· pvm , where pvm is a fixed VM’s price [308]. In the SC case, the user is
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

charged based on its execution time: pi,sc = λi Dt fi−1 psc (λT ), where the average
SC’s response time is Dt and fi−1 shows that the more important is a user for the
social cloud computing system the greater is the incentive for the SC to assign a lower
(t)

(t)

price. The psc (λT ) is the SC’s rate of return function, which is a function of the
P
(t)
(t)
overall number of offloaded jobs at the SC, i.e., λT = i∈N λi , and is formulated
as:

(t)

p(t)
sc (λT ) =




(t)

(t)

Λsc −λT
(t)

Λsc

(t)

(t)

· psc , if λT < Λsc

 pf
sc

(5.22)

, otherwise

(t)

where Λsc is the number of jobs threshold that the SC can operationally process
(t)

(t)

during Dt . If λT ≥ Λsc , the SC’s response time is greater than Dt and the SC
"fails", thus, the SC’s price is the minimum one (pfsc < psc ). To this end, the latter
phenomenon is essentially described by the introduced concept of the Tragedy of the
Commons 2.3. In the case of SC’s failure, the user’s successfully executed jobs during
Dt are only the ones executed at the VMs.
(t)

(t)

Proposition 12 The SC’s rate of return function psc (λT ) is strictly decreasing with
(t)

(t)

respect to λT , since as the λT increases the less the SC can guarantee that the average
response time is Dt , and the lower is the SC’s price.
(t)

Actual Utility: The user’s i actual utility zi expressing its satisfaction from exe(t)

(t)

(t)

cuting λi jobs at the SC and the rest (Ji − λi ) at the VMs is formulated. This
satisfaction is captured by the portion of jobs that are executed successfully during
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the timeslot t and the user’s overall cost, as follows.
(t)

(t)

(t) (t)
(t)
zi (λi , λ−i )

Ei

=

(t)

−

(t)

pi,vmp + pi,sc

Ji

(5.23)

(t)

Bi

(t)

(t)

where λ−i is the vector of the offloading decisions of all users except i, Ei
jobs that are executed successfully during Dt , and

5.2.4

(t)
Bi

are the

is the user’s i total budget.

The Prospect of Cloud

The SC is a CPR since all the users can arbitrarily offload part of their jobs to
it and share its resources. Towards maximizing the actual utility, each user aims
(t)

at determining in an autonomous and distributed manner the number of jobs λi

offloaded to the SC, by accounting for the uncertainty of the SC’s failure due to
over-exploitation. Based on this uncertainty, we introduce the SC’s probability of
non-responsiveness.
(t)

Assumption 2 SC’s probability of non-responsiveness P nR(t) (λT ) is strictly in(t)

(t)

creasing, convex and twice continuously differentiable with respect to λT ∈ [0, Λsc ),
(t)

(t)

(t)

with P nR(t) (λT ) = 1, ∀λT ≥ Λsc .
(t)

A linear probability of non-responsiveness P nR(t) (λT ) = max{

(t)

λT

(t)

Λsc

, 1} is considered.

Other forms of P nR(t) that follow Assumption 2 can be considered without damaging the applicability and validity of the following analysis.

Risk-aware Resource Allocation under Prospect Theory
Our introduced risk-aware decision-making framework (Chapter 2.3.2) is adopted
to address the users’ subjectivity in decision-making under the SC’s uncertainty.
Following this behavioral decision-making framework, the users make actions under
risk and uncertainty regarding the corresponding payoff of their actions. Each user’s
satisfaction by offloading a number of jobs to the SC and the VMs is evaluated with
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respect to a reference point (reference dependence property). Each user’s reference
(t)

point is the guaranteed utility zi,0 that the user obtains by offloading all the jobs at
(t)

the VMs (referred to as thesafe resource),
thus, λi = 0. Therefore, each user’s i

(t)
(t)
J
Ei
(t)
reference point is zi,0 = 1 − (t)i
· pvm
(t) , where
(t) = 1 (Equation 5.23) since all
λvm (Dt )

Bi

Ji

the jobs are executed successfully during the time slot t.
To this end, as per Chapter 2.3.2, each user’s i, i ∈ N prospect-theoretic utility
is defined as follows:

(t)
(t)
 (z (t) − z (t) )αi
, if zi ≥ zi,0
i,0
i
(t)
(t) (t)
ui (λi , λ−i ) =
 −ki · (z (t) − z (t) )βi , if z (t) > z (t)
i,0
i
i,0
i

(5.24)
(t)

If the SC does not fail due to the overall offloaded number of jobs λT , then
(t)

(t)

zi ≥ zi,0 , and by appropriate mathematical derivations based on the first branch of
Equation 5.24, we conclude that its prospect-theoretic utility is
(t) (t)
(t)
ui (λi , λ−i )

=

(t)
(λi )ai (

γi pvm
(t)
(t)
λvm (Dt )Bi

(t)

−

(t)

Dt fi−1 psc (λT )
(t)
Bi



(t)

, where γi is the user’s i regulator factor, such that

−λi
(t)

)ai

λvm (Dt )

· γi =

(5.25)


(t)

−λi
(t)

λvm (Dt )

. On the

(t)

other hand, if the SC "fails", user’s i experienced actual utility zi is lower than its
(t)

reference point zi,0 , and the user’s i prospect-theoretic utility is obtained as:
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

ui (λi , λ−i ) = −ki (λi )ai (

1
(t)
Ji

−

γi pvm
(t)
(t)
λvm (Dt )Bi

+

fi−1 Dt
(t)
Bi

pfsc )ai

(5.26)

where based on the second branch of Equation 5.24, the price of the SC is the
(t)

(t)

minimum one, thus psc = pfsc . For notational convenience we define i
γi pvm
(t)
(t)
λvm (Dt )Bi

+

fi−1 Dt f ai
(t) psc ) ,
Bi

(t)

(t)

and hi (λT ) = (
(t)

γi pvm
(t)
(t)
λvm (Dt )Bi

(t)

−

=(

1
(t)
Ji

−

(t)

Dt fi−1 psc (λT ) ai
) ,
(t)
Bi

and if the

(t)

SC does not fail, then hi (λT ) > 0. Thus, considering the probability of nonresponsiveness P nR(t) of the SC, the user’s prospect-theoretic utility can be written
as:


 (λ(t) )ai h(t) (λ(t) ) with prob. 1 − P nR(t)
i
i
(t) (t)
(t)
T
ui (λi , λ−i ) =
(t)
 −ki  (λ(t) )ai
with prob. P nR(t)
i
i
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, and as the user’s i expected prospect-theoretic utility is given as (Chapter 2.3.2) :
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

E(ui ) = (λi )ai hi (1 − P nR(t) ) − (λi )ai ki i P nR(t)
(t)

(t)

(t)

= (λi )ai [hi (1 − P nR(t) ) − ki i P nR(t) ]
(t)

(5.28)

(t)

= (λi )ai gi (λT )
(t)

(t)

(t)

where gi (λT ) = [hi (1 − P nR(t) ) − ki i P nR(t) ] is the user’s effective rate of return
from the SC.

5.2.5

Optimizing Resource Allocation: Problem Formulation

Each user’s i goal is to maximize its perceived expected prospect-theoretic utility
(Equation 5.28) via determining its best recourse allocation strategy, i.e., the number
(t)

of jobs λi that are offloaded at the SC at timeslot t. This problem is formulated as
a maximization problem of each user’s i expected prospect-theoretic utility function
(Equation 5.28), as follows:
(t)

(t)

(t)

max E(ui ) = (λi )ai gi (λT )

(5.29)

(t)
(t)
λi ∈Si

(t)

where Si is the user’s i strategy space as it is defined later.
The above maximization problem can be treated as a non-cooperative game
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

G = {N, {Si }, {E(ui )}} among the N users, where Si = [0, min(Ji , Λsc )] is the
(t)

strategy space of each user i, and E(ui ) is its expected prospect-theoretic utility.
Towards solving the non-cooperative game, the concept of Pure Nash Equilibrium
∗,(t)

(PNE) - Chapter 2.1 is adopted. Let λ∗,(t) = [λ1
∗,(t)

source allocation strategies and λ−i

∗,(t)

, · · · , λN ] denote the users’ re-

the vector of all the users’ resource allocation

strategies except user i at the PNE point.
Existence and Uniqueness of PNE
The best response strategy of user i is
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

Bi (λ−i ) = arg maxE(ui (λi , λ−i )) : S−i ⇒ Si
(t)
(t)
λi ∈Si
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(t)

(t)

where S−i = ×j∈N−{i} Sj

Theorem 16 For each user i, its best response strategy exists and it is single-valued,
∗,(t)

such that λi

(t)

= Bi (λ−i ).
(t)

We adopt the notation λ−i,T =

P

(t)

j∈N,j6=i

λj to depict the total number of offloaded

jobs at the SC of all users except user i. The proof of Theorem 6 can be readily
concluded based on Berge’s Theorem [226] and the following Lemmas 9-11.
(t)

Lemma 9 For each user i the following holds true: i) there exists a value λi , such
(t)

(t)

(t)

that gi (λi ) = 0, ii) if λ−i,T ≥ λi
(t)

exists an user-specific interval Ai ⊂
∗,(t)

positive, and λi

(t)

∗,(t)

then λi

(t)
[0, λi )

(t)

(t)

= 0, and iii) if λ−i,T < λi

there

such that all user’s best responses are

(t)

+ λ−i,T ∈ Ai .

The proof of Lemma 9 is directly emanated from the proof of Lemma 1 .
Lemma 10 The best response λ∗i , ∀i ∈ N is single-valued ∀λ−i,T ∈ [0, Λsc ].
Proof : Based on Lemma 9 we know that ∀λi > 0 such that λi + λ−i,T ∈ Ai , we have
gi (λT ) > 0 and

∂gi (λT )
∂λT

< 0, where λT = λi + λ−i,T . Also, since gi (λT ) is concave

in interval Ai (Lemma 9), the user’s i expected prospect-theoretic utility is concave,
i.e.,

∂ 2 E(ui )
∂λ2i

= λai i ∂

2g

i (λT )
∂λ2T

+ 2ai λiai −1 + ai (ai − 1)λai i −2 gi (λT ) < 0. As a result, since any

best response λ∗i satisfies λ∗i + λ−i,T ∈ Ai , λ∗i is an argument of maximum of E(ui ),
and therefore is unique.
Lemma 11 The user’s best response λ∗i : S−i ⇒ Si is continuous for λ−i ∈ S−i .
The proof of Lemma 11 is derived based on Berge’s Theorem [226] and Lemma 10,
and is directly emanated from the proof of Lemma 3.
Theorem 17 A Pure Nash Equilibrium λ∗ = [λ∗1 , · · · , λ∗N ] of the non-cooperative
game G = [N, {Si }, {E(ui )}] exists.
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Proof : The strategy set Si is a convex compact subset of the Euclidean space and
so is the joint strategy space, S = S1 × · · · × SN ⊂ RN . By defining a mapping
T : S → S such that T (λ1 , · · · , λN ) = (λ∗1 , · · · , λ∗N ), from Lemma 10, T is singlevalued and from Lemma 11 is continuous. Brouwer’s fixed point theorem guarantees
the existence of a strategy profile s = {λ∗i }i∈N ∈ S that is invariant under the best
response mapping and therefore is a PNE of G [226].
Lemma 12 The function di (λT ) =
∀λT ∈ Ai .

−ai gi (λT )
∂gi (λT )
∂λT

is strictly decreasing with respect to λT ,

Proof : The first-order derivative of di (λT ) is

∂di (λT )
∂λT

(

= −ai

∂gi (λT ) 2
∂ 2 gi (λT )
) −gi (λT )
∂λT
∂λ2
T
∂gi (λT ) 2
( ∂λ
)
T
∂ 2 gi (λT )
∂λ2T

When λT ∈ Ai , based on Lemma 9 it holds true that gi (λT ) > 0 and
therefore it hollows directly that

∂di (λT )
∂λT

.

≤ 0,

< 0, ∀λT ∈ Ai

Theorem 18 The Pure Nash Equilibrium of the non-cooperative game G is unique.
Proof : We use the notation λ∗T to denote the total offloaded number of jobs at the
SC at the PNE of game G. The proof of Theorem 18 is based on the reduction
to absurdity. Let λ∗T (1) , λ∗T (2) be two distinct PNE points. Without loss of general∆

ity we assume that λ∗T (2) > λ∗T (1) . We define the set Sup = {i ∈ N : λ∗T < λi },
thus it includes every user that offloads a non-zero number of jobs at the SC.
P
P
Thus, Sup2 ⊂ Sup1 . Also, we have j∈Sup1 dj (λ∗T (1) ) = λ∗T (1) , j∈Sup2 dj (λ∗T (2) ) =
P
P
P
λ∗T (2) . So, j∈Sup2 dj (λ∗T (1) ) + j∈Sup1 \Sup2 dj (λ∗T (1) ) = λ∗T (1) ⇒ j∈Sup2 dj (λ∗T (1) ) ≤
P
∗
∗
λ∗T (1) < λ∗T (2) =
j∈Sup2 dj (λT (2) ). However, dj (λT ) is decreasing, so dj (λT (1) ) >
dj (λ∗T (2) ), ∀j ∈ Sup2 , which is contradiction. Thus, λ∗T (1) = λ∗T (2) .

5.2.6

Algorithm-Convergence to PNE

Based on Lemma 12, each user’s best response strategy λ∗i is decreasing with respect
to the total number of offloaded jobs λ−i,T of the rest users. Thus, G belongs to the
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best-response potential games, and therefore the sequential best response dynamics
converge to the PNE [228]. Each user i first receives the total number of offloaded jobs
of the rest users, i.e., λ−i,T , in order to compute its best response λ∗i and it determines
if λ∗i = 0, thus, whether gi (λ−i,T ) ≤ 0 and

∂gi (λT )
|λT =λ−i,T
∂λT

< 0 holds true (conditions

stemming from Lemma 9). If the user i finds that λ−i,T < λi , then its λ∗i exists
and is single-valued (Theorem 16). Specifically, due to the existence of the unique
root of

∂E(ui )
∂λi

= 0, and considering that

decreasing (i.e.,

∂ 2 E(ui )
∂λ2i

∂E(ui )
∂λi

is a continuously differentiable and

< 0, Lemma 10) with respect to λi , then the unique root ri∗

can be found via binary search into [0, Λsc ] with an approximation  → 0, and finally
user’s i best response to be λ∗i = min(Ji , ri∗ ). The complexity of the binary search
is O(log2 Λsc ). In each iteration of the sequential best response dynamics, only one
user i determines its best response strategy via executing arithmetical calculations
(Algorithm 7). By denoting as Ite the number of iterations that are needed for
convergence to the PNE, the complexity of the Algorithm 7 is O(N ∗ Ite ∗ log2 Λsc ).
It is noted that the execution time of Algorithm 1 scales very well with respect to
the number of users, as it is presented in the Empirical Evaluation.

5.2.7

Empirical Evaluation

In this section, we provide detailed numerical results to illustrate the performance
of the proposed approach in terms of the following aspects: basic operation of our
framework, scalability, and framework’s behavior under heterogeneous users in terms
of loss aversion parameter ki . Finally, a comparative evaluation of our approach
against alternative resource allocation techniques is provided.
In our study, the duration of each timeslot is Dt = 1sec and the price of reserving
a VM for Dt is pvm = 10, while the SC’s price per unit of time is psc = 0.3 and
pfsc = 0.2 [308]. The maximum number of jobs that can be executed by an VM
(t)

instance during Dt is λvm = 10. A directed social network is created with random
(t)

topology and 100 users, where each user has Ji ∈ [400, 1000] number of jobs. Each
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Algorithm 7 Distributed Algorithm for Convergence to PNE
1: Input/Initialization: S, Dt , fi , psc , pfsc , Λsc , pvm , λvm

Ite = 0, λi ∈ [0, min(Ji , Λsc )], ∀i ∈ N
2: Output: PNE profile λ∗ = [λ∗1 , · · · , λ∗N ]
3: while PNE not reached do
4:

Ite = Ite + 1

5:

for i = 1 to N do

6:

User i receives the λ−i,T

7:

if (gi (λ−i,T ) ≤ 0 &&

8:

∂gi (λT )
|λT =λ−i,T
∂λT

< 0) then

λ∗i = 0

9:

else

10:

ri∗ = BinarySearch([0, Λsc ], ),  → 0

11:

λ∗i = min(Ji , ri∗ )

12:

end if

13:

end for

14:

Check convergence to PNE

15: end while
(t)

user is associated with its social factor fi . For the SC, we have Λsc = 10%×

P

(t)

i∈N

Ji .

Unless otherwise stated, we assume homogeneous users with parameters ai = 0.2,
ki = 5.

Pure Operation of the Proposed Framework
Figure 5.8a illustrates the average number of offloaded jobs to the SC (left vertical
axis) and the average expected prospect theoretic utility (right vertical axis expressed
in logarithmic scale), as a function of the iterations (low horizontal axis) and the
execution time (upper horizontal axis). Figure 5.8b presents the overall number of
jobs at the SC (left vertical axis) and the SC’s probability of non-responsiveness
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Figure 5.8: Pure operation

(right vertical axis), while in the contained sub-figure the corresponding SC’s pricing
is depicted. From the results in Figure 1a and Fig 1b, we confirm that starting from a
random initial strategy, as the time evolves the algorithm converges to a stable point
(i.e. unique PNE point), where each user has determined its best response strategy.
Throughout this evolving process and till we reach the PNE point, the users either
offload a larger number of jobs at the SC in order to increase their expected prospect
theoretic utility, or they follow an opposite resource allocation strategy, i.e., a lower
number of jobs at the SC, when the SC’s probability of non-responsiveness increases.
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Figure 5.9: Scalability Evaluation - Increased number of users

Figure 5.9 illustrates each user’s average number of offloaded jobs at the SC (and
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the sub-figure presents the total number of jobs at the SC) and the average expected
prospect theoretic utility with respect to the number of users. As the number of users
increases, the SC becomes more congested (increased total number of offloaded jobs
at the SC - contained sub-figure in Figure 5.9a), while each user offloads a smaller
number of jobs, since its incentive is reduced due to the higher SC’s probability
of non-responsiveness (Figure 5.9b), while experiencing a lower expected prospect
theoretic utility (Figure 5.9a). Figure 5.9b shows the actual required time for our
algorithm to converge to the PNE. As observed from the results our algorithm’s
execution time presents sub-linear behavior with respect to the number of users and
is well aligned with our scalability analysis.
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Figure 5.10: Loss Aversion impact study

The impact of users’ heterogeneous loss aversion prospect theoretic behavior on
the achievable performance is studied. In particular, in Figure 5.10a and Figure
5.10b we compare a scenario of heterogeneous users, where each user is associated
with a different personalized loss aversion index ki , against a homogeneous scenario
where all users assume the same exactly loss aversion parameter km . For fairness in
the comparison we consider that km is equal to the average loss aversion parameter
value of all the members of the heterogeneous group. It is noted that the more loss
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averse is the users’ behavior (higher loss aversion parameter), the less number of
jobs they offload at the SC (Equation 5.28). The opposite holds true for the risk
seeking users, which may lead the SC to "failure", thus the users’ expected prospect
theoretic utility will decrease.
Indeed, based on Figure 5.10a and Figure 5.10b, the heterogeneous users led the
system to higher congestion levels, as there is an increase in the average number
of offloaded jobs at the SC and a decrease in the SC’s pricing psc (λT ) (Eq.5.22).
However, in our case, Figure 3a illustrates that the increase of the average number
of offloaded jobs at the SC led the heterogeneous users to achieve a higher average
expected prospect theoretic utility compared to the homogeneous case.
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Figure 5.11: Comparative Evaluation - Impact of users’ behavior

We present a comparative study of our proposed theoretic framework (that assumes prospect theoretic (pt) users) with five other alternatives, assuming user behaviors as follows: (a) non prospect theoretic (npt) users, but expected actual utility
E(zi (λi , λ−i )) maximizers instead, taking into account the SC’s probability of nonresponsiveness, (b) actual utility maximizers (ut) users, where each user maximizes
its actual utility (Equation 5.23) without considering the SC’s probability of nonresponsiveness, (c) social (soc) users, where each user based on its social factor fi
offloads fi ∗ Ji number of jobs at the SC, (d) (sp) users where each user i offloads all
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of its jobs Ji at the SC, and (e) (vm) users where each user offloads all of its jobs Ji
at the VMs.
The comparative evaluation is performed in terms of: (i) the expected actual
utility, (Figure 5.11a), (ii) SC’s probability of non-responsiveness (Figure 5.11b), and
(t)

(iii) users’ average normalized pricing, i.e.,

(t)

pi,vmp +pi,sc
(t)

Bi

(Figure 5.11c). In particular,

Figure 5.11a shows that both (pt) and the (npt) frameworks achieve a higher average
actual expected utility (with (pt) slightly outperforming) compared to the rest of the
approaches, due to the realistic consideration of the system’s uncertainty (through
the SC’s probability of non-responsiveness). Both the (ut) and the (sp) frameworks,
by ignoring the SC’s probability of non-responsiveness, lead the SC to "failure",
i.e., P nR(λT ) = 1 (Figure 5.11b), and therefore these two approaches conclude to a
lower user average actual expected utility compared to the (pt) and the (npt) (Figure
5.11a). Please note that although the (ut) approach leads the SC to "failure", the
users still offload part of their jobs at the VMs, and therefore achieve a positive
average actual expected utility, while on the other hand, under the (sp) alternative,
users achieve a negative average expected actual utility since none of their jobs is
executed successfully.
On the other hand, the users under the (soc) approach, by offloading some jobs
simply based on their social factor fi , do not lead the SC to "failure", however,
conclude to a lower average actual expected utility compared to the (ut) approach,
since they do not perform any optimization. Under (vm) alternative the SC option is
not exploited and each user offloads all its jobs at the VMs. Thus its actual expected
utility is its reference point, which is lower compared to the ones achieved by the
(ut) and the (soc). Finally, it is stressed that the (pt) framework operates better
than the (npt), achieving lower SC’s probability of non-responsiveness (Figure 5.11b)
and higher average expected actual utility (Figure 5.11a), because in the (npt) case,
each user does not follow a risk-aware behavior and determines its best response
strategy λ∗i by only considering its guaranteed actual utility, and as a result, the
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SC’s utilization is better by the (pt) users.
Figure 5.11c presents the average users’ normalized pricing for all the scenarios.
In the (sp) case, the users by offloading all of their jobs at the SC perceive the
lowest pricing pfsc per unit of time, while for the opposite reason highest price is
experienced in the (vm) case. The (soc) users perceive the second-highest average
normalized price since they offload a small portion of their jobs. Comparing the (npt)
alternative with the (pt), we notice that they present very similar performance, with
(npt) concluding to slightly lower average normalized price compared to the (pt),
since by offloading a higher portion of their jobs at the SC, they perceive a lower
price from the SC.
The same holds for the (ut) users, who offload a larger number of jobs at the SC
compared to the (pt) and (npt) users (Figure 5.11b), and as a result, they perceive
the second-lowest average normalized price (Figure 5.11c).

5.2.8

Summary

A novel risk-based distributed approach, towards determining each user’s computing
tasks optimal allocation strategy, in a social cloud computing environment offering both options of VM and SC computing, is designed. Based on the properties
of Prospect Theory and the theory of The Tragedy of the Commons, we take into
account the loss-averse and gain-seeking behavior of the users, as well as the uncertainty introduced due to the shared nature of the SC model. To address the
decision-making problem at hand, a non-cooperative game is formulated among the
users, where the goal of each user is to maximize its perceived expected prospect
theoretic utility. The existence and uniqueness of the non-cooperative game’s PNE
are proven, and a distributed low-complexity algorithm that converges to the PNE
is devised. Detailed numerical results were presented highlighting the performance
benefits of our proposed approach.
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Chapter 6
Simulation and Emulation
Environment
In this chapter, the software libraries and platforms that were used in this dissertation
towards developing scientific and robust simulation and emulation environments for
the described empirical evaluations, are presented and described. The empirical evaluations were developed in Python [311], and in the programming platform MATLAB
[312]. In particular, the simulation environments were developed in Python through
the utilization of software libraries such as NumPy [313], SciPy [314], Pandas [315],
Matplotlib [316], and PyTorch [317].
• NumPy is the fundamental package for scientific computing in Python. It
is a Python library that provides a multidimensional array object, various
derived objects (such as masked arrays and matrices), and an assortment of
routines for fast operations on arrays, including mathematical, logical, shape
manipulation, sorting, basic linear algebra, basic statistical operations, and
random simulation.
• SciPy is a scientific library for Python for mathematics, science and engineering.
The SciPy library depends on NumPy, which provides convenient and fast N-
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dimensional array manipulation. It provides many user-friendly and efficient
numerical practices such as routines for numerical integration and optimization.
• Pandas is a Python package that was utilized for data processing, as it provides
fast, flexible, and expressive data structures designed to make working with
structured (tabular, multidimensional, potentially heterogeneous) and time series data both easy and intuitive. Generally, Pandas aims to be the fundamental
high-level building block for doing practical, real world data analysis in Python.
• Matplotlib is a comprehensive library for creating static, animated, and interactive visualizations in Python, and was used as our main software option for
generating and illustrating our empirical evaluations.
• PyTorch is an open source Machine Learning library based on the Torch library,
primarily developed by Facebook’s AI Research lab. PyTorch was used in this
dissertation for the development of Deep Reinforcement Learning , Supervised,
Unsupervised, and Probabilistic models that were used either as our introduced decision-making frameworks and approaches, or for emulating the users’
behavioral patterns (e.g., risk-aware attitudes) based on publicly available user
data.
Our emulation environment was mainly developed in the programming platform
MATLAB. In particular, the MATLAB toolbox for Wireless Communication was
used for emulating concepts of over-the-air signals, whereas the Reinforcement Learning toolbox was utilized towards training policies using look-up tables, and for implementing the proposed decision-making frameworks. The considered and studied
environments, e.g., Mobile Edge Computing, were designed and emulated through
the MATLAB Simulink toolbox. Finally, the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox was
utilized for finding parameters that minimize or maximize our introduced objectives
with respect to the described constraints of the autonomous computing systems.
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Chapter 7
Future Work
Our work thus far suggests several avenues for further research. Based on our results,
we believe that our introduced autonomous decision-making frameworks can be extended to real-time applications that are characterized by resource-constrained computing systems and shared resources. Furthermore, we believe that our introduced
theory and approaches that incorporate humans’ behavioral characteristics, riskaware attitudes, and propose more efficient and realistic equilibrium points for noncooperative games, could serve as the underlying intelligence of resource-constrained
computing systems designed to provide daily personalized assistance to their owners.
In particular, part of our current and future work includes the extension of the
introduced autonomous decision-making frameworks for Mobile Edge Computing
(MEC). The uncertain mobility of mobile devices (users), and their stochastic computation demands alongside the dynamic network and computation conditions of
the MEC environment, arise additional key themes. In particular, mobile devices’
decision-making regarding MEC servers’ selection to perform their computation offloading, under the setting of a multiple MEC servers environment, and the required
computation and communication resource allocation influence their experienced completion latency and energy consumption for their applications. Towards this direction, in the following chapter, we present our current research work, which could be
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considered as an extension of the introduced decision-making frameworks in Chapter
3. Specifically, the combined problem of mobile users’ association to MEC servers,
and mobile users’ computation offloading problem, are investigated jointly and addressed through a two-stage Deep Reinforcement Learning and risk-aware framework.

7.1

A Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach for
Risk-aware Orchestration in MEC

A full-fledged risk-aware orchestration of multiple mobile users is proposed for the
setting of a stochastic and dynamic multiple MEC servers environment. The proposed framework consists of two stages, thus the mobile users association to MEC
servers (first stage), and mobile users’ computation offloading to the corresponding MEC servers (second stage). The mobile users association to MEC servers over
the long time horizon is formalized as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) and is
performed through an SDN controller that acts as a DRL decision-making agent
(DRL-SDN) empowered with a powerful function approximator (neural network).
The DRL-SDN agent trains its neural network in an online fashion towards approximating the optimal Q-values (Chapter 2.2), by exploiting its perceived feedback
from the environment. The DRL-SDN agent associates the mobile users to the MEC
servers through a stochastic -greedy policy, which is adjusted over time, and the
DRL-SDN agent determines an optimal association policy that optimizes the mobile
user’s perceived cumulative completion latency and energy consumption over the
long time horizon. Each cluster of a MEC server and the associated mobile users is
treated independently, and the mobile users’ computation offloading is performed under the consideration of the MEC server’s computing uncertainty (Chapter 3), and
through the introduced distributed algorithm for convergence to the unique Pure
Nash Equilibrium point (Algorithm 2 in Chapter 3.5).
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7.1.1

Contributions

Towards extending our introduced decision-making frameworks in Chapter 3, we incorporate mobile users’ behavioral factors in both mobile users’ association with the
MEC servers and mobile users computation offloading problem. The two problems
are decoupled and addressed through a two-stage approach over the long time horizon, and through the consideration of a DRL-SDN enabled MEC framework. The
main contributions are summarized below:
1. A stochastic and dynamic multiple mobile users and multiple MEC servers environment is considered. The joint problem of mobile users’ association to MEC
servers, alongside the former’s computation offloading after the association, is considered. In contrast with the vast majority of the research literature (Chapter 3.1)
the two problems are decoupled. The latter allows us to investigate the considered
joint problem under a more realistic setting compared to the already adopted environments in Chapter 3, where the mobile users’ characteristics and demands, as long
as the MEC servers’ key computing attributes change stochastically over time.
2. The joint problem is studied over the long time horizon, thus over multiple timeslots, and the mobile users’ association to the MEC servers is formulated as a Markov
Decision Process (MDP) [97]. The latter problem is handled by a centralized Deep
Reinforcement Learning (DRL) SDN controller, i.e., DRL-SDN agent, that is empowered with a powerful function approximator (neural network). The DRL-SDN
agent seeks an optimal association policy through online training, which optimizes
the mobile user’s long-term cumulative perceived completion latency and energy
consumption by offloading parts of her applications to the MEC servers over the
considered timeslots.
3. The DRL-SDN agent’s neural network is utilized as a Deep Q-Network (DQN)
(Chapter 2.2) and approximates the optimal Q-values, from which an optimal association policy is implicitly defined. At each timeslot, during the first stage, the mobile
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user’s information, e.g., mobility, application’s demands, risk-aware characteristics,
and the MEC servers’ computing characteristics constitute the mobile user’s state
representation, and is used as input to the DRL-SDN agent’s DQN. The Q-values of
the actions is determined as the output of the DQN, where the actions are all the
different MEC servers, i.e., association options. The Q-value of each action expresses
the mobile user’s expected perceived cumulative completion latency and energy consumption after being associated with the particular MEC server. The DRL-SDN
agent uses the Q-values and associates the mobile user to a MEC server through its
-greedy policy [62], which is adjusted over time and expresses the DRL-SDN agent’s
trade-off between exploration and exploitation.
4. After each mobile user’s association to a MEC server, each cluster of MEC server
and associated mobile users is treated independently, and the latter’s computation
offloading constitutes the second stage of the proposed approach. Each mobile user
can offload an arbitrarily part of its application to the MEC server that has been
associated with. Given the computing uncertainty of each MEC server that mainly
stems from the latter’s shared nature and limited computation and storage capabilities, each MEC server is treated as a Common Pool of Resources (CPR). The
inherited computing uncertainty is captured through Prospect Theory, where each
mobile user’s perceived completion latency and the energy consumption is formulated in a probabilistic manner (expected prospect-theoretic utility), and through
the mobile user’s risk-aware characteristics’ consideration. Each mobile user’s computation offloading decision-making that optimizes its expected prospect-theoretic
utility is formulated as a non-cooperative game among the MEC server’s associated
mobile users. A distributed decision-making framework (Algorithm 3.5.3 in Chapter
3) is utilized for converging to the unique Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) point of the
non-cooperative game.
5. Each mobile user after performing its computation offloading, receives her actual
overall completion latency and energy consumption. The latter constitutes the DRL-
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SDN agent’s corresponding associated reward for its action, thus for associating the
mobile user with the particular MEC server. The DRL-SDN agent stores its observed
interactions for each mobile user in the form (state, action, next state, reward) into
a single replay memory buffer.
6. The DRL-SDN agent’s online training consists of randomly sampled batches of
interactions from the replay memory buffer, which are used for evaluating the Temporal Difference Loss function (Equation 2.28), whose gradient is used for updating
the DQN’s parameters through gradient descent. The updating of the DQN’s parameters with the use of interactions of different mobile users better exploits the power
of neural networks and defines an additional generalization dimension over the mobile users. The latter constitutes another differentiation of our work with the vast
majority of the research literature, which commonly assumes that each mobile user’s
device act as an RL agent that is trained on its observed interactions. Despite that,
the consideration of a centralized DRL-SDN controller addresses the latter commonly
made assumption, which may not be realistic in a variety of networking scenarios
[318], due to each mobile user’s device’s limited energy availability and computing
capability.
7. A series of experiments are performed to evaluate the performance and the inherent attributes of the proposed DRL-SDN-enabled MEC framework that addresses
the problem of the mobile users’ association with the MEC servers and mobile users’
computation offloading problem under the setting of a dynamic and stochastic environment. A comparative study demonstrates its superiority and benefits, in terms
of the mobile user’s perceived overall completion latency and energy consumption
throughout the long-time horizon.
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Figure 7.1: DRL-SDN enabled MEC environment

7.1.2

System Model

A DRL-SDN enabled multiple MEC servers and multiple mobile users system, as
shown in Fig. 7.1, is considered. Following the existing literature in MEC (Chapter
3.1), the MEC servers could be located at the Macro Base Stations (MBSs) of the
macrocells or the Access Points (APs) of the small cells, e.g., femtocells [176, 179].
The whole operation of the examined system is divided into time slots (e.g., different
time points throughout a day), where T = {1, · · · , t, · · · , T } denotes their corresponding set. At each time slot, each mobile user’s association with a MEC server
is performed by the SDN controller, which exploits the mobile user’s and MEC environment’s information, and acts as a Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) agent
with a global view of the considered system. As a result, after each mobile user’s
association with a MEC server through the DRL-SDN agent, each MEC server has
been associated with a cluster of mobile users. Moreover, regarding mobile users’
computation offloading, we adopt the described setting in Chapter 3.5, thus each
mobile user is assumed able to offload part of her application to the MEC server that
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has been associated with, whereas the remaining part of her application is processed
locally at her device.
In our model, we denote by U = {1, · · · , i, · · · , U } the set of mobile users, and
with S = {1, · · · , s, · · · , S} the set of MEC servers in the system. We further denote
by Ati = (Bit , φti ) the mobile user’s i application at timeslot t, which is characterized
by: a) Bit the amount of the inputs bits (data to be processed), and b) φti · Bit the
]. In particular, φti > 0 describes the level of
required Cpu-Cycles, where φti [ Cpu-Cycles
bit
the mobile user’s Ati computing intensity, and a higher value of φti expresses a more
computing demanding application. Furthermore, at each time slot t, each mobile
user’s local device is characterized by a limited energy availability ēti (associated
with the actual device’s remaining battery), which decreases over time slots, thus
ēti > ēt+1
i , as we do not consider any energy harvesting capability for the mobile
user’s device.
At each time slot t ∈ T , after the mobile users’ association with the MEC servers
through the DRL-SDN agent, a cluster of mobile users denoted as Ust , where Ust ⊆ U,
is associated with the MEC server s ∈ S, while with αit we denote the mobile user’s
i MEC sever s that has been associated with, thus αit ∈ S, and αit = s, ∀i ∈ Us . In
this work, following the recent existing literature in MEC, we study mobile users’
computation offloading under the setting of partial offloading. In other words, as in
Chapter 3, mobile users’ applications can be arbitrarily partitioned into subsets of
any size, so mobile user i is able to offload a part bti,s ∈ [0, Bit ] of hers application Ati
to the MEC server s, where s = αit , for remote execution, and keep the remaining
part (Bit − bti,s ) for local processing. As a result, we have bti,s = 0 if mobile user i
decides to compute its whole application Ati locally. We adopt the computation and
communication models that were introduced in Chapter 3.5, and for clarity purposes,
a summarized description of them is given in the following. Moreover, for the rest
of the analysis regarding mobile users computation offloading, we drop the time slot
notation t for notational convenience since the same hold true ∀t ∈ T .
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Communication Model We consider a typical interference limited communication environment, where each MEC server s ∈ S operates and receives data over
a dedicated communication link [319], thus each mobile user i that is associated
with the MEC server s, while transmitting hers data bi,s senses the interference
P
j∈Us ,j6=i pj,s · gj,s from the mobile users Us , who are the ones associated and transmitting to the same MEC server s, thus aj = s, ∀j ∈ Us . The communication channel
gain between the mobile user i and the MEC server s is denoted by gi,s , and pi,s is
the mobile user’s i transmission power to offload hers data bi,s to MEC server s.
Moreover, given the bandwidth Ws allocated to to MEC server’s s communication
link, the mobile user’s i achievable data rate, while offloading hers bi,s is given as:
Ri,s = Ws · log (1 +

σ02

p ·g
P i,s i,s
)
+ j∈Us ,j6=i pj,s · gj,s

(7.1)

, where σ02 indicates the variance of the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) of
the MEC server s. To this end, mobile user i by offloading bi,s amount of data to
the MEC server s experiences an overhead consisting of the transmission latency of
the data
l,tr
=
Oi,s

bi,s
[sec]
Ri,s

(7.2)

, and the corresponding transmission energy consumption
e,tr
Oi,s
=

bi,s · pi,s
[J]
Ri,s

(7.3)

Computing Model We assume that each MEC server s ∈ S is empowered with a
strong computing resource, e.g., high-speed CPU, and is able to process the received
offloaded data in parallel. Moreover, each MEC server’s s computing capability is
limited by the total amount of data Bs that can process at the same time, e.g., due to
either limited memory storage or finite multi-core architecture, as this was described
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in Chapter 3.5. The computing capability of each MEC server s, which is denoted
by f¯s [ Cpu-Cycles
], is shared among the mobile users Us , thus the ones that have been
sec
associated and offload parts of their applications to this MEC server s. As a result,
each mobile user i ∈ Us perceives a computing capability by the MEC server s in
order to remotely execute hers offloaded data bi,s , and it is defined through mobile
user’s i return function fi,s (b̄s ) that is given as follows (Equation 3.31):
fi,s (b̄s ) = P

φi
j∈Us

φj

· fs (b̄s )[

Cpu-Cycles
]
sec

(7.4)

, where b̄s denotes the total amount of offloaded data to the MEC server s, thus
P
b̄s =
i∈Us bi,s , and fs (b̄s ) defines MEC server’s s production function, which is
given as follows (Equation 3.32:

 (1 −
fs (b̄s ) =
 0

b̄s
)
Bs

· f¯s , if b̄s < Bs

(7.5)

, otherwise

, where Bs is the MEC server’s s total amount of data that can process without failing its operation. As a result, each mobile user i receives a computation capability
fi,s (b̄s ) by the MEC server s, which is personalized based on hers application’s Ai
computing demands φi (e.g., mobile users with applications that have higher computing demands will receive higher computing capabilities). Moreover, mobile user’s
i assigned computing capability fi,s decreases with respect to the total amount of
offloaded data b̄s , as in a realistic scenario an MEC server s is characterized by a
threshold amount of data, i.e., Bs , that can process at the same time, and as b̄s
increases, the MEC server s becomes more over-exploited, thus the computing capability that each mobile user perceives decreases.

Actual Overhead: As a result, mobile user i receives an fi,s computing capability
by MEC server s in order to remotely execute hers offloaded data bi,s , and the
l,ex
corresponding execution latency is Oi,s
=
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[sec].
fi,s

Additionally, by considering
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mobile user’s i transmission latency (Eq. 7.2), then mobile user’s i overall latency
overhead by offloading bi,s to the MEC server s is formulated as follows:
l,tr
l,ex
l
Oi,s
= Oi,s
+ Oi,s
= bi,s (

φi
1
+
)
Ri,s fi,s

(7.6)

Furthermore, mobile user i by offloading bi,s to MEC server s, executes the remaining
part (Bi − bi,s ) of its application locally on hers device. In particular, by denoting
J
as dci [ Cpu-Cycles
], and dei [ Cycle
] mobile user’s local device’s computing capability and
sec

energy consumption respectively, the local computing execution latency is given as
follows:
l
Oi,d
=

φi · (Bi − bi,s )
dci

(7.7)

, and device’s local energy consumption is determined as:
e
Oi,d
= φi · (Bi − bi,s ) · dei

(7.8)

To this end, based on Eq. 7.6 and Eq. 7.7, mobile user’s i overall latency overhead
is formalized as:
l
l
Oil = Oi,s
+ Oi,d
= bi,s (

φi
φi (Bi − bi,s )
1
+
)+
Ri,s fi,s
dci

(7.9)

, and based on Eq. 7.3 and Eq. 7.8, mobile user’s i overall energy overhead is given
as:
Oie =

bi,s pi,s
+ φi (Bi − bi,s )dei
Ri,s

(7.10)

Furthermore, both the latency and energy overheads are of high importance in mobile user’s computation offloading decision, and in this work we are interested on
accounting both of them, as well as the emerging tradeoffs. In particular, based on
Eq. 7.9 and Eq. 7.10, we express the mobile user’s latency and energy overheads
through the actual overhead function, which is defined as follows:
Oi (bi,s , b̄s ) = wil ·
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Oil
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+ wie · i
t̄
ēi

(7.11)
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, where wil , wie ∈ [0, 1],wil + wie = 1, denote the weights of mobile user’s i application’s
Ai completion latency, and device’s energy consumption, respectively, that can be
tuned by the mobile user according to different priorities and considerations (e.g., low
battery consideration wie > wil ). Moreover, ēi is mobile user’s device’s current available energy (e.g., actual remaining battery), and t̄ is the duration of time slot t ∈ T .
The above-normalized formalization of mobile user’s overall overhead guarantees the
same order of magnitude of the two types of overhead (latency, energy), which in
principle are of different nature. Moreover, in contrast with Chapter 3.5, where a
static scenario was considered, here each mobile user at each time slot can dynamically adjust the corresponding weights wie , wil , based on her application’s completion
latency importance, and device’s energy consumption significantly.

7.1.3

Mobile Users Computation Offloading

As described in Chapter 3.5.2, each MEC server s ∈ S constitutes a Common Pool of
Resources (CPR) (Chapter 2.3), and it is characterized by a threshold amount of data
Bst (e.g., storage limitations) that is able to process at each timeslot t ∈ T without
its operation to fail. Moreover, each MEC server’s s threshold amount of data Bst
cannot be deterministically known by the mobile users, and the latter constitutes a
computing uncertainty. As a result, each mobile user’s perceived completion latency
and energy consumption by offloading a part of its application to the MEC server that
has been associated with is formulated in a probabilistic manner through Prospect
Theory, and by considering the mobile user’s risk-aware characteristics. As before,
since here we focus on mobile user’s computation offloading, a specific time slot
t ∈ T is considered, and a static association between mobile users and MEC servers
is assumed. Thus, for each MEC server s ∈ S, a corresponding associated group of
mobile users Ust is considered, where each mobile user i ∈ Ust is able to offload an
arbitrarily part bti,s of its application Ati to the MEC server s for remote execution.
As a result, the time slot notation t is dropped for notational convenience, since the
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same hold true ∀t ∈ T .

Each MEC server’s computing uncertainty to process the mobile users’ offloaded
data, is captured through its probability of failure, which is defined with respect
to the associated mobile users’ offloaded data, i.e., b̄s , as it represents the MEC
server’s s probability to fail serving the mobile users’ offloaded data due to its overexploitation of its computing capabilities. As in Chapter 3.5, each MEC server’s s
(CPR) probability of failure ps (b̄s ) is strictly increasing, convex and twice continuously defferentiable with respect to b̄s ∈ [0, Bs ), with ps (b̄s ) = 1, ∀b̄s ≥ Bs . Here,
without loss of generality, we consider a linear probability of failure function, thus
ps (b̄s ) =

b̄s
, ∀b̄s
Bs

< Bs , while ps (b̄s ) = 1, ∀b̄s ≥ Bs . To this end, the MEC server s

will deterministically fail to process the associated mobile users’ offloaded data b̄s , if
the latter exceeds the MEC server’s s computation capacity, i.e., Bs . On the other
hand, in the case where the associated mobile users’ offloaded data does not exceed
the MEC server’s s computation capacity, i.e., b̄s < Bs , then the MEC server’s s
probability of failure is not zero, but it probabilistically depends on the amount of
offloaded data that it needs to process, i.e., ps (b̄s ) =

b̄s
,
Bs

as the mobile users do not

deterministically know the actual threshold amount of data Bs of the MEC server
s, while they are making their computation offloading decisions. The latter mainly
stems from the fact that a MEC server’s s threshold amount of data Bs is time variant, as in a realistic scenario a MEC server performs a wide range of computations
[320], and not only mobile users’ offloaded data processing, thus the MEC server’s
computing capacity dynamically changes over time.

Following the principles of Prospect Theory, each mobile user’s reference point
constitutes a "safe" outcome for the mobile user, and here this reference point expresses the corresponding actual overhead that the mobile user would have perceived
if processed locally her whole application, i.e., Bi . In other words, by setting bi,s = 0
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in Eq. 7.11, each mobile user’s i reference point is defined as follows:
φi · Bi
φi · Bi · dei
+ wie ·
dci · t̄
ēi


dei
dei
1
l
−
)+
= φi · Bi · wi · (
t̄ · dci
ēi
ēi

qi,0 = wil ·

(7.12)

, where wie has been replaced by (1 − wil ).
Furthermore, mobile user’s prospect-theoretic utility function by offloading bi,s to
the MEC server s is formulated as follows:

 (q − q )αi
, if qi,s ≤ qi,0
i,0
i,s
ui,s (qi,s ) =
 −ki · (qi,s − qi,0 )γi , if qi,s > qi,0

(7.13)

, where qi,s = Oi (bi,s , b̄s ) is the mobile user’s i actual overhead perceived by the
MEC server s by offloading bi,s amount of data, as defined in Eq. 7.11, and qi,0
is the mobile user’s i reference point, as defined in Eq. 7.12. Each mobile user
i aims to autonomously determine hers computation offloading decision bi,s , such
that hers perceived prospect-theoretic utility ui,s is maximized. The real parameters
αi , γi ∈ (0, 1] describe mobile user’s i sensitivity in gains and losses (Chapter 3.5.2),
respectively, and these ones are expressed through mobile user’s experienced actual
overhead qi,s (Eq. 7.11), and hers reference point qi,0 (Eq. 7.12).
Considering the case that the MEC serer s does not fail to process the associated
mobile users’ Us offloaded data b̄s , then the mobile user’s i perceived actual overhead
qi,s is assumed lower than hers reference point qi,0 , which corresponds to the overall
actual overhead for processing the whole application, i.e, bi,s = 0, locally, as the
MEC server’s s computation capability f¯s is significantly higher compared to mobile
user’s device’s computation capability dci , thus qi,s ≤ qi,0 . Therefore, based on the
first branch of mobile user’s prospect-theoretic utility, and by substituting Eq. 7.11
h l
iαi
wi φi
1−wil
pi,s
αi
φi
1
from Eq. 7.12, we have that ui,s = bi,s · t̄ ( dci − fi,s − Ri,s ) + ēi · (φi dei − Ri,s ) .
On the other hand, if the MEC server s fails to process mobile users’ offloaded data,
then each mobile user’s i perceived actual overhead is qi,s = qi,0 +
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1−wil bi,s pi,s
,
ēi
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thus it is consisted of the overall local computing qi,0 , as the mobile user i process
hers application locally due to MEC server’s s failure, and the extra communication
overhead, i.e., latency and energy transmission overheads (Eq. 7.2 & 7.3), as initially
the mobile user offloads hers bi,s data to the MEC server s before the latter’s failure.
As a result, in the MEC server’s s failure case, it holds true that qi,s > qi,0 , and based
iαi
h
1−wl
wl
on the second branch of Eq. 7.13, we have that ui,s = −ki · bαi,si R1i,s ( t̄i + ēi i pi,s ) .
iαi
h
∆ w l φi
1−wil
pi,s
φi
1
−
−
)
+
·
(φ
de
−
)
,
For notational convenience, hi,s = t̄i ( dc
i
i
fi,s
Ri,s
ēi
Ri,s
i
considering that hi,s > 0 if the MEC server s does not fail, and we define as λi,s =
iαi
h
wil
1−wil
1
(
p
)
. As a result, by considering the MEC server’s s probability of
+
i,s
Ri,s t̄
ēi
failure ps (b̄s ), the mobile user’s i prospect-theoretic utility function can be rewritten
as:
ui,s


 bαi · h (b̄ )
, with prob. 1 − ps (b̄s )
i,s s
i,s
=
 −ki · λi,s · bαi , with prob. ps (b̄s )
i,s

(7.14)

To this end, the mobile user’s expected prospect-theoretic utility is given as follows:
E [ui,s ] = bαi,si · hi,s (b̄s )(1 − ps (b̄s )) − ki · λi,s · bαi,si · ps (b̄s )
= bαi,si · eri,s (b̄s )

(7.15)

, where eri,s (b̄s ) = hi,s (b̄s )(1 − ps (b̄s )) − ki λi,s ps (b̄s ) is the effective rate of return of
the MEC server s for the mobile user i.
The mobile user i ∈ U associated with a MEC server s ∈ S, thus i ∈ Us ⊆ U,
aims at autonomously determining hers computation offloading decision bi,s such that
hers perceived overall overhead (Eq. 7.11) is minimized. Considering the computing
uncertainty that stems from each MEC server s, and mobile users’ risk-aware behavioral attitudes under uncertainty, this problem can be formulated as a maximization
problem of each mobile user’s expected prospect-theoretic utility function (Eq. 7.15)
as follows:
max E [ui,s ] = max bαi,si · eri,s (b̄s )

bi ∈[0,Bi ]

bi ∈[0,Bi ]
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As in Chapter 3.5, the above maximization problem can be treated as a noncooperative game. In particular, considering a MEC server s, and it’s corresponding
group of associated mobile users Us , where ai = s, ∀i ∈ Us , let us denote as Gs =
{Us , {Γi }i∈Us , E[ui,s ]} the non-cooperative game among the mobile users Us , where
each mobile user’s strategy space is Γi = [0, min(Bi , Bs )], and hers perceived payoff
is the expected prospect-theoretic utility (Eq. 7.15). Towards solving the aforementioned non-cooperative game Gs , the concept of Nash Equilibrium (NE) is adopted.
Specifically, the computation offloading vector b∗s = (b∗1,s , · · · , b∗i,s , · · · , b∗Us ,s ) constitutes the NE point of the non-cooperative game Gs if and only if no mobile
user i ∈ Us has the incentive to change hers own computation offloading strategy given the computation offloading strategies of the rest of the mobile users. Let
b∗−i,s = (b∗1,s , · · · , b∗i−1,s , b∗i+1,s , · · · , b∗Us ,s ) denote mobile users computation offloading
strategies except for mobile user i at the NE point. The NE point of each noncooperative game Gs exists and is unique (Chapter 3.5.3).
Each non-cooperative game Gs belongs to the class of best-response potential
games, thus the sequential best response dynamics converge to the PNE of the game
Gs [228]. To this end, towards solving the aforementioned non-cooperative game Gs
with the consideration of each mobile user’s risk-aware characteristics, the distributed
decision-making framework introduced in Chapter 3.5.3 is adopted. In particular,
at each iteration of the Algorithm 2 the selected mobile user i receives the total
amount of offloaded data of the mobile users Us , i.e., b̄s , and the interference factor
P
j∈Us pj,s · gj,s from the mobile user j that was selected at the previous iteration
τ − 1. The mobile user i then determines the amount of offloaded data of the rest
mobile users, i.e., b̄−i,s = b̄s − bi,s , and then checks if hers computation offloading
best response is zero, i.e., whether b̄−i,s ≥ bth
i,s . The latter holds true if and only if
eri,s (b̄−i,s ) ≤ 0. If the mobile user i finds that b̄−i,s < bth
i,s , then hers computation
offloading best response b∗i,s exists and is single-valued (Theorem 6). In particular,
due to the existence of the unique root of
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∂ 2 E[ui ]
∂b2i,s

< 0, thus

∂E[ui ]
∂bi,s

is strictly decreasing with respect to bi,s , then the unique root

∗
ri,s
can be found through binary search into [0, Bs ] with an approximation , such

that  → 0, and the mobile user’s i computation offloading best response strategy
∗
). Finally, after the mobile user has determined hers comto be b∗i,s = min(Bi , ri,s

putation offloading decision strategy b∗i,s , then the total amount of offloaded data is
updated, i.e., b̄s = b̄−i,s + b∗i,s , and the interference factor in the case where b∗i,s = 0.
The latter ones are shared with the rest of the mobile users through intra-channel
broadcasted signals [319].
The complexity of the binary search is O(log2 Bs ) [229]. Moreover, given that
Us mobile users execute the following computation offloading algorithm, and given
that the rest of operations involve arithmetical calculations, the overall complexity
for converging to the PNE of the non-cooperative game Gs is O(Us ∗ T ∗ log2 Bs ),
where T are the number of iterations needed for convergence.

7.1.4

Mobile Users Association to MEC Servers: a Markov
Decision Process

At each timeslot t ∈ T , each mobile user i ∈ U must be associated with a MEC
server s ∈ S to perform hers computation offloading decision regarding hers application Ati . The mobile user’s association with a MEC server s impacts significantly
the former’s experienced completion latency (Eq. 7.9) for hers application, and hers
device’s energy consumption (Eq. 7.10). Furthermore, in a stochastic, time-variant,
and heterogeneous multiple MEC servers environment, several mobile user’s, and
environment’s characteristics, e.g., user mobility, computing demands, computation,
and communication conditions, change over time, and they constitute the mobile
user’s assignment problem not straightforward. Specifically, mobile users’ association with MEC servers can be viewed as a matching problem, whose combinatorial
complexity makes it infeasible to be addressed by regular matching theory [321].
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For that reason, many research works focus on solving the assignment problem
by considering either preference functions [322, 323], e.g., transmission power, which
drives their matching-based approaches, or through decentralized learning schemes
that utilize heuristic-crafted preference functions [324]. On the other hand, many
research works [325, 326, 327] incorporate mobile users association with MEC servers
into mobile users computation offloading problem, where the two problems are solved
and optimized jointly, but by not considering a full stochastic MEC environment due
to the complexity of the problem. The latter mainly stems from the fact that in a
realistic stochastic scenario, several time-variant factors should be taken under consideration in the optimization, which makes the dimensionality of the assignment
problem a key limitation that is not properly being addressed in the described research works. Despite that, the majority of the research works solve the assignment
problem for a single time instance, whereas the mobile users association with MEC
servers should be properly addressed over the long time horizon by considering the
underlying stochasticity of the environment, i.e., environment’s dynamics.
To this end, here we utilize Deep Reinforcement Learning (Chapter 2.2.2) towards solving the mobile users association with the MEC servers problem over the
long time horizon. Considering the unknown dynamics of the considered multiple
mobile users and multiple MEC servers environment, the mobile users’ assignment
to MEC servers could be treated as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) over the long
time horizon T . In particular, at each time slot t ∈ T , the DRL-SDN agent must
associate each mobile user i ∈ U with a MEC server s ∈ S, in order the former one
to perform hers computation offloading decision (Chapter 7.1.3). To this end, each
mobile user i and the considered multiple MEC servers constitute the DRL-SDN
agent’s environment that interacts with, and whose dynamics are unknown. In the
following, we formulate the mobile users association to MEC servers by adopting
the MDP model, and we describe the corresponding meaning to each element in the
MDP formulation, i.e., (S, A, r, ρ, γ), as these were introduced in Chapter 2.2, and
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based on our considered environment. Additionally, in the following, the indication
of the time slot, i.e., t, is included in each notion that was introduced in Chapter 7.1.3.

State space: Towards providing an effective and personalized association of each
mobile user i with a MEC server s, at each time slot t ∈ T , each mobile user i
is characterized by hers state representation sti . The latter is composed of mobile
user’s and MEC servers’ related information. Specifically, at the time slot t ∈ T , the
mobile user’s i state sti ∈ S includes the following information:
• mobile user’s position vector: vit = (xti , yit ).
• mobile user’s application’s Ati characteristics, completion latency and energy
consumption weight preferences:
cti = (Bit , φti , wil,t , wie,t ), wil,t + wie,t = 1(Chapter 7.1.3)
• mobile user’s risk-aware characteristics: zti = (αit , kit ).
• mobile user’s local device’s characteristics:
dti = (dcti , deti , ēti )
• mobile user’s transmission power vector:
pti = (pti,1 , · · · , pti,s , · · · , pti,S ), s ∈ S
• MEC servers threshold amount of data vector:
B t = (B1t , · · · , Bst , · · · , BSt ), s ∈ S
• MEC servers computing capability vector:
f̄ t = (f¯1t , · · · , f¯st , · · · , f¯St ), s ∈ S
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Concretely, we denote the mobile user’s i state representation at time slot t ∈ T , as
a vector sti = (vit , cti , dti , pti , B t , f̄ t ) ∈ S.

Action space: In each time slot t ∈ T , the mobile user i needs to be associated
with a MEC server s ∈ S, i.e., ati = s, based on hers current state sti ∈ S. As a
result, the feasible action space of the DRL-SDN agent in each time slot is the set of
∆

MEC servers, thus A = S = {1, · · · , s · · · , S}.

Reward: In each time slot t ∈ T , the DRL-SDN agent observes mobile user’s
i current state sti , and associates the mobile user i with the MEC server s ∈ S,
thus it performs action ati = s ∈ A. After that, the DRL-SDN agent receives a
reward r(sti , ati ) for associating mobile user i, whose state is sti , to the MEC server
ati ∈ A. In our model, with the objective of minimizing both the mobile user’s overall
experienced completion latency for hers applications, i.e., Ati , ∀t ∈ T , and device’s
overall energy consumption over the long time horizon T , we define reward r(sti , ati )
as follows:
r(sti , ati ) = −Oti

(7.17)

, where Oti is the mobile user’s i actual overall overhead that perceives after performing hers computation offloading decision, as this is defined by Algorithm 2 in Chapter
3.5.3, to the MEC server ati . As a result, based on Eq. 7.11, 7.12 and our discussion
in Chapter 7.1.3, the mobile user’s i experienced actual overhead at time slot t ∈ T
is defined based on if MEC server ati fails to process mobile user’s i offloaded data
bti,s (determined by Algorithm 2 - Chapter 3.5.3), and is given as follows:

 Ot (bt , b̄t )
i i,s s
t
Oi =
t
wil,t
 q t + bi,s
(
+
t
i,0
t̄
R
i,s

, if not failure
wie,t
ēi
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Transition probability: Given DRL-SDN agent’s action ati at time slot t ∈ T , the
t t
transition probability ρ(st+1
i |si , ai ) represents the probability that the mobile user’s

i state is transformed to st+1
from sti in the next time slot.
i
According to the MDP model given above, the mobile user’s association with a
MEC server can be formulated as a problem of finding the optimal association policy
that maximizes the long-term discounted cumulative reward (Eq. 2.15). Specifically,
the definition of the association policy obtained by the DRL-SDN agent is given as
follows:
Definition 9 An association policy πi : S → A is defined as a mapping from state
sti to action ati , i.e., π(sti ) = ati . Specifically, the DRL-SDN agent determines an
association action ati ∈ A for the mobile user i according to policy πi , and given
mobile user’s i observed environment state sti .
To this end, DRL-SDN agent aims to determine an optimal association policy πi∗
that maximizes the long term discounted cumulative reward (cumulative perceived
completion latency and energy consumption) obtained over the long time horizon T ,
i.e.,
"
πi∗ = arg max E
πi

7.1.5

T
X

#
γ t r(sti , ati ) = arg max E
πi

t=0

" T
X

#
−γ t Oti

(7.19)

t=0

Full-Fledged Risk-aware Orchestration

The DRL-SDN agent learns an optimal association policy πi∗ that maximizes mobile
user’s i perceived cumulative completion latency and energy consumption over the
considered set of timeslots T , by learning and approximating the optimal Q-values
(Q∗ ) through its DQN, as it is presented in Fig. 7.1. At each timeslot t ∈ T , each
mobile user’s i ∈ U association to a MEC server s ∈ S is performed through the
DRL-SDN agent (first stage). In particular, the DRL-SDN agent receives the mobile
user’s i characteristics, and by combining them with the MEC servers’ characteristics,
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it constructs the mobile user’s i state representation sti (Chapter 7.1.4). As a result,
the DRL-SDN agent, evaluates each action’s Q-value through its DQN (forward
propagation), and a MEC server, i.e., ati is selected through its -greedy policy.
Therefore, after each mobile user’s i association to a MEC server s, the computation offloading (second stage) takes place independently (in parallel) for each cluster
of MEC server s and associated mobile users Us , and through the proposed decisionmaking framework, i.e., Algorithm 2 in Chapter 3.5.3). Each mobile user i performs
its computation offloading bti,s , and perceives an actual overhead Oti , as per Eq. 7.18.
The latter is used as the DRL-SDN agent’s associated reward r(sti , ati ) = −Oti for
performing action ati , thus it is reported back, and it stored to the DRL-SDN agent’s
replay memory buffer D (Chapter 2.2.2). At each learning iteration i the DRL-SDN
agent randomly samples a batch of the form:
t+1
t
t
t
t
t
t
B = {(st1 , at1 , st+1
1 , r(s1 , a1 )), · · · , (sM , aM , sM , r(sM , aM ))}

where M is the batch size, and the Temporal Difference Loss function is evaluated
as per Eq. 2.28. The latter’s gradient, which is defined as follows:


∇θi Li (θi ) = ED (yi − Q(sti , ati ; θ))∇θi Q(sti , ati ; θi )

(7.20)

is used for updating of DQN’s parameters θi through backward propagation (gradient
descent). Finally, the target DQN’s parameters θi− are updated periodically with the
DQN’s parameters θi . Our full-fledged proposed framework is presented bellow.

7.1.6

Empirical Evaluation

In this Section, a detailed numerical evaluation is presented to study the performance
and the inherent attributes of the proposed DRL-SDN enabled and risk-aware based
framework regarding mobile users’ computation offloading and association with MEC
servers. We consider multiple mobile users and multiple MEC servers environment,
and we study the performance of the proposed framework by focusing on mobile users’
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Algorithm 8 : Association & Computation Offloading
Input: Mobile users U, MEC servers S
for t = 1 to T do
Association (DRL-SDN):
for i = 1 to U do
Evaluate Q(sti , ati ; θ), ∀ati ∈ A.
Choose action ati (-greedy policy)
end for
Computation Offloading (Mobile users):
for s = 1 to S (In parallel) do
Algorithm 2 in Chapter 3.5.3
end for
Learning (DRL-SDN):
for each learning iteration i do
Sample batch B
Estimate Li (θi ) (Eq. 2.28)
Update θi through gradient descent steps of ∇θi Li (θi )
if i%τ == 0 (τ updating period) then
θi− = θi
end if
end for
end for

association to MEC servers. Regarding mobile users’ computation offloading through
the distributed decision-making framework (Algorithm 2 - Chapter 3.5.3), indicative
results are presented in Chapter 3.5.4. In particular, our proposed mobile users’
association with the MEC servers through the DRL-SDN agent, which trains in an
online fashion its DQN towards determining an optimal association policy (Eq. 7.19)
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is evaluated concerning mobile users’ perceived cumulative completion latency and
energy consumption over the long time horizon T . Specifically, we demonstrate the
DQN’s performance for different neural network architectures, learning parameters,
while we present a scalability analysis for an increasing number of users and MEC
servers. Furthermore, we present the DRL-SDN agent’s capability to learn and
determine an optimal association policy in the realistic case of mobile users’ dynamic
entrance and exit. Finally, a comparative evaluation of the DQN is presented with
respect to different neural network designs, which have demonstrated state-of-the-art
performance in the recent RL research literature.
We consider an 1000 × 1000 grid of multiple mobile users and multiple MEC
servers network, where our base simulation scenario consists of servicing U = 200
mobile users via a set of S = 3 MEC servers, where the latter ones are randomly
distributed in the considered grid. We investigate the problem of mobile users computation offloading and association to MEC servers over 20 time slots, i.e., T = 20, that
could be considered as different time instances over a particular time window, e.g.,
day, week. Towards constructing a realistic and stochastic dynamic environment all
mobile user’s and MEC servers’ characteristics, which are included to mobile user’s
state representation sti as well, are drawn from distinct multivariate Gaussian distributions with random means and covariance matrices, which are defined per mobile
user i ∈ U, and per time slot t ∈ T . In other words, mobile user’s i position vector vit
at time slot t is drawn from a multivariate Gaussian distribution of two dimensions,
i.e., vit = (xti , yit ), thus vit ∼ N (µti,v , Σti,v ), with random mean µti,v and covariance
matrix Σti,v . As the indexing indicates, the latter multivariate Gaussian distribution
is defined per mobile user’s i position vector, i.e., (µti,v , Σti,v ) 6= (µtj,v , Σtj,v ) for i 6= j
P0
0
and per time slot t, i.e., (µti,v , Σti,v ) 6= (µti,v , ti,v ) for t 6= t0 .
Equivalently, the rest of each mobile user’s and MEC servers’ characteristics are
drawn as follows:
(Bit , φti ) ∼ N (µti,A , Σti,A )
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(ati , kit ) ∼ N (µti,r , Σti,r )
(ē0i , de0i , dc0i ) ∼ N (µi,d , Σi,d )
(Bst , f¯st ) ∼ N (µts , Σts )
∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ U, ∀s ∈ S. Moreover, regarding mobile user’s i local device’s energy
consumption (deti ), and computing capability (dcti ), are kept constant over the time
slots, thus deti = de0i , dcti = dc0i , ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ U. On the other hand, each mobile
user’s local device’s energy availability ēti at time slot t is updated dynamically by
(t−1)

subtracting from the previous remaining energy availability ēi

, the mobile user’s

i overall consumed energy for performing hers computation offloading bti,s (if any),
and for executing locally the remaining part of hers application (Bit − bti,s ) (if any).
Furthermore, regarding each mobile user’s i completion latency and energy consumption weight preferences, i.e., (wil,t , wie,t ), it holds true that wil,0 = wie,0 = 0.5, ∀i ∈ U.
However, ∀t ∈ T , t > 0, the mobile user’s i completion latency weight preference
is updated as wil,t =

ēti
ē0i

· wil,0 , where the latter physical meaning indicates that the

mobile user’s i completion latency weight preference is a decreasing function with
respect to the time slots, as the remaining energy availability ēti is being decreased
over time as well, thus the mobile user i shifts hers attention to hers device’s energy
consumption as the time pass, since wie,t = 1 − wil,t .
For all the aforementioned drawn values, as per [231, 230], we make sure that
Cycles
Bit ∈ [1000, 5000]KB, Bit · φti ∈ [1000, 5000] Mega-Cycles, dc0i ∈ [0.1, 1] · 109 Cpusec
,
P
de0i ∈ [0.1, 1] · 10−9 Cpu JCycle , ∀i ∈ U, ∀t ∈ T . Furthermore, Bst ∈ [30, 70]% · i∈U Bit ,

∀s ∈ S, ∀t ∈ T . Each MEC server’s s ∈ S channel bandwidth Ws = 15MHz
(Eq. 7.1), and each mobile user’s transmission power pti,s at timeslot t is defined as
pti,s =

dti,s
,
Rs2

where dti,s is the mobile user’s i distance from MEC server s at timeslot t,

and Rs is the MEC server’s s coverage area, which here is set to Rs = 250m, ∀s ∈ S.
t
Finally, each mobile user’s channel gain gi,s
with the MEC server s is modeled as
t
=
gi,s

1
,
(dti,s )θ

where θ = 3 is the distance loss exponent.
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Furthermore, the online training of the DRL-SDN agent occurs over a number of episodes, where each episode consists of the considered 20 timeslots, i.e.,
T = {1, · · · , 20}. The DRL-SDN agent learns the optimal Q-values, by randomly
sampling batches of the form (sti , ati , r(sti , ati ), st+1
i ), and through gradient steps towards minimizing the Temporal Difference Loss function (Eq. 2.28). We adopt the
Adam optimizer [328] as the optimization method for updating the parameters of
the DQN. In the following figures, unless otherwise explicitly stated, we demonstrate
the average cumulative reward, i.e.,

PT =20
t=0

−γ t Oti
U

for the base scenario of simulation

with U = 200 mobile users, and S = 3 MEC servers. The DRL-SDN agent associates
each mobile user i ∈ U to a MEC server s ∈ S through an -greedy policy [62], as
follows:

 arg max t
t
t t
ai ∈A Q(si , ai )) , with prob. 1 − 
t
αi =
 random
, with prob. t

(7.21)

where ati ∈ S is the MEC server with which the mobile user i is associated for
the timeslot t ∈ T , given the mobile user’s i corresponding state representation sti
(Chapter 7.1.4).
To this end, the DRL-SDN agent through its -greedy policy (Eq. 7.21), it maintains a trade-off between exploration and exploitation. In particular, at the beginning
of the training, a high value, i.e., 0 = 1, indicates a high exploration for the DRLSDN agent, as the latter is needed in order the DRL-SDN agent to receive sufficient
feedback for all the different options of associations of a mobile user to a MEC server,
and learn the unknown environment. On the other hand, as the training evolves,
the  value is decreasing with respect to the episodes, i.e., t = decay · t−1 , where
decay < 1, as the DRL-SDN agent is tending to trust more its learned Q-values
(exploitation).
Pure Operation Fig. 7.2a & 7.2b demonstrate the DRL-SDN agent’s learning
as a function of the episodes, and concerning different sizes of sampling batches, and
a different number of hidden units on each layer of the DQN. First of all, as Fig. 7.2a
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

Figure 7.2: Mobile users’ association to MEC servers: DRL-SDN agent’s online
learning

& 7.2b indicate, the average cumulative reward is increasing throughout DRL-SDN
agent’s learning, and almost after 1000 episodes, the DRL-SDN agent establishes an
association policy, through which the mobile users can experience almost a fivefold
decrease in their perceived cumulative completion latency and energy consumption
over the considered 20 timeslots. Furthermore, the DRL-SDN agent’s learning stabilizes after a certain point of episodes, as the DRL-SDN agent’s -greedy policy is
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essentially becoming a deterministic policy concerning the learned Q-values, thus the
DRL-SDN agent at each timeslot t ∈ T associates each mobile user i ∈ Us with the
MEC server s ∈ S that provides the highest Q-value (Eq. 7.21). Moreover, Fig. 7.2a,
indicates that DRL-SDN agent’s learning is more effective with sampling batches of
the size of 256, as a higher cumulative reward is achieved. Similarly, Fig. 7.2b, shows
that a greater number of hidden units on each layer of the DQN does not always
lead to more efficient learning, as the DRL-SDN agent is overfitting concerning its
learned Q-values, a well-common phenomenon for high capacity neural networks. It
is worth to be mentioned, that all combinations of batch sizes and a number of hidden
units were investigated towards tuning the DRL-SDN agent, while here for practical
purposes we demonstrate individually the cases of the batch size and the number of
hidden units. The tuning of the DRL-SDN agent, indicated the best combination of
batch size and a number of hidden units to be 256 and 128, respectively. Finally, we
did not need to perform tuning concerning the learning parameter of the DRL-SDN
agent per gradient step, as the Adam optimizer [328] adjusts its learning parameter
dynamically on each step. Moreover, it is worth to be noted that the rest presented
figures correspond to the best combination of batch size and a number of hidden units.

Scalability Analysis: Fig 7.2c & 7.2d demonstrate the average cumulative reward
of DRL-SDN agent’s association of mobile users to MEC servers, as a function of the
episodes, and concerning a different number of mobile users and MEC servers. It is
worth to be mentioned that due to the DRL-SDN agent’s -greedy policy (Eq. 7.21),
regardless of the complexity of the considered environment, e.g., number of mobile
users or MEC servers, we expect the DRL-SDN agent to exploit its learned Q-values
after a certain period, as its association policy becomes deterministic (first branch
in Eq. 7.21). Indeed, the latter is confirmed from Fig 7.2c and 7.2d, as regardless of
the number of mobile users and MEC servers, the average cumulative reward stabilizes as the DRL-SDN agent’s training evolves. Moreover, as the number of mobile
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users increases the latter’s association to MEC servers becomes more complex, as the
competition for each MEC server’s computing resources is increasing as well, and as
a result is more difficult for the DRL-SDN agent to establish an optimal policy in
that case. However, as Fig 7.2c shows the DRL-SDN agent can learn an association
policy after almost 1000 episodes, and even in the extreme case of 500 mobile users,
the latter experience almost a two-fold decrease in their perceived cumulative completion latency and energy consumption over the considered number of timeslots.
On the other hand, Fig 7.2d shows that the average cumulative reward increases, as
the number of MEC servers increases. In other words, the DRL-SDN agent can efficiently identify and utilize the increased number of MEC servers, and determine an
optimal association policy such that the mobile users’ perceived completion latency
and energy consumption decreases as the number of MEC servers increases.

Dynamic Entrance and Exit: Multiple mobile users and MEC servers environment are challenging mainly due to their stochastic nature. In the above evaluation,
we have shown how the DRL-SDN agent can train and utilize its DQN to establish an
optimal policy for associating the mobile users to the appropriate MEC servers, such
that the former’s perceived cumulative completion latency and the energy consumption is minimized over timeslots. The latter demonstrates the ability of the DRLSDN agent to learn the stochastic unknown environment, where all mobile users’
and MEC servers’ characteristics per timeslot are changing dynamically. However,
in a realistic environment, considering each MEC server’s coverage area, new mobile
users enter the considered environment, or/and mobile users exit the environment,
as they are located inside/beyond the coverage area of the MEC servers. We call the
latter dynamic scenarios, as dynamic entrance and exit of mobile users, respectively.
Here, towards investigating the DRL-SDN agent’s ability to adapt its learning for
the described dynamic scenarios, the latter is performed at a particular point of time
during the DRL-SDN agent’s online training. In particular, regarding the new mo-
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bile users’ dynamic entrance, a point of time is selected, and new mobile users that
have not been seen before by the DRL-SDN agent, are considered in the association
and computation offloading. Similarly, regarding the mobile users’ dynamic exit, a
point of time selected, and several mobile users are assumed to be located beyond
the coverage of each MEC server, thus are not yet considered in the association and
computation offloading.
Fig. 7.2e demonstrates the DRL-SDN agent’s perceived average cumulative reward as a function of the episodes, and by considering the case of mobile users’
dynamic entrance. Initially, the base simulation scenario is considered, thus a set of
U = 200 mobile users who are being served by a set of S = 3 MEC servers. However,
as Fig. 7.2 shows, a particular episode is selected, in which a set of 100 new mobile
users enter the considered environment. The notion of new mobile users refers to
the fact that the latter’s characteristics over the considered number of timeslots e.g.,
mobility, applications’ demands, risk-aware characteristics, etc, have not been seen
before by the DRL-SDN agent. As a result, as we in Fig. 7.2e, at the time of new
mobile users’ entrance, the DRL-SDN agent’s achieved average cumulative reward
is decreasing, as the association policy that was established until this point, is no
longer effective for the new considered environment, where 100 new mobile users
are included in the association and computation offloading as well. However, as the
DRL-SDN agent’s training evolves, the latter can adapt its learned association policy, and the average mobile users’ experienced cumulative completion latency and
the energy consumption is decreasing over the rest episodes. Furthermore, Fig. 7.2
indicates the average cumulative reward as a function of the episodes for the case
of U = 200 (blue line), and the case of U = 300 mobile users (orange line), where
the latter one corresponds to the case where the DRL-SDN agent starts to learn an
optimal association policy, and all U = 300 mobile users are considered from the
beginning, in contrast with the dynamic entrance case, where the DRL-SDN agent
starts to learn an optimal association policy with the consideration of only U = 200
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mobile users, and the rest 100 mobile users enter the considered environment later,
as new mobile users. As we see, in the case of mobile users’ dynamic entrance (green
line) the DRL-SDN agent at the end, can establish an association policy, such that its
perceived average cumulative reward is lower than the case of U = 200 mobile users
(blue line), due to the higher completion of each MEC server’s computing resources,
and close to the corresponding value of the case where the new entered 100 mobile
users, were considered from the beginning of the DRL-SDN agent’s training, thus the
case of U = 300 mobile users totally (orange line). As a result, the DRL-SDN agent
can adapt its learning for the case of mobile users’ dynamic entrance, and determine
an effective final association policy.
Fig. 7.2f presents the DRL-SDN agent’s perceived average cumulative reward
as a function of the episodes, and by considering the case of mobile users’ dynamic
exit. In particular, the DRL-SDN agent starts to learn an association policy with
the consideration of the base simulation scenario, thus U = 200 mobile users, and
S = 3 MEC servers. However, as the DRL-SDN agent’s training evolves, a particular
episode is selected, and 100 mobile users who are randomly selected, are assumed
to be located beyond the coverage area of each MEC server. As a result, the latter
mobile users are not yet considered in the association and computation offloading
for the rest of the episodes. As Fig. 7.2f indicates, at the point of mobile users’
dynamic exit, the DRL-SDN agent’s average cumulative reward is decreasing, as its
currently learned policy, which corresponds for the case of U = 200 mobile users, is
not yet effective for the new case of U = 100 mobile users. However, the DRL-SDN
agent in the case of mobile users’ dynamic exit (green line) can adapt its association
policy and effectively address the considered dynamic scenario, as its final learned
association policy achieves a higher average cumulative reward compared to the case
where U = 200 mobile users are considered until the end (blue line), and slightly
lower than DRL-SDN agent’s perceived value in the case where only the corresponding remaining U = 100 mobile users in the dynamic scenario of exit, are considered
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from the beginning and until the end of DRL-SDN agent’s training (orange line).

Comparative Evaluation: Here, we compare the performance of the considered
DQN against alternative DRL approaches, which are commonly considered as improvements of DQN in the RL research literature. In particular, we consider the
cases of Double DQN (DDQN), Dueling DQN (DuQN), and Dueling Double DQN
(D3QN). The idea of DDQN [329] is to reduce over-estimations by decomposing the
max operation in the target yi of the Temporal Difference Loss function (Eq. 2.28),
into action selection and action evaluation. Specifically, at each learning iteration i,
the yi in Eq. 2.28 is replaced with:


−
double
yi
= Est+1 ∼D r(st , at ) + γQ(st+1 , arg max Q(st+1 , at+1 ; θi ); θi ))
at+1

, thus the selection of the best action at+1 is performed through the DQN, and its
evaluation (Q-value) is performed through the target network with parameters θi− .
On the other hand in Dueling DQN (DuQN) [330] an alternative neural network architecture is introduced, mainly motivated from the fact that is not always necessary
for the RL agent to evaluate each action for a given state. In the considered problem
of the mobile users’ association to the MEC servers, the latter idea is equivalent to
the observation that given a mobile user’s i state representation sti at timeslot t, it
may be the case that the mobile user’s perceived cumulative completion latency and
energy consumption after that state, is not highly affected by the DRL-SDN agent’s
chosen action, i.e., MEC server.
For example, consider the case where at timeslot t the mobile user i desires to
execute an application Ati with relative small size of input data Bit . In that case,
is probable more beneficial for the mobile user i to execute its application locally
at hers device, and avoid the additional transmission overhead. As a result, in
that case, it is not necessary for the DRL-SDN agent to examine and explore all
different association options, i.e., actions, as regardless the MEC server s that the
mobile user i will be associated with, the latter will not perform any computation
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offloading. Generally, in DuDQN the DQN’s output layer is decomposed in two
different streams. The first one approximates the optimal value function of a state
st , i.e., V ∗ (st ; θ), and the second one approximates the optimal advantage function
for performing action at at the given state st , i.e., A∗ (st , at ; θ). In particular, given
a policy π the value function of the state st is given as V π (st ) = Eat ∼π(st ) [Qπ (st , at )],
and the advantage function is defined as Aπ (st , at ) = Qπ (st , at ) − V π (st ). As a
result, the DuDQN’s parameters are updated via gradient steps of the Temporal
Difference Loss function, where the only difference with the regular DQN, is that
each Q-value is estimated through the aggregation of the corresponding value and
advantage function, i.e., Q(st , at ; θ) = V (st ; θ) + A(st , at ; θ). Finally, D3QN [331] is
considered as the combination of the ideas of Double DQN (DDQN) and Dueling
DQN (DuQN).
The comparative evaluation is performed by considering the base simulation scenario of U = 200 mobile users and S = 3 MEC servers, and concerning the perceived
average cumulative reward after 1000 episodes of training, alongside with the perceived average cumulative reward on U = 200 new mobile users that have not been
seen by the DRL-SDN agent during its training. In other words, after the DRL-SDN
agent is trained in an online fashion for the considered U = 200 mobile users and
1000 episodes, then its perceived average cumulative reward is evaluated on U = 200
new mobile users. The latter is estimated as the average value over 1000 executions
of 20 timeslots, where we make sure that the mobile users’ characteristics are drawn
from different multivariate Gaussian distributions compared to the ones that were
used for the DRL-SDN agent’s training. As a result, the perceived average cumulative reward for the U = 200 new (unseen) mobile users, constitutes a generalization
measurement for each DRL approach.
Table 7.1 summarizes the corresponding results. It is worth to be noted that for
each of the above DRL approaches, the best values of the free parameters, i.e., batch
size, number of hidden units, were used, and were identified through a common tun-
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Table 7.1: Comparative evaluation of different DRL approaches
Avg. Cum. Reward
after 1000 Episodes

Avg. Cum. Reward
for 200 Unseen Users

Difference
(%)

-0.047
-0.045
-0.041
-0.037

-0.051
-0.048
-0.044
-0.039

8.5%
6.6%
7.3%
5.4%

DQN
DDQN
DuQN
D3QN

ing process concerning the perceived average cumulative reward on the 200 unseen
mobile users. For example, for the DQN approach, the best values of batch size and
a number of hidden units were identified as 256, and 128, respectively, thus similarly as in the Pure Operation analysis above. As Table 7.1 indicates, the presented
DRL approaches can effectively generalize. Specifically, the difference between the
DRL-SDN agent’s perceived average cumulative reward after 1000 episodes, and the
corresponding value for the case where the DRL-SDN agent’s learning association
policy is used for U = 200 new mobile users is less than 9%. Moreover, Double
DQN (DDQN) and Dueling DQN (DuQN) can improve the regular setting of DQN
in both the perceived average cumulative reward during the online training and the
DRL-SDN agent’s ability to generalize on new mobile users. DuQN demonstrates
the highest improvement, mainly because can efficiently explore the most promising
areas of the state-action space. Finally, the combination of DDQN and DuQN constitutes the best DRL approach, where the DRL-SDN agent learns the best association
policy for the considered U = 200 mobile users, which generalizes effectively (5.4%
difference) in the case of U = 200 unseen mobile users as well.

7.1.7

Summary

The joint problem of mobile users’ association to the MEC servers, and mobile users’
computation offloading is decoupled and studied through a two-stage Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) risk-aware approach. A centralized DRL-SDN controller
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that acts as a DRL agent is considered and performs the mobile users’ association
to the MEC servers. The latter is formulated as an MDP over the long-time horizon, and the DRL-SDN agent seeks an optimal association policy that minimizes
the mobile user’s perceived cumulative completion latency and energy consumption.
Towards addressing the high-dimensional, unknown and stochastic environment, the
DRL-SDN agent maintains and trains its DQN in an online fashion, while it associates each mobile user to a MEC server through its -greedy policy. The mobile
users’ computation offloading to the corresponding MEC server is formulated as a
non-cooperative game under the consideration of each MEC server’s computing uncertainty, and a distributed decision-making framework is adopted (Chapter 3.5.3)
for converging to the unique Nash Equilibrium point. The proposed model and approach consider the mobile user’s risk-aware characteristics in both the association
and the computation offloading. The latter comes in contrast to the majority of the
existing methods in the literature, where the mobile users are assumed risk-neutral.
Furthermore, the mobile users’ association through a centralized DRL-SDN agent
enables better utilization of the power of neural networks, and an additional generalization dimension over the mobile users. Despite that, the centralized DRL-SDN
agent overcomes the commonly made assumption by the research literature, where
each mobile user’s device is assumed capable of performing complex learning approaches, which does not always hold due to the latter’s limited energy availability,
and computing capability. Detailed numerical results were presented highlighting the
performance benefits of our proposed approach, and the DRL-SDN agent’s ability to
learn a complex stochastic environment, and effectively adapt its learned association
policy for the mobile users’ dynamic entrance and exit scenarios.
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7.2

Future Directions

Our introduced decision-making frameworks utilize Reinforcement Learning (RL) towards determining optimal policies in unknown and stochastic environments, which
are characterized by partial or incomplete information. In this thesis, we primarily
leveraged RL in its online fashion, thus the learning of the RL agents (computing systems) is performed online during their actual decision-making process. The process
of RL involves iteratively collecting experiences by interacting with the environment,
typically with the latest learned policy, and then using that experience to improve
the policy (Chapter 2.2).
In many settings, the latter is impractical either because data collection is expensive, e.g., education or healthcare decision-making computing systems, and/or dangerous, e.g., autonomous driving, healthcare. In our studied application domains,
the collection of experiences with intermediate non-optimal policies could harm the
end-user experience in a variety of different ways. For that reason, we strongly believe that Reinforcement Learning and our introduced decision-making frameworks
could be studied from an offline perspective as well, thus without iterative online
interaction with the real-world environment. The latter is commonly called Offline
Reinforcement Learning [332], and has recently started attracting tremendous research attention [333, 334].
In particular, by leveraging the information of past experiences and interactions
that could have been generated by previously developed and deployed decisionmaking frameworks, Offline Reinforcement Learning could utilize only these logged
experiences to learn an optimal policy through off-policy learning. Q-learning and
its deep learning variant DQN (Chapter 2.2) constitute indicative examples of offpolicy learning methods, since for the learning of the optimal Q-values, there is no
need of knowing the actual policy that was used to select these experiences, thus in
Equations 2.27 & 2.28 the Q-value of the best action is used as a target value.
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To this end, our decision-making frameworks could be extended in a way such
that the learning of the optimal policies, e.g., data offloading or/and association with
MEC servers, to happen offline by using logged interactions that were generated by
previously applied decision-making frameworks by different and/or the same mobile
users. The latter would hopefully lead the decision-making agents to establish an
optimal policy offline, and then apply this policy to the real-world environment, e.g.,
multiple MEC servers environment, and better improve it through the new observed
interactions. The offline learning of an initial optimal policy in contrast with the
regular online RL could avoid low-quality actions to be performed in particular states
and time instances that could harm the end-users perceived experience.
Furthermore, in this thesis, due to the actual nature of the studied applications
domains, the inherited uncertainties of the shared resources were investigated under
probabilistic models that follow certain assumptions (Chapters 3.5, 3.6, and 5.2).
We are strongly suggesting the theoretical investigation of our introduced theory
and decision-making frameworks under alternative probabilistic models that could
be more powerful and/or realistic on different application domains. The theoretical
analysis of the notions of convergence, existence, and uniqueness of Equilibrium
points, as these were provided in this thesis, would be highly important under these
alternative probabilistic models.
Finally, in this thesis we were interested in non-cooperative games, thus games
where the decision-makers (computing systems) compete with each other for the
shared resources. It would be really valuable the investigation and extension of our
proposed theory and decision-making frameworks under the principles of cooperative
games, which correspond to a different sub-field of Game Theory, as the decisionmakers are assumed collaborative instead of rational (non-cooperative games).
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Conclusions
Autonomous intelligent decision-making in resource-constrained computing systems
is complicated by the limited computing capabilities and competition for shared
resources. The latter’s’ inherited uncertainties constitute additional challenges that
need to be addressed and properly considered in the design of decision-making frameworks for resource-constrained computing systems. In this thesis, we address these
problems.
First, we model the competition of the computing systems for the shared resources
through Game Theory. The consideration of non-cooperative games allows us to
develop distributed decision-making frameworks that converge to Equilibrium points,
and do not ultimately depend on centralized and single-point of failure entities.
The introduction of more efficient Equilibrium points that are defined on the idea
of satisfying the computing systems’ requirements towards providing personalized
services, enables a realistic formalization of the decision-making process and reduces
the complexity of Equilibrium optimal solutions.
Second, the incorporation of Reinforcement Learning addresses the computing
systems’ challenge of performing decisions autonomously in stochastic environments,
and learn from their own past experiences. Furthermore, the benefits of neural networks and Deep Reinforcement Learning contribute significantly to the development
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of decision-making frameworks for complex high dimensional environments, where
regular techniques lack generalization and effectiveness.
Third, the modeling and incorporation of human awareness in the decisionmaking process of the computing systems deal with the introduced uncertainties
by the shared resources, which could be over-exploited. Prospect Theory constitutes
a behavioral model that describes human’s decision-making under uncertainty and
risk, through the consideration of risk-aware characteristics. To this end, Prospect
Theory allows us to design decision-making frameworks, based on which the computing systems mimic their owner’s behavior concerning risk, and thus optimize their
owners’ personalized goals. We detail how Prospect Theory can be incorporated in
the regular Reinforcement Learning setting through reward reshaping and therefore
provide practical risk-aware decision-making frameworks.
The work from this thesis established methodological practice and introduced
theoretical foundations for the design and application of autonomous and risk-aware
decision-making frameworks for computing systems with constrained resources. Our
introduced approaches were theoretically analyzed and empirically evaluated concerning their convergence properties, operation, scaling capabilities, and overall performance compared to alternative approaches. Although the aforementioned analysis
was performed under the prism of particular challenging applications, the proposed
theory, and approaches apply to a much broader domain.
Ultimately, our work and suggested future directions will allow for more research
intersecting Game Theory, Reinforcement Learning, and Prospect Theory towards
designing efficient decision-making frameworks for resource-constrained computing
systems that can sense their owners’ behavioral patterns and make decisions autonomously and intelligently. We believe that personalized services, and human
awareness, are notions strongly connected, and this thesis proposed theory and practical approaches towards this direction and based on these principles.
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